Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky

Summary
Criminal Manifestations of Racism and Xenophobia : Violence : Vandalism
Public Activity of the Ultra-right : Rallies and other public actions : Party formation : Other kinds of activity of the ultra-right groups
Counteraction to Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism: Criminal prosecution for violence : Criminal prosecution for vandalism : Criminal Prosecution for Propaganda : Federal List of Extremist Materials : Deeming organizations extremist : Other administrative measures
Appendix. Statistics of Crime and Punishment (in word format)[1]

Summary

The beginning of 2012 was marked by a boom in party formation, caused by a change to the law on political parties. The Justice Ministry registered a significant number of organizing committees of potential parties, including those with various kinds of nationalist tendencies. At the same time, the primary and possibly most notable nationalist unions were not in much of a hurry, while gathering regional organizational support, before going to the Justice Ministry. However, by the end of spring, almost all of them had established the necessary organizing committees.

The party formation process in general did not strongly influence ultra-right organizations’ strategy or tactics. As before, their main efforts were focused on participating in significant public actions, first of all, ones organized by the common opposition.

Ultra-right participation in the public opposition movement, which includes major rallies and marches and ‘Occupy’ actions as well, was remarkable – but their real role in managing those actions basically amounted to zero.

Moreover, most autonomous right radicals do not participate in the protest movement because they consider any contact with liberals and leftists inappropriate. For this reason, the share of nationalists as a portion of the whole mass of protesters remains small. However, the leaders of the nationalist organizations continue to use the protest actions as a means of self-representation. Their goal is to coopt the initiative from other oppositionists, and preferably to assume the key roles in leading the protest movement.

Most of the current organizers, along with a significant portion of participants, of the protest movement still consider nationalists as legitimate fellow protesters in spite of the fact that the latter do not hesitate from violent attacks against their partners. As far as we can observe, political opponents, not ethnic minorities, became the main victim group of ultra-right attacks this spring.

The shift in the focus of aggression did not change the level of the ultra-right’s criminal activity compared to previous periods. Attacks against ‘ethnic strangers’ did not stop in spite of a quantitative reduction.

For the first time since 2009, an organized gang of representatives of an ethnic minority asserted itself. It was the Kyrgyz gang Patriot, which became known after the online publication of videos picturing gang members scoffing at their countrywomen for dating young men of “other nationalities.”

As for law enforcement, it seems that officials of the respective structures have concentrated their energy on combating propaganda. Legitimate prosecution of racist violence was barely noticeable during the period. We can note only a sentence against members of the neo-Nazi group Autonomous Combat Terrorist Organization (ABTO, Avtonomnaya boevaya terroristicheskaya organizatsiya). As for sentences for propaganda, there were more of them issued than during the whole period since Spring 2011. Most of the individuals convicted were authors of various xenophobic replicas and republications in social networks and forums, that is, people who committed crimes of clearly minor danger. However, the juridical quality of prosecution has appreciably improved. The number of suspended sentences has diminished, whereas the number of people given more effective measures not related to the deprivation of freedom has risen.

The Federal List of Extremist Materials continued to be supplemented actively and chaotically. Materials were being added with the same amount and diversity mistakes as before, making the senselessness of such a monstrous instrument increasingly obvious. The ‘fight against extremism’ on the Web becomes more active, clearly, due to the growth of the federal list. During the spring, the number of warnings to Internet service providers with demands they block access to  “improper websites” has grown. Such demands vary in legitimacy, as well as in the efficiency of their fulfillment.

Prosecutors’ attempts to combat swastikas and related inscriptions on walls and fences seem more useful. Prosecutors repeatedly issue numerous warnings to municipal workers, urging them to fulfill their obligations to remove such graffiti.

We can say in general that while political nationalist organizations aim at using the protest wave in any and all ways possible, the ultra-nationalist militants remain behind the scenes at such events. Facing the activation of the opposition, law enforcement seems to consider propaganda a preferable target to racist violence, and this tendency is alarming. First, though the level of violence has reduced certainly, it has not so done so at a level that the state should lower its pressure against groups that practice violence. Second, today’s methods of combating racist propaganda can be called, at the very least, inefficient.

Criminal Manifestations of Racism and Xenophobia

Violence

In Spring 2012, at least 44 people suffered from racist attacks, with two of them killed. These numbers are similar to those of winter 2011–2012, when 35 were beaten, and four killed. In all, from the beginning of 2012 at least 74 have suffered, and four of those were killed. According to Sova Center’s most up-to-date data, during the spring of 2011 73 people suffered, five of them were killed. In comparison, during the first five months of 2011 94 people suffered, and 11 of them were killed. However, we cannot state confidently that there was a real decrease in racist violence since we receive data with a considerable delay. For instance, the Spring 2011 [2] report said that 34 people suffered with three of them being killed. A year later, the number of victims of that period that we know of became twice as high.

Contrary to expectations, the number of attacks in April (15) was not greater than the preceding (16 in March) or the next (13 in May) month. However, one cannot say that Hitler’s birthday was not celebrated among right radicals. Neo-Nazis organized the ‘White Carriage’ action [3] in electric trains from Moscow to Tver, Klin (Moscow region) and Konakovo (Tver region). Several people were injured.

During 2012’s three spring months, attacks took place in 10 regions (Moscow, Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, and Tula regions, and the republics of Bashkiria and Karelia). Moscow is still at the top of the list (13 people attacked). St. Petersburg, which had previously occupied the second place (or sometimes even the first [4]), sank to the third (10 people attacked) leaving the second spot to Bashkiria (11 people attacked).

As in the preceding period, [5] the main targets were representatives of youth and informal groups (20 people attacked). This group includes antifascists, ordinary people attending antifascist actions and the ironic Monstration that takes part on May 1, members of pickets in support of Pussy Riot, and even anime enthusiasts.

The second group – which had occupied the first place before winter 2011–2012 – consists of people from Central Asia (12 people attacked, one of them killed). Other groups consist of people from the North Caucasus (three people attacked, one of them killed), people of unidentified ‘non-Slavic appearance’ (five attacked), Jehovah’s Witnesses (three attacked), and Russians (two attacked).

Another group targeted by the ultra-right was comprised of LGBT activists., with the peak of the attacks against them coming in May. In particular, on May 17, nationalists attacked participants of the action ‘Rainbow Flashmob’ in St. Petersburg, and later buses carrying guest workers (seemingly, because they were unable to attack the buses with the action’s participants as they were guarded by police). On May 1, right radicals attacked LGBT activists who took part in the Monstration in Novosibirsk. These attacks were partly a reaction to the rousing of LGBT activists themselves, who actively protested against the scandalous law banning ‘homosexual propaganda’ in St. Petersburg in the beginning of March. [6] Policemen in Novosibirsk were loyal to the attackers, and for all intents and purposes did not intervene. This is not surprising, given the very high level of homophobia in Russian society.

In spring we also registered attacks based on religious, rather than ethnic, motives. Thus, on the night of May 29, journalist Sergei Aslanyan was attacked in Moscow. According to a theory provided by Life News, a tabloid website, the attacker cried out, “You are the enemy of Allah!”. The reason could be Aslanyan’s phrase on the Prophet Mohammad while on air with Mayak Radio on May 14, which some Muslims found insulting. [7] Investigators consider several theories, including the possibility of an attack, because of this statement.

For the first time since 2009 (after the Black Hawks (Chernye yastreby) gang [8]), an organized gang of representatives of an ethnic minority asserted itself. The group in question is the Kyrgyz gang Patriot. As opposed to members of ‘Caucasian gangs’ that attack ethnic strangers, the Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ targeted their own countrywomen as victims. They attacked Kyrgyz girls because the latter had allegedly dated men from Tajikistan. The gang became known after provocative videos were posted online (in March and May 2012) picturing young men insulting and beating girls, undressing them in the streets, demanding they answer the questions looking straight at the camera and to tell their names and addresses. One of the girls was found in Kyrgyzstan and convinced to write a report to law enforcement. (It is unclear whether it was a journalist or the girl’s relatives who found her.) After that a criminal case was instigated, and it is currently set to be transferred to Moscow, where the crime was committed. Another girl who suffered at the hands of the gang members sent a letter to Russian police and the Kyrgyz embassy in Moscow, telling them what had happened. Any details or information of other deeds of the gang are not known. However, it is significant that Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ use the same rhetoric as the Russian ‘patriotic’ youth who reproach Russian girls for “going” with “non-Russians.”

 

Vandalism

In Spring 2012, Sova Center registered at least 16 acts of vandalism in 10 regions of the country motivated by hate or radical nationalist ideology. Vandal activity has somewhat reduced compared to Spring 2011. At that time, we registered at least 22 acts of xenophobic vandalism in 14 regions. In all, from the beginning of 2012 at least 24 acts of such vandalism were committed in 14 regions. However, it is still too early to speak of a significant lowering of xenophobic vandalism during the year: the information is far from final, as in the case of violent crimes.

The vandals were traditionally the most active from the end of April to the end of May. Hitler’s birthday (April 20) and Victory Day (May 9) were marked by numerous neo-Nazi graffiti and stenciled portraits of Hitler on the walls of buildings.

Unlike in previous years, St. Petersburg heads the list of regions where acts of vandalism were registered (five cases), followed by Moscow and Udmurtia (two cases in each).

Apart from graffiti, which traditionally prevails (nine cases; we register only the most significant ones, not single swastikas on fences), in spring vandals smashed windows (four cases) and set fires (three cases).

In Spring 2012, at least six ideological objects were desecrated. Targets of attacks during the spring months were buildings of Jehovah’s Witnesses (five cases), Orthodoxy (four cases) and Jewish objects (one case).

Public Activity of the Ultra-right

Rallies and other public actions

The spring period was characterized by the ultra-right movement’s political activity, which was almost as high as was demonstrated during winter. However, winter was spent almost exclusively under the sign of actions ‘For Fair Elections,’ while in spring the ultra-right’s rally activity was more diverse.

March became the last month when the demonstration tactics formed in winter remained in use.

Immediately following the presidential elections, the final wave of actions For Fair Elections took place in Moscow and other cities across the country. Those actions drew fewer people than the initial winter ones.

Over 10,000 people gathered on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow on March 5. The ultra-right stood under imperial flags, as well as the flags of the Russian Civil Union (RGS, Russkii grazhdanskii soyuz) (Anton Susov, Alexander Khamov), and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA, Natsional-demokraticheskii al’yans) (Ilya Lazarenko, Alexei Shiropaev). Two leaders of the Russians (Russkie) alliance, Alexander Belov and Georgii Borovikov, could be seen in the crowd. We should mention that the entire share of ultra-right activists on the square was not high. Speakers who were among nationalists at the rally included Alexei Navalny; Russian Nationwide Union (ROS, Russkii obshchenatsional’nyi soyuz) head Sergei Baburin; and the leaders of the Russian Social Movement (ROD, Russkoe obshchestvennoe dvizhenie), Vladimir Tor and Konstantin Kyrlov. During the speeches of the latter two, attendees at the rally shouted, “Fascism will not do!”

The action became memorable not only due to the fact that fewer people attended it, but also because it became the first one of the rallies For Fair Elections to be dispersed by the police. In spite of the considerable number of law enforcement officials, the ultra-right attempted to organize a separate, unsanctioned march to reach Manezhnaya Square, where a rally of Vladimir Putin’s allies was being held. Their attempt to march straight down Tverskaya Street, one of Moscow’s main thoroughfares, was suppressed by the police almost immediately. But an alternate route through Tverskoi Boulevard and Bolshaya Nikitskaya Street was more successful. The nationalists nearly reached their goal, shouting right radical slogans all along the way. Some of them were detained on the way to Manezhnaya Square, while others scattered. During the march, they beat a reporter of the Echo of Moscow (Ekho Moskvy) radio station.

Slavic Force (Slavyanskaya sila) leader Dmitrii Demushkin attempted to hold another separate, unsanctioned action on the same day. He planned to lay flowers at the Central Election Commission building near the Lubyanka Metro station. The action was widely advertised by ultra-right websites and football fan forums, but it gathered no more than 20 people. All of them were detained while exiting the subway. [9]

At the next (and last) action For Fair Elections, held in Moscow on March 10, nationalists were not allowed to the tribune by the organizers. About 200 to 300 ultra-right activists under imperial flags indignantly left the rally. Demushkin explained their decision, saying “the liberals have let down the protest.” The ultra-right demarche developed into another procession, this time on the Stary Arbat. Right radicals marched, while shouting nationalist and anti-Caucasian slogans, including obscene ones, and burning flares. Later, a significant number of the marchers were detained. [10]

A split between the ultra-right and other representatives of the opposition, which was apparent in Moscow, was as visible in other regions, where the ultra-right succeeded in building more or less stable relationships with mainstream opposition activists during the winter period. A good example would be in St. Petersburg, where the share of nationalists in the local Civil Council (Grazhdanskii sovet) is very high. Apart from leftist and liberal movements, it includes autonomous neo-Nazi alliance Free Rein (Vol’nitsa), Semen Pikhtelev and Dmitrii Sukhorukov’s National Democrats of St. Petersburg (Natsional’nye demokraty Sankt-Peterburga) (both also have joined the Russians movement), Igor Artemov’s Russian All-National Union (RONS, Russkii obshchenatsional’nyi soyuz), Nikolai Bondarik’s Russian Party (Russkaya partiya), Anton Susov’s RGS, Stanislav Vorobyev’s Russian Imperial Movement (RID, Russkoe imperskoe dvizhenie), and Konstantin Krylov’s ROD, represented by Andrei Kuznetsov in St. Petersburg.

Due to such significant activity by nationalists, whose share among St. Petersburg protesters has been far higher than in Moscow since the very beginning of the winter rallies, the ultra-right have more often become co-organizers, not simple participants in rallies and marches. They also always receive the option of freely addressing the demonstration.

Thus, for instance, on March 24 the march For the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens was held in St. Petersburg. About two thousand people marched from the Gor’kovskaya Metro station on Kamennoostrovsky Avenue. Their main slogan was a demand for direct elections of the city’s governor. The action was finished by a rally on the Marsovo field. Nationalists marched in a separate column with a banner reading, ‘Fair Elections – Nationalists to the Parliament!’ National Democrats activists Pikhtelev and Sukhorukov took part in the action, with the latter speaking at the rally. In addition to nationalists, representatives of the Other Russia (Drugaya Rossiya), Yabloko, Solidarity (Solidarnost’), alliances of election observers, cheated shareholders, etc. were present.

Another joint action was held in St. Petersburg on March 25. The rally Russian Spring was organized by Nikolai Bondarik and his movement Russians Against Putin, and the Civil Council as well. The action was held on Konyushennaya Square and gathered not more than 500 people – activists of the RID, Slavic Force, Dmitrii Bobrov’s National Socialistic Initiative (NSI, Natsional-sotsialisticheskaya initsiativa), Alexander Rastorguev’s Association of Initiative Citizens of Russia (TIGR, Tovarishchestvo initsiativnykh grazhdan Rossii), Left Front, Civil Committee, etc. Speakers were Sergei Baburin (ROS), Nikolai Kur’yanovich, Nikolai Bondarik, and others. After the rally was over, about 10 people including Olga Kurnosova (of Garry Kasparov’s United Grazhdanskii Front (OGF, Ob”edinennyi grazhdanskii front)) and Bondarik were detained when they attempted to hold a march on Nevsky Prospekt.

After the end of the election cycle and Putin’s victory in the presidential elections, it became clear to the opposition as a whole and to nationalists in particular that they would not succeed in achieving re-election to the Duma or the presidency. The slogan For Fair Elections lost its topicality. As such, it became necessary to search for new unifying slogans and ideas. The end of March and April as a whole were spent under the aegis of this search (during the aforementioned action in St. Petersburg on March 24, the demand to return the direct elections of the governor could become such a new slogan), but with little success. There were no significant actions during the period.

The ultra-right devoted the end of April to preparations for the traditional Russian First of May (Russkii Pervomai). This time, the right radicals attempted to make their march not a traditional nationalist action for their own in-group, but instead a major common oppositional event. In the end of March, Demushkin invited his ‘colleagues’ from the Civil Union to join the action. Nationalists achieved a small victory when then action, organized by the Russians association and other traditional participants of the Russian Marches, was advertised not only on right radical Web resources but also on websites of non-nationalist movements. The Civil Union presented it as one of many oppositional events along with past actions For Fair Elections. Wishing to correspond with the declared statute, the organizers even changed the traditional title of the action. This year, it took the name Civil March.

The nationalists’ wish to cooperate with other representatives of the opposition was used for their own designs by the organizers of alternative ‘Russian marches,’ which are traditionally held under the name ‘Imperial March.’ During preparations for the Moscow action, the Russosvet coalition, the Right League (Pravaya liga) and movements that joined them focused on the anti-liberal slogans and the inadmissibility of cooperation with nationalists’ ideological enemies. It was probably done in the hope of winning the favor of autonomous neo-Nazis, most of whom are known to share such a point of view. Besides, in order to secure a more attractive route than that of their rivals, the organizers decided not to coordinate their action with the authorities separately, but to join the already-approved march of left organizations from Kaluzhskaya to Teatralnaya Square.

However, their efforts were in vain. The ultra-right march was attended by about 50 people, which is even fewer than a year before, when they managed to gather about 60. The alternative march was attended by organizations that joined the Russosvet coalition (the Russian DPNI, the Russian Party of the National Great Power (NDPR, Natsional’no-derzhavnaya partiya Rossii), the Russian National Socialism (RNS, Russkii natsional’nyi sotsializm), Russian Case (Russkoe delo) movement, Civil Disobedience (Grazhdanskoe nepovinovenie) organization), the Right League, the Council of the Russian People (Sobor russkogo naroda), the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia (Narodno-patrioticheskii soyuz Rossii), the Eurasian Union of Youth (ESM, Evraziiskii soyuz molodezhi), one of branches of Orthodox Gonfaloniers (pravoslvanye khorugvenostsy). Activists of the Russian Image (Russkii Obraz) were also expected, though Demushkin had attempted to drive them out of the main nationalist march of May 1, and adherents of the People’s Council (Narodnyi sobor) were as well. However, the increase in number expected due to the participation of these organizations did not happen. The Russian Image was represented by Evgenii Valyaev only, and the activists of the People’s Council simply ignored the event.

Nor  can the traditional nationalist march held by the Russians association, which took place several hours later than the ‘alternative’ one, really be called successful. Organizers hoped to gather five thousand people to the action, but in the end even fewer activists came than in the previous year – about 500 people against 600 in 2011. There was no expected increase in numbers due to other representatives of the opposition having ignored the invitation. The only column that represented the Civil Movement (led by Maxim Brusilovsky, leader of the Movement of TSZh (Association of Home Owners, Tovarishchestvo sobstvennikov zhil’ya)) turned out to be the least numerous (about 30 people). It included mostly representatives of organizations closed to nationalists, for instance, the Council of the Russian People, and Yuri Mukhin’s Army of People’s Will (Armiya voli naroda).

As a result, these were the traditional participants of the May 1 marches who took part in the procession: the Russians association, ROD, the Union of Orthodox Gonfaloniers, as well as activists of Andrei Savelyev’s Great Russia (Velikaya Rossiya) party, and autonomous neo-Nazis. Therefore, the membership of the traditional march changed a bit. Adherents of Mukhin and Savelyev joined, but also those of Vladimir Kvachkov (the Minin and Pozharsky All-Russian People’s Militia (NOMP, Vserossiiskoe narodnoe opolchenie imeni Minina i Pozharskogo)) and Svetlana Peunova (Will (Volya) party).

The action was declared to be a common oppositional one, and it was planned to emphasize the civil and political rights of Russian citizens. There were myriad anti-governmental slogans. But the planned format was not followed, and nationalists marched shouting their traditional xenophobic slogans, and many people raised their hands in the fascist salute. [11].

In most other cities where the Russian Pervomai was celebrated, nationalists managed to gather the same or even bigger numbers of activists than in previous years, on the average. The territory of the march grew: it was held in several cities where it had not been held ever before. The best example is the Russian Pervomai in Yekaterinburg, which was held in the city for the first time and gathered about 500 people. The city had hosted only the traditional autumn Russian March before. The last one, in 2011, was attended by about 200 people. It is worth noting that this time, the action was organized by Valerii Solovei’s newly formed party New Force (Novaya sila), which declares itself a moderate national democratic movement. However, this did not prevent people from shouting xenophobic slogans and throwing the fascist salute in response to the similar gesture with which the leader of the march, Maxim Vakhromov, concluded his speech. [12]

Generally, it is likely that both the clear lack of progress at the Moscow Pervomai, and the success of regional actions were caused by numerous winter and spring rallies For Fair Elections.

The Moscow rallies, in this case, damaged the nationalist cause. From the very beginning, autonomous neo-Nazis were sharply opposed to the initiative to hold joint actions with liberals. Consequently, they could not be pleased at the idea of making another ‘common’ action out of the traditional nationalist march. The other reason for the failure could be ordinary nationalists’ disappointment with public actions as a way of putting pressure on the state. More and more often, yesterday’s attendees of the rallies would say that a forced seizure of power was necessary. As a result, the spring action that is generally not very popular did not manage to gather even last year’s number of attendees.

In other regions where social political activity was extremely low, rallies For Fair Elections helped regulate relations between major nationalist organizations (and other representatives of the opposition as well) and local, minor radical right organizations.

The next major common oppositional action was the March of Millions held in Moscow on May 6, the day before Putin’s inauguration. Nationalists actually ignored the action. The more or less significant number of nationalists represented only Andrei Savelyev’s Great Russia, but even they left the action quite early on. Their column of about 100 people passed through metal detectors, drew up on Yakimanka Street in the direction opposite the common one, shouted anti-liberal and nationalist slogans, and left the march in an organized procession chanting “We don’t share the way with liberals!”

An addition to Great Russia, a column of the RGS (about 30 people) took part in the action with flags and a banner reading, “Russians Choose Freedom.” The symbols of the Common Case (Obshchee delo) movement and imperial flags of various sizes could be seen. Also, there were a few right radical activists at the march who did not organize columns (or joined them only for some time), but later took part in clashes with riot police. [13]

Nationalists, like some other radicals, clearly did not expect that the May 6 march to Bolotnaya Square would gain such a big public response. The leaders of the Russians association staked on their own separate action, which was to be held on Manezhnaya Square. They evidently hedged that an attempt of a breakout near the Kremlin would bring them more political dividends and attention than one more peaceful march, especially because paratroopers and veterans of the armed services promised to come to the action (though ultimately they did not show). But it turned out quite the opposite way: clashes with the police at the March of Millions became a major event, while Belov, Demushkin and Borovikov led about 70 right radicals from the Teatralnaya Metro station to Revolution Square but were unable to hold their action. Some people were detained almost immediately, while others left on their own. The role of nationalists in the clashes on Bolotnaya Square was also insignificant.

The March of Millions and the amendments toughening the law on rallies gave new impetus to the fading oppositional movement. The Moscow ultra-right faction once again began paying close attention to the common oppositional actions. They found there a decent possibility of becoming legitimate and permanent participants of the common protests. Specifically these were the Occupy actions, a series of informal meetings of opposition activists (and anybody interested) in different places in the city.

Nationalists actively advertised these actions, trying to attract more activists from public organizations and autonomous neo-Nazis. They recorded interviews and video addresses, published letters calling on people to join the opposition actions, and condemning “web fighters” who sit in their apartments. On May 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, representatives of the Russians association, ROD and RGS arrived to the Occupy camp near the Chistye Prudy Metro station, including Belov, Tor, Krylov and Alexander Khramov (RGS). The latter presented the Catechism of a National Democrat (Katekhizis national-demokrata) and a new run of the Issues of Nationalism (Voprosy natsionalizma) magazine at Chistye Prudy. After the camp moved to Kudrinskaya Square, these visits continued. Belov, Borovikov, Savelyev and Anton Severny (of the Russians association) arrived to the camp. The latter remained there almost permanently.

In some sense, their efforts gained success. In the very beginning of the “people’s walk” in the capital, the ultra-right was represented mostly by uncoordinated activists from various cities (Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Ulyanovsk (Ilya Sotnikov and members of his organization), and Ufa). But later they were replaced by adherents of major ultra-right organizations, primarily the Russians association. Young people with ‘imperial’ ribbons consequently took the responsibility of guarding the camp, ousting other representatives of the opposition. After that, they tried to do the same with managing the kitchen and even the gathering of money for the camp. As a result, a separate structure was formed, the “camp’s brigade,” which was actively supported by the Russians association. The Russians even attempted to coordinate the gathering of money, especially for the functioning of the brigade.

Other opposition representatives soon found themselves dissatisfied with the situation. They began accusing the ultra-right of aggression against fellow opposition members, poor work in the kitchen, and even thefts and embezzlement of money from the common box. There were several attempts to ban nationalist propaganda in the camp and to discuss the very presence of nationalists and their statute. For instance, on May 18, it was decided to put the issue to the vote at the “assembly” (the ruling body of the camp, working on the principles of the direct democracy; to approve an initiative, one needs three fourths of votes of all who gathered). However, this plan became known beforehand, and the ultra-right took preventive measures. They expanded the number of activists and spoiled the vote on the issue, shouting slogans during the assembly, setting deliberately unpassable proposals (for instance, to ban liberal propaganda), etc. As a result, nationalists remained in the camp but the situation began to irritate autonomous neo-Nazis even more. The latter interpreted this as a capitulation before “liberals.”

 

Party formation

This spring, the ultra-right continued to create and develop its political parties, or rather the parties’ organizing committees that started to spring up across the country after then-President Dmitry Medvedev introduced a bill simplifying the party registration process on December 23, 2011.

A handful of organizing committees, including national democratic groups, groups of radical nationalists, monarchists and Cossacks, and parties close to nationalists with their own original ideological views, have already applied to the Justice Ministry for registration. [14] The membership of these groups is strikingly heterogeneous. The groups profess deeply different versions of relations with the sitting authorities, so it is hard to foretell their future development. But the return of some old nationalist organizations to the public activity (for instance, the adherents of the ‘Dead Water’ conception of social security) and the appearance of some new ones have not influenced the situation with the nationalist movement yet, because it remains unclear whether the numerous organizing committees will manage to gather the number of regional departments necessary for registration.

Consequently, the work of ultra-right organizations in the regions became slightly more active. However, brand new regional departments have not shown themselves yet. Perhaps the one exception is the remarkable May 1 New Force action in Yekaterinburg.

Ultra-right organizations in the capital gradually started their dialogue with regional right radical movements in order to unite with an eye to party formation. But during spring, not one more or less regional organization declared it was joining any Muscovite nationalist party.

The party formation process also forced some nationalist organizations to better prescribe their programs and emphasize the strategy of their struggle for the sympathies of adherents and future voters.

Thus, for instance, on March 24 a constituent conference of Konstantin Krylov’s National Democratic Party (NDP, Natsional’no-demokraticheskaya partiya) was held in Moscow, formed on the grounds of Krylov’s ROD and Susov’s RGS. The conference was attended by the extended circle of political writers (whose articles are published in the Agency of Political News (APN, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei) edited by Krylov and the Issues of Nationalism magazine) and activists of national democratic orientation: Krylov, Tor, Susov, Khramov, Rostislav Antonov (ROD-Siberia), Yegor Kholmogorov, Mikhail Remizov (former editor-in-chief of the APN, now president of the Institute of National Strategy), Pavel Svyatenkov, Oleg Nemensky, and Sergei Sergeev. The conference was also visited by Vladimir Milov (Democratic Choice (Demokraticheskiy vybor)) and Vladimir Ermolaev (the Russians association). Krylov became chairman of the party’s organizing committee, Susov his deputy. Tor headed the executive committee, Kholmogorov was appointed the organizing committee’s plenipotentiary for relations with the Justice Ministry. Nationalists expressed hope for Navalny’s inclusion in the party.

The new party’s manifesto [15] was presented at the conference. Its authors speak once again on the party’s national democratic character, and declare their adherence to democratic and liberal values – such as the electiveness of the authorities, separation of powers, freedom of speech and assembly, and human rights. Ethnic nationalism is expressed weakly in the manifesto, hidden behind a statement on the necessity of the self-determination of the Russian people as a main force capable of “reviving the country.” Anti-migrant attitudes and the demand for sharp limitation to flows of migration are covered up by standard speculations on the deterioration of the “criminogenic” atmosphere and the rise in social tension. The party also demands the widening of the state’s social guarantees, the investigation of cases on the privatization of major state property in the 1990s, citizenship to all “Russians” living outside Russia’s borders, etc. Therefore, the manifesto is keeping with the objectives evidently set by the party leaders, which is to become nationalists of the European type who would be supported by the xenophobic majority of Russian society.

The main party program theses of the NDP’s main competitor, Valery Solovei’s New Force party, were published in the second half of May.

Just like the NDP, the New Force speaks of its adherence to democracy and the necessity to comply with human rights. The ethnocentrism here is also veiled by theses on the restoration of allegedly infringed rights of the ethnic Russian population in Russia. Besides, Solovei proposes widening the president’s functions, making him not only the head of the state but also the head of the government. In this case, in order to restore the balance between the executive and legislative power branches, Solovei also proposes widening parliament’s authorities by simplifying the procedure to impeach the president and by adding new functions to the chambers of the Federal Assembly. This system is very similar to the classical model of the presidential republic like that in the United States but it is unclear why Solovei thinks that it would be better defended from turning into a dictatorship than today’s model.

The migration policy Solovei proposes is extreme, blocking the possibility to move to Russia for anyone who is not ethnically Russian. The idea to reform deportation centers for labor migrants is exceptionally alarming: “…everyone who is subject to deportation will be placed in temporary migration labor centers and will be occupied with social objects for half a year (building infrastructural objects, social housing, etc.). They all will have their salary (minus economic losses of Russia during their illegal stay in the country, and the cost of their deportation). Their regime of staying on the territory of Russia will be organized on the ‘work-dorm-work’ principle and severely controlled by the law enforcement structures.” [16]

Just like the NDP, the New Force proposes the essential widening of the state’s social commitments, funding them by obliging the major business to pay a “compensatory tax” for the “unjust” privatization of Soviet enterprises and manufacturing facilities. [17]

The Russians association also announced the formation of its own party. On April 20, a congress of the organization was held in the Belarusian town of Glubokoe (Vitebsk region). Dmitry Demushkin was elected chairman of the organizing committee. The congress was also attended by Belov, Borovikov and Bobrov. The new party is supposed to be named simply the Party of Nationalists, and its emblem will be the imperial flag. Belarus was chosen as a place to hold the congress due to fears that the Russian authorities would attempt to break it up. It can be seen by the neutral name of the party and the symbol chosen that the Russians have continued their course of establishing the most inclusive organization possible, as they hope to attract nationalists of all stripes. The prospective party’s hopes are explained by the fact that it comprises organizations that differ in ideology: Bobrov’s National Socialistic Initiative attracts the most radical part of the ultra-right spectrum, Stanislav Vorobyev’s Russian Imperial Movement is for nationalists with Orthodox and imperial trend and monarchists, whereas Semen Pikhtelev and Dmitrii Sukhorukov’s National Democrats might struggle with the NDP and the New Force for the sympathies of moderate nationalists.

Just like other proto-parties from the capital, the Russians organize trips to the regions for their leaders, but with their own radical specificities. On March 24 a press conference was held in Syktyvkar, with the participation of Alexei Kolegov, leader of the North Border (Rubezh Severa) movement, and Demushkin, and in the evening the latter held a master class on knife fighting. At the press conference, Kolegov did not rule out that activists of his organization would join the party being formed on the grounds of the Russians association.

So far, one can note that the Russians (and the New Force as well) lose significantly to Krylov’s project in terms of regional departmental activity. However, Russians’ mixed membership gives them a better chance of attracting regional organizations than Krylov’s and Solovei’s parties, which are more ‘specialized.’ However, it is obvious that the prospect of party formation also depends on who and how the authorities would counteract.

The process of party formation has intensified the craving for personnel and competition between ultra-right organizations. Representatives of various movements can often be seen in competing structures. In some cases, a change of organization by an activist can be explained logically, but sometimes the ideological preferences of new members run counter to the parties’ declared ideological platforms.

For instance, when Dmitrii Feoktistov moved from the RGS to the New Force, it could be explained by the fact that one national democratic structure for some reason seemed more attractive to him than the other. But when the adherent of Orthodox and imperial ideology Stanislav Vorobyev (RID) and the neo-Nazi Dmitrii Bobrov received (and accepted) invitations to join the New Force, but kept their posts in Russians, this once again casts doubt on the principle of the New Force’s national democratic character as declared by Solovei.

It is likely that many who join the New Force or combine their membership there with posts in other organizations estimate that the chances of Solovei’s party receiving registration to be rather high, and have doubts about the possibility of official registration for their initial movements.

The atypical position of Andrei Savelyev’s Great Russia party is worthy of separate note. It declared that so far it did not intend to submit documents for registration because it considered it wrong to address to the current authorities for anything. We remind readers that in 2007, the party submitted documents for registration and was denied. After passing through all Russian judicial instances, Great Russia addressed the European Court of Human Rights. As Savelyev said, he assumed the ECHR would take his case and deem the denial of the party illegal. That, it seems, is how Great Russia plans to achieve legalization without addressing the Justice Ministry. [18]

It can be said that Savelyev’s party – which had been virtually unseen in previous years – became far more active during winter and spring 2012. It consistently fixates on autonomous neo-Nazis, cultivates provocative fascist motives even in its image, and does not allow contacts with representatives of neo-nationalist groups in order to avoid provoking the resentment of potential adherents in the neo-Nazi sphere. Still, the party has not gained particular support here. Neo-Nazis think highly negatively of Savelyev’s past as a Duma deputy, considering him a politician who sold himself to the Kremlin, just like current Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, the former head of the Motherland (Rodina) party.

Extreme neo-Nazis still believe the same of the other ultra-right organizations, that is the Russians association, ROD, etc. who, in contrast to Savelyev, have not decided on who they plan to orient on – autonomous neo-Nazis or the xenophobic majority of ordinary citizens. As a result, these organizations remain unattractive to both.

 

Other kinds of activity of the ultra-right groups

In addition to participation in protests and party formation, the ultra-right continued to occupy themselves with various social actions tied to problems important in this or that region.

Thus, on April 8 the Perm department of the Slavic Force held an anti-drug rally in the city with support from the activists of the City Without Drugs foundation and local Cossacks. Over 150 people took part.

In spring ROD-Siberia continued its cooperation with Siberian ecologists, having held the joint actions ‘For Fresh Air in Siberia’ in winter. The Civil Patrol (Grazhdanskii patrul’) organization, established by ROD-Siberia leader Rostislav Antonov, continued its regular raids in search of expired products in shops. This activity drew some attention in Novosibirsk. This in turn allowed the Civil Patrol to hold a press conference in April and invite officials from the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of the Defense of Consumers’ Rights and Human Well Being (Rospotrebnadzor) and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as representatives of supermarkets where expired products had been found.

Minor ultra-right groups carried on with the idea of the Civil Patrol. For instance, the Sober Don (Trezvyi Don) organization (of Rostov-on-Don), which has held campaigns against alcohol and tobacco before, intends now to organize raids in shops for control purchasing and reveal shops where children are able to buy alcohol or tobacco.

The Resistance (Soprotivlenie) movement has resumed its activity after having been out of sight since last summer. Activists began holding community work days and various actions once again propagandizing a healthy lifestyle. As it has been said so many times, such actions allow the ultra-right to gain a positive image and improve their relationship with local officials and police.

We should note specially that not all nationalist social actions are peaceful. In that connection, this spring a handful of ultra-right groups appeared, calling themselves pedophile hunters. They create accounts on social networks under the names of minors and set dates with adult men. After that, several nationalists come to the rendezvous point and “talk” to the men, that is beat and intimidate them, recording everything on camera. Various ultra-right resources support this initiative. Recently, it was carried on by a widely known neo-Nazi in ultra-right circles, Maxim “Hatchet” Martsinkevich.

So far, social actions remain the prerogative of minor regional right radical groups oriented at local residents and not at the participation in big politics, in contrast with the ultra-right from the capital. If major nationalist parties are registered, the number of social actions is likely to rise as the parties join the struggle for local votes.

Counteraction to Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism

Criminal prosecution for violence

As in the winter period, spring saw general inactivity in terms of criminal prosecution for xenophobic violence. We are aware of two guilty verdicts [19] for violence accounting for the hate motive; 12 people in Moscow and Irkutsk were convicted. In all, in 2012 seven guilty verdicts have been issued for racist violence, in which 23 people were convicted.

In order to qualify crimes as racist, Article 105, Part 2, Item “k” (political, ideological, race, national or religious hate-motivated murder of two or more people), and Article 115, Part 2, Item “b” (nationalist hate-motivated cause of minor harm to health) were used. Only one sentence (for the case of the ABTO [20], see below) mentioned Article 282 (incitement of national hatred), and Article 280, Part 1 (public calls for extremist activity) incriminated for certain propagandist activity.

• Punishments were allocated as follows:
• One person received a suspended sentence without additional sanctions;
• One person was sentenced life imprisonment;
• One person was sentenced to 22 years of deprivation of freedom;
• Three persons were sentenced to terms varying from 10 up to 15 years of deprivation of freedom;
• Five persons were sentenced to terms varying from five up to 10 years of deprivation of freedom;
• One person was sentenced to five years of deprivation of freedom;
• One person was set free from punishment “due to the reconciliation of parties.”

The main portion of the convicts consists of members of the neo-Nazi Autonomous Militant Terrorist Organization (ABTO, Avtonomnya boevaya terroristicheskaya organizatsiya) charged with a series of arsons and explosions in Moscow. Most of the gang’s members were sentenced to prison terms from five to 13 years. It is remarkable that the court ruled to fine the convicts 1.5 million rubles (about $45,000 USD) as compensation for damage. Reports on such measures are rare, though we consider that those who suffered from such attacks have the full right to serious compensation. The second sentence for violence was issued against brothers Artyom and Ruslan Vokin, who were charged with the racist-motivated murders of people from Central Asia (the so-called Patrol operation) and policemen in Irkutsk.

Aside from the aforementioned, two other sentences for ultra-right violence were issued in spring. The first was against Nazi skinheads in Omsk who were charged with the murder of their 24-year-old comrade, committed on Hitler’s birthday, April 20. Their comrade was killed for “betrayal and cooperation” with law enforcement. The second sentence was in Moscow, against Yuri Tikhomirov, who was charged with the murder of anti-fascist Ilya Dzhaparidze in 2009.

The case of the murder of the anti-fascist was held in a very strained atmosphere, in a closed session. Relatives of the deceased received threatening phone calls.

Tikhomirov was initially charged with Article 105, Part 2, Items “g” and “k” (murder committed by a group of persons by prior arrangement, motivated by hate towards a social group[21]), but the case was later qualified under Article 111, Part 4 (causing grave bodily harm leading to the death of the man who suffered).[22] Accomplices have not been found yet. One of them, Maxim Baklagin, who used a knife, was detained in connection with the case but set free, and after that he hid himself from the investigation. The 10-year sentence in a strict penal colony satisfied neither the defense nor the prosecution. Both sides appealed the ruling.

The season’s first sentence was issued in the case of the Minin and Pozharsky All-Russian People’s Militia (NOMP). Its leader Vladimir Kvachkov is charged with preparing an armed riot and involving people in terrorist activity. He has been in custody since December 23, 2010. In July 2011, the Federal Security Service detained a NOMP member in Ekaterinburg, reserve colonel and paratrooper Leonid Khabarov (born in 1947), together with a few “companions-in-arms.” During the search, officials seized ammunition, explosives and weapons from him. One of the accused in the Khabarov case was another NOMP adherent, former criminal investigation official Vladislav “Termite” Ladeishchikov. In May, the Sverdlovsk Regional Court gave him a suspended six-year sentence under Article 279, Article 30, Part 1 (preparation for an armed riot) and Article 205.1 (involving people in terrorist activity). Such a light penalty is explained by the fact that the defendant agreed to cooperate with the investigation and was the only one of those charged to fully confess his guilt.

 

Criminal prosecution for vandalism

In spring (and the year 2012 as a whole), at least two sentences were passed for xenophobic vandalism against two persons, in the Orenburg region and the Khabarovsky Krai. Last spring, the number of sentences was the same. In both cases, people were charged with Article 214, Part 2 (national or religious hate-motivated vandalism). In one case, the defendant was given a suspended one-and-a-half year sentence. In the other, it was one year of limitation of freedom with a requirement to continue professional education. We consider such punishments for xenophobic graffiti commensurate with the acts committed.

 

Criminal Prosecution for Propaganda

While the number of sentences for xenophobic violence has been decreasing, the number of sentences for xenophobic propaganda is growing swiftly. In Spring 2012 at least 21 sentences were passed for xenophobic propaganda against 23 people. Sentences were passed in 19 regions (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Kemerovo, Kursk, Murmansk, Novgorod, Ryazan, Saratov, and Tyumen regions, Republics of Khakassia and Udmurtia, and Zabaikalye Krai). Since the beginning of 2012, at least 33 such sentences were passed, with 42 people convicted.

As usual, the main article here (in 20 sentences of 21) was Article 282, Part 1. In 16 cases, it was the only one. In three cases, it neighbored Article 280. And in one sentence, Article 280 was used together with Article 214 (see above): it was for anti-Semitic and obscene inscriptions over the portrait of Albert Einstein on the wall of a mathematics lyceum in Khabarovsk.

Apart from that, the statistics included the aforementioned sentence against neo-Nazis from the Autonomous Combat Terrorist Organization. Their sentence mentioned, among other articles, Article 282, Part 1, and Article 280.

Court rulings for propaganda were allocated as follows:

• Two persons were sentenced to deprivation of freedom;
• One person received a suspended sentence without additional sanctions;
• Seven persons were sentenced to various fines;
• Eight persons were sentenced to obligatory labor;
• Three persons were sentenced to educational labor;
• Two persons were released from punishment following the expiry of a statute of limitations.

As it can be seen from the data listed above, the share of suspended sentences has significantly decreased. As far as we are concerned, only one person was given a suspended sentence for propaganda during the spring months; it was the aforementioned anti-Semitic vandal in Khabarovsk. This share is significantly smaller than that of previous periods (five of 22 persons in winter, eight of 19 persons in autumn 2011). Most punishments were more effective, such as obligatory or educational labor, and fines. We consider such punishments to be more appropriate means for punishing comments on web forums and xenophobic graffiti on fences.

As for deprivation of freedom, there were two sentences in the period in question. Prison terms were given to perpetrators of gun violence from the ABTO, though in their cases the articles regarding propaganda were clearly not the main ones: and to the editor-in-chief of the Cossack’s View (Kazachii vzglyad) newspaper Alexander Dzikovitskii, who received one year in a colony settlement for xenophobic articles in his publication. The prosecution demanded that Dzikovitskii be also banned from journalist work. However, this measure was not taken, which we consider wrong. The employment ban would be the most adequate punishment for propagandists spreading xenophobic ideas in public – as is the case with Dzikovitskii.

Apart from Dzikovitskii, no serious propagandist appeared in law enforcement’s field of vision. Sentences were passed for the same relatively unthreatening activities as in previous periods, that is for comments on forums and xenophobic graffiti on buildings. Law enforcement officials’ attention was focused on young bloggers, graffiti artists, distributors of leaflets and even pensioners who allowed themselves xenophobic shouts in quarrels with neighbors.

 

Federal List of Extremist Materials

In spring, the Federal List of Extremist Materials was supplemented 18 times, with items from 1082 through 1198.

These were:

• Xenophobic materials of various Russian ethnic nationalists, among them the anti-Semitic “Appeal to the Russian People, the Army and Navy Officers, the Cossacks, the Russian Youth and Orthodox Priesthood” with calls to kill “proteges of the world Judaic cabal,” listed with names;[23] a video entitled “Skins Stab Wogs[24],” an old message from the Combat Organization of Russian Nationalists (BORN, Boevaya organizatsiya russkikh natsionalistov) with threats and a photo of the cut-off head of a migrant worker;[25] Nikola Korolev’s book The Skinhead’s Bible, songs by bands Tsiklon B and Kolovrat, etc.;
• Materials of Bashkir ethnic nationalists;
• Materials of Ukrainian nationalists
• Materials of contemporary Ukrainian historians written in Ukrainian;
• An article by Stalinist Yury Mukhin in newspaper To the Stand! (K bar’eru);
• Historic materials, in particular, memoirs of the Waffen-SS troops by Kurt Meyer;
• Materials of Islamist militiamen, in particular from the website http://hunafa.com;
• Materials of “unofficial” Muslim movements including books by Said Nursi and materials of Hizb ut-Tahrir;
• Scientologist materials (as usual, books by L. Ron Hubbard);
• The article “Death to Russia!” by radical democrat Boris Stomakhin,[26] published on the “Free Radicals” (Svobodnye radikaly) website.

Not one of the problems of the list that we have noted on so many past occasions has been solved. Materials are still hard to identify because they are described with bibliographical and grammatical mistakes.[27] Duplicates that appear due to parallel court rulings remain in the list (39 items). Materials that are already included can be added again with new output data, or if the matter is a material from the Web, it can be added to the list for a second time if published on another website. The list is growing regularly. As the report is being written, it contains 1254 items.

As always, many of the materials are banned with no legal grounds for doing so. Among spring’s additions falling under this category are, for instance, books by Said Nursi or L. Ron Hubbard, the respectable academic research of Ukrainian historians, and others.

 

Deeming organizations extremist

In spring, the process of banning organizations due to extremism became active again. In May, the Supreme Court deemed extremist the international neo-Nazi association Blood&Honour and banned its activities on Russian territory.

The openly Hitlerite organization, which carries on active and radical hate propaganda – the name of which is taken from the Hitler Youth slogan “Blut und Ehre,” could have been banned before; it has existed in Moscow since autumn 1995.[28] One of its websites was already deemed extremist in Lipetsk in April 2000. Its militant wing Combat 18 openly practices street violence. Besides, this movement is already banned in Germany and Spain, and was unable to register in the Czech Republic. Although the ruling banning the organization is rather late, we cannot welcome more the intention of the state bodies to fight against neo-Nazi organizations, this way in particular.

That court ruling has not entered into force, and the organization is not yet included in the Federal List of Extremist Organizations published on the Justice Ministry’s official website, which currently consists of 28 items.

 

Other administrative measures

In Spring 2012, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Information Technologies and Communications (Roskomnadzor) reported on no fewer than five anti-extremist warnings to editorial staff. We consider at least two of these warnings inappropriate: the one sent to the editorial staff of the AmurMedia information agency for mentioning the National Bolshevik Party (NBP, Natsional-bol’shevistskaya partiya) on the Web without adding that the party’s activity was banned, and the one sent to the editorial staff of the Rush Hour in the Upper Pyshma (Chas pik v Verkhnei Pyshme) newspaper for an article on the relationship between people living on one of the streets of the town and Gypsies living in the neighborhood. In one case more, we doubt the appropriateness of a warning given to the editorial staff of the Second Cossack Gate (Vtoraya kazachya zastava) for several articles. Such a proportion (nearly half of all warning given are inappropriate or dubious) remains virtually unchangeable for the work of the agency since Spring 2011. (For instance, in Spring 2011 we wrote on three inappropriate warnings, one dubious and two appropriate.)

Among the warnings that were evidently appropriate was one sent to the editorial staff of the By Their Right Names (Svoimi imenami) newspaper for publishing the article “The View from Ukraine” (Vzglyad s Ukrainy) by Alexander Sivov on February 7, 2012. The article appeals to lead political activity “to the urge towards seizing weapons,” etc. The other was sent to the Bell (Kolokol) newspaper for publishing an address by Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, who is currently in custody. Kvachkov addressed the All-Russian Officer’s Assembly with an appeal for war and a political operation to remove the current government from power.

Prosecutors actively used various articles of the Administrative Code in spring. We are aware of at least six appropriate sentences issued under Article 20.29 (mass distribution of extremist materials included in the published Federal List of Extremist Materials), and seven under Article 20.3 (propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols) in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, Kostroma, Perm, Sakhalin, Saratov, Tula, Volgograd regions, Primorye Krai and Republic of North Ossetia.[29] Apart from this, the mother of a 15-year-old student was called to administrative account under Article 5.35 (improper fulfillment of obligations by parents of minors to nurture and educate them) because her sons had published a handful of racist videos on Vkontakte, Russia’s most popular social network. In all cases, the punishment was a fine.

In spring, prosecutors’ offices continued the fight against swastikas on walls, trees and fences by issuing warnings to workers of public utilities in Ryazan, Tomsk, Chelyabinsk regions, and the Republic of Komi.

Apart from these, we are aware of at least five warnings sent by prosecutors to local Web providers demanding the block access to websites containing materials from the Federal List of Extremist Materials, or to websites deemed extremist. We should note that we do not consider the ban of access to the website appropriate if there is no court ruling deeming the website or materials therein extremist. Besides, we consider the limitation of access to the whole website if it contains only separate extremist materials inappropriate.

 

---

We have used the materials of daily monitoring by the Sova Center (including that performed in several regions). The monitoring was held with state support allocated as grants according to the Direction of the President of Russian Federation #127-rp of 2 March 2011.

 

[1]The data was registered up to June 22, 2012.

[2] See: Natalia Yudina, Vera Alperovich. Spring 2011: Causes Célèbres and New Ultra-right Formations // Sove Center. 2011. July 12 (http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2011/07/d22101/).

[3] This is how people from the ultra-right community call the organized beating of people of ‘non-Aryan’ appearance in trains. See: Elektrichki byli zaderzhany iz-za besporyadkov i drak v vagonakh // Zelenograd — Nash Dom. 2012. 22 April(http://zelhome.ru/novosti/32160).

[4] See: Natalia Yudina, Vera Alperovich. Spring 2011: Causes Célèbres and New Ultra-right Formations.

[5] Natalia Yudina, Vera Alperovich. Winter 2011—2012: The Ultra-right — Protest and Party Building // Sova Center. 2011. May 7 (http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2012/05/d24364/).

[6] The bill #108-18 was approved on March 7 as amendments to the city law ‘On Administrative Violations in St. Petersburg’, in particular, Article 7 Part 1 (‘Public actions aimed at propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, bisexualism, transgenderness among minors’) and Article 7 Part 2 (‘Public activity aimed at propaganda of pedophilia’).

[7] The imam and parishioners of the Zakabannaya mosque in Kazan asked the prosecutor’s office to instigate a criminal case against the journalist.

[8] See: Galina Kozhevnikova. Under the Sign of Political Terror. Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Counteract It in 2009. // Sova Center. 2010. March 10 (http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2010/03/d18151/).

[9] See further in: Ul’trapravye prinyali uchastie v protestnykh aktsiyakh 5 marta v Moskve // Sova Center. 2012. March 6 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2012/03/d23815/).

[10] See further in: Ul’trapravye vyshli iz protesta // Sova Center. 2012. March 11 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2012/03/d23835/).

[11] See further in: Ul’trapravyi Pervomai-2012 v Moskve // Sova Center. 2012. May 1 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2012/05/d24320/).

[12] Pervomaiskie aktsii natsionalistov v raznykh gorodakh 2012 goda // Sova Center. 2012. May 3 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2012/05/d24345/).

[13] Natsionalisty na ‘marshe millionov’ i posle nego v Moskve // Sova Center. 2012. May 6 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2012/05/d24363/).

[14] See further in: Elena Strukova, Partii russkikh natsonalistov: registratsiya v Minyuste. // Sova Center. 2012. May 11 (http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2012/05/d24385/).

[15] Manifest of sozdanii Natsional’no-demokratickeskoi partii // Russkii obozrevatel’. 2012. April 26.

[16] Ostanovit’ migratsionnyi khaos // New Force official website. 2012.

[17] Vosstanovlenie sotsial’nogo gosudarstva // New Force official website. 2012.

[18] Pochemu partiya ‘Velikaya Rossiya’ ne toropitsya za registratsiei // Andrei Savelyev’s blog. 2012. April 17.

[19] Besides, in March 2012 a case under Article 115, Part 2, Item “b” (nationalist hate-motivated cause of minor harm to the health) against an adolescent who attacked a man of ‘non-Slavic appearance’ with an axe in August 2011, was closed in Chita (Zabaikalye Krai) ‘due to the reconciliation of parties.’

[20] The full list of articles used: Article 205, Part 2, Items “a”, “c” (terrorist attack committed by a group of people by a previous concert or by an organized group that caused the death of a person by negligence), Article 205.2, Part 1 (public calls for terrorist activity), Article 223, Parts 1, 3 (illegal manufacturing of weapon by an organized group), Article 167, Part 2 (intentional destruction or damage of property for reasons of hooliganism, by arson, explosion or other dangerous way, or which led to the death of a person or other grave consequences by negligence), Article 222, Parts 1, 2, 3 (illegal purchase, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or carrying of weapon, its main parts, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices committed by an organized group).

[21] We stand for excluding the undetermined term “social group” from anti-extremist articles. A list of such groups is not given in current anti-extremist laws, and the term itself does not have any common meaning. The extension of its interpretation leads to the fact that anti-extremist law is used to defend groups like, for instance, “nationalists” or “policemen.” We submit that in this case, it would be enough to mention the motive of ideological hatred as a qualifying sign of the crime.

[22] Unfortunately, the report on the court’s website does not make the exact formulation of the sentence clear. It is unknown, in particular, whether the hate motive remained in the text.

[23] The article from the website www.kazak-chita.ru was added to the list. The text itself appeared on the Web in 2009, on the website of the Union of Officers in particular. The same text sent via e-mail was deemed extremist by the ruling of the Leninskii regional court in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia, on July 29, 2010, and already included into the list as item 868.

[24] The other, more well-known title is ‘The Execution of a Tajik and a Dag’ (person from Dagestan).

[25] This letter was sent via e-mail to a handful of human rights organizations on December 8, 2008, and contained threats against migrant workers and officials, and a photograph of the chopped-off head of worker Salakhetdin Azizov from Tajikistan, who was murdered by Nazi skinheads on December 5, 2008 in the Moscow Region. The prosecutor’s office instigated criminal cases under Article 282, Part 1 (incitement of national hatred). We should remind readers that in October 2011, the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office addressed a claim to the Nikulino Regional Court demanding it deem extremist six declarations made on behalf of BORN published on the websites “Right News” (Pravye novosti) and Antikompromat.Org.

[26] Stomakhin has already served five years of deprivation of freedom under articles 280 and 282 for other oppositional articles containing numerous calls for violence and approval of terrorist activity.

[27] For instance, one more unidentifiable leaflet entitled “Just look, my prince, what scum has infested within the Kremlin walls!” (in Russian, it is a rhymed verse: Smotri-ka, knyaz’, kakaya mraz’ v stenakh kremlevskikh zavelas’!) was included in the list. Earlier, another leaflet under the same title was included, too (item 414). Besides, there is one more leaflet in the list with a similar title, “Just take a look, my prince what scum, has infested within the walls of the Kremlin!” (Vzglyani-ka, knyaz’ kakaya mraz’, v kremlevskikh stenakh zavelas’!) (item 898). It is completely impossible to understand how these leaflets differ.

[28] Websites of the Russian Division – “Blood&Honour. Combat 18 Russia” and “Combat 18. Adolf Hitler’s Combat Group”.

[29] Without mentioning inappropriate sentences.