The following is our review of the primary and most representative events in the misuse of Russia's anti-extremist legislation in July 2023.

Lawmaking

On July 24, Vladimir Putin signed laws toughening the legislation on “foreign agents.” The first of them added an article to the current federal law “On Control over the Activities of Persons Under Foreign Influence” requiring that not only the government agencies but any organizations, as well as office holders and individuals, take into account the restrictions associated with the “foreign agent” status. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Justice was empowered to exercise state control not only over “foreign agents,” but also over the overall compliance with the legislation regulating their activities. At the request of citizens, organizations, or the authorities, the Ministry will be able to conduct unscheduled inspections of any persons or entities, who by their actions or inaction contribute to the violation of the “foreign agents” legislation, and issue warnings to them with orders to eliminate their violations within a month.

The second law supplemented Article 19.5 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO) with a new part – on liability for failure to comply within the prescribed period with the warning or order of an agency exercising control over the activities of “foreign agents.” The new part stipulates fines, and, if the offenders acted in their official capacity, their disqualification for up to two years. Liability will be incurred if the violations communicated by the Ministry of Justice to a “foreign agent” or another contributing entity are not eliminated within a month.

On July 31, the president approved a law that introduces fines for social networks for evading content moderation. The law, in force since February 2021, defines a social network as a service that includes personal pages of users, advertising aimed at a Russian audience, and daily traffic of over 500 thousand users from Russia. The register of social networks is maintained by Roskomnadzor. The entities included in it must, upon notifications from Roskomnadzor or based on user complaints and their own monitoring results, block content that is considered illegal in Russia (for more information about the law, see here). In mid-July, the deputies suddenly conducted the second reading of the bill on fines, which had seen no movement since April 2018, and promptly adopted it. The amendments introduced administrative liability for the owners of social networks; new articles were added to the CAO with fines ranging from 50 thousand for citizens to eight million for legal entities.

In mid-July, a group of deputies submitted to the State Duma a bill to expand the scope of Article 280 of the Criminal Code (CC), which now covers public calls for extremist activity. The deputies believe that it should also apply to public justification and propaganda of extremism. In addition to changing the scope, the deputies proposed to supplement Article 280 CC with notes to provide definitions of justification and propaganda of extremism – by analogy with Article 205.2 CC (public calls for terrorism, public justification of terrorism, or propaganda of terrorism). The public justification of extremism is defined as “a public statement that recognizes the ideology and practice of extremism as correct and deserving of support and imitation,” and propaganda – as “the activity of disseminating materials and (or) information aimed at imparting on others the ideology of extremism, belief in its attractiveness or the idea that extremist activities are permissible.

It should be noted that the concept of “ideology of extremism,” which the deputies propose to use in the footnote to Article 280 CC, is not defined by law and can be interpreted broadly. The same is true for the concept of “ideology of terrorism” from Article 205.2 CC. However, the very definition of extremist activity (extremism) in the relevant federal law is formulated more extensively and less clearly than the definition of terrorist activity – the factor that could also lead to law enforcement abuses.

We should also add that, under the amendments that came into force in December 2021, materials that contained “defense and (or) justification” of extremist activity are already subject to extrajudicial blocking. Another law adopted in 2022 gave the Prosecutor General's Office the authority to suspend and revoke the registration of media outlets for disseminating such materials.

Sanctions for Statements against the Authorities

Justifying Terrorism

On July 25, Boris Kagarlitsky, a left-wing publicist and political scientist and the editor-in-chief of the media outlet Rabkor, was detained and charged under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC (public justification of terrorism on the Internet). His criminal case was initiated by the Komi Republic Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russia, so Kagarlitsky was taken to Syktyvkar, where, on July 26, the city court placed him under arrest for two months.

Searches took place at the homes of Kagarlitsky and his Rabkor associates, who were interrogated as witnesses in the case.

The charge is related to the publication of a certain video, which, according to the investigation, was “aimed at publicly justifying terrorism.” According to the defense, the incriminating material discussed the explosion on the Crimean Bridge, which took place on October 8, 2022. Presumably, the video in question is the one posted on the Rabkor YouTube channel on October 19, 2022, where Kagarlitsky talked about the circumstances, military and strategic significance and political consequences of the explosion. We found this video to contain no signs of propaganda or justification of terrorism, as defined in the notes to Article 205.2 CC.

On July 18, the 2nd Western District Military Court received a case under Article 205.2 Part 2 CC against 22-year-old Prokhor Neizhmakov. Neizhmakov arrived from Rubizhne (the Sievierodonetsk District of the Luhansk Region) to the Vladimir Region in the spring of 2022 to visit his mother and sister and received temporary asylum status in Russia. The criminal case against him was initiated in early March based on messages that he, according to the investigation, sent in November 2022 to the “Vladimir Gang” (vladimirskaya banda) Telegram chat. Neizhmakov wrote that Russia with its “imperial ambitions” was destroying Ukraine, that due to Vladimir Putin’s policies, he had “no home, education and everything else,” and that Ukraine will negotiate with Russia only after Putin is overthrown. From our point of view, if this is the only charge imputed to Neizhmakov, he is being prosecuted inappropriately. The phrase “we will not negotiate with Putin... overthrow him and then let’s go ahead” is too abstract to be considered a call to terrorism – in fact, it says nothing about the methods of “overthrowing.”

Inciting Hatred towards the Authorities and Their Supporters

We classify as inappropriate the sanctions under Article 20.3.1 CAO (incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity) for critical statements targeting public servants (including law enforcement officers) or military personnel, unless such statements are accompanied by calls for violence or credible threats of violence.

We recorded two such cases in July. In the second half of the month, the Anzhero-Sudzhensk City Court of the Kemerovo Region fined retiree Oleg Tyryshkin, a trade union activist, 15 thousand rubles based on harsh comments regarding the military he had made in VKontakte groups. Tyryshkin had already faced sanctions under Article 20.3.1 CAO and other CAO articles on prior occasions. In our opinion, the prior sanctions were inappropriate as well.

On the same day, the Yefremov Interdistrict Court of the Tula Region fined Pavel Skorovarov 10 thousand rubles for leaving insulting comments about law enforcement officers under a post about “lessons in courage” school initiatives in the group “Overheard in Yefremov.”

Discrediting the Use of the Armed Forces or Government Agencies

We view as inappropriate the charges under Article 20.3.3 CAO for discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces and the activities of government agencies abroad as well as under Article 280.3 CC for repeatedly discrediting these entities, unless the relevant statements are accompanied by direct calls for violence.

According to the Mediazona portal, as of the second half of July, the total number of cases under Article 20.3.3 CAO, received by Russian courts since its introduction, has reached 7430. As before, people face sanctions for their offline and online statements, for picketing or displaying posters, for slogans on their clothes, for graffiti on various objects, for distribution of printed campaign materials, for singing Ukrainian songs, and so on.

In July, this category also came to include Vladimir Kvachkov, a 74-year-old former GRU colonel and a well-known nationalist politician, who had previously found himself behind bars on numerous occasions, including on the charges of attempting an armed rebellion. Kvachkov assumes that his case under Article 20.3.3 CAO could be based on the appeal by the All-Russian Officers' Meeting published by Kvachkov on social networks. In this text, he and his associates criticized the course of the military operation in Ukraine and urged “to move from conducting a special operation to a full-scale war with the Ukrainian army.” The Tverskoy District Court of Moscow postponed the consideration of Kvachkov’s case until mid-August.

In July, we became aware of four sentences under Article 280.3 Part 1 CC (repeatedly discrediting the use of the Russian armed forces). According to the OVD-Info project, as of the second half of July, the total number of defendants in criminal cases opened under this article since its introduction into the Criminal Code has reached 101.

• On July 18, the Leninsky District Court of Penza sentenced retiree Nikolai Gutsenovich to a fine of 100 thousand rubles. Gutsenovich reacted to certain posts on Odnoklassniki, causing the posts to automatically appear on his page. In total, he positively reacted to 18 posts. According to the investigation, some of these posts characterized the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine as “criminal, predatory,” and contained allegations that Russian troops carried out rocket attacks in Ukraine, “which resulted in the death of civilians.” Earlier, Gutsenovich was fined 30 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO for his one-person picket holding an anti-war poster.

• Two additional verdicts we consider dubious in the part that involves Article 280.3 CC:
• On July 7, the Kireevsky District Court of the Tula Region sentenced Igor Kazankov under Article 280.3 Part 1 with Article 214 Part 1 (vandalism) and Article 282.4 Part 1 CC (repeated public display of Nazi symbols) to three years in prison with a two-year ban on administering websites on the Internet. Kazankov, while drunk, engaged in disorderly behavior in the store and the parking lot near it, bared his torso to display tattoos with Nazi symbols, and shouted, “Glory to Ukraine!” Kazankov had faced administrative responsibility in Moscow for a previous similar incident in the Moscow metro. In March 2022, the Dorogomilovsky District Court fined him 50 thousand rubles under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO and placed him under arrest for ten days under Article 20.1 Part 2 CAO (disorderly conduct) and for eight days under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (public display of Nazi symbols).
• On July 12, the Novomoskovsk City Court of the Tula Region sentenced Sergei Buivol to three and a half years in a minimum-security penal colony under Article 280.3 CC and Article 318 Part 2 CC (use of violence endangering life or health against a representative of the authorities). In May 2022, he was fined under Article 20.3.3 CAO because of his post on Odnoklassniki criticizing the actions of Russian military pilots in Ukraine. We have no information on the statements that triggered the criminal prosecution against him under Article 280.3 CC. During his detention, Buivol behaved aggressively and put up armed resistance against law enforcement officers.

In July, we became aware of 11 new cases under Article 280.3 CC against 11 people:

• a musician from Vladivostok for his posts on Twitter; he had previously been fined for posting pictures and comments on VKontakte, criticizing the Russian armed forces and commenting on the events in Bucha;
• Vladimir Sukhorukov from the Pechersky District of the Pskov Region;
• Alexei Filyugin from the village of Ust-Uyskoye in the Kurgan Region for posts on a social network; he was also charged with spreading fake news about the army under Article 207.3 Part 1 CC and sent to a pre-trial detention center;
• Alexander Kapustin, a well-known activist from Krasnoyarsk, for his Telegram comment that the Russian soldiers were committing crimes in Ukraine;
• Olga Avdeeva, a surgeon from Izhevsk for writing the word “fascists” in red paint under the Z symbol on the facade of the Tchaikovsky Theater of Opera and Ballet;
• Batyr Zhaboev from Nalchik for his Instagram video, in which he stated that during the Chechen wars and the hostilities in Ukraine, the Russian military caused civilian deaths and characterized the actions of the Russian armed forces as “fascist and predatory”;
• activist Zulfiya Sitdikova from Kazan, who had previously been fined for coming to Oleg Gazmanov’s concert wearing an anti-war T-shirt:
• Ruzil Bisheva, a schoolteacher and founder of the Saratov Parents movement, for writing to the Minister of Education of the Saratov Region demanding that the “Important Conversations” class at school, the Unified State Exam, the Basic State Examinations, and the Russia-Wide School Tests be canceled, Her appeal specifically criticized the “special operation”; she had previously been fined for her anti-war messages in a Viber group chat;
• 39-year-old Dmitry Ch. from Nizhny Tagil – likely local activist Dmitry Cherepkov – for commenting on VKontakte that, while he did not support the “Banderites,” he still viewed the Russian troops as “occupiers.” He had been previously fined for comments on the same social network;
• Crimean resident Dmitry Kozlya, previously fined for making anti-war comments on Facebook;
• Lidia Prudovskaya, a resident of Mirny in the Arkhangelsk Region, for unspecified posts on VKontakte.

“Fakes about the Army” Motivated by Hatred

We disagree with the use of the motive of political hatred in libel cases, including in cases of spreading false information about the Russian army. The manifestation of political or ideological hatred, in and of itself, is not criminalized, and we believe that it is appropriate to classify this motive as an aggravating circumstance only in articles on crimes that pose a serious public danger, namely, in articles on the use of violence. We believe that the motive of political hatred in cases of military “fakes” is invoked inappropriately. Obviously, people who publish information about military operations in Ukraine that differs from the official position most often ideologically and politically disagree with the course of the authorities and thus, in most of these cases, it is a form of peaceful political criticism, which should not be limited. Therefore, we consider prosecution under paragraph “e” of Article 207.3 Part 2 CC (disseminating knowingly false information about the use of the Russian armed forces motivated by political hatred) inappropriate, unless the incriminating statements contain incitement to violence.

In July, it was reported that a criminal case had been opened against Ukrainian journalist Yanina Sokolovskaya, who had frequently appeared on Russian TV in the past. According to the investigators, from March to May 2022, she published on her Telegram channel “knowingly false information” about the actions of the Russian armed forces against the civilian population in Ukraine. Her Moscow apartment was searched, but she had already left Russia. Sokolovskaya was the Izvestia-in-Ukraine editor-in-chief until 2014; over the years, she collaborated with other Russian media outlets: Kommersant, RIA Novosti Ukraine, Channel One, and Russia 24.

Vandalism

We doubt the validity of imposing sanctions for vandalism motivated by political hatred (Article 214 Part 2 CC), since, in most cases, these actions represent a form of political propaganda. As we said above, we believe that the motive of political hatred is only appropriate as an aggravating circumstance in the articles related to the use of violence. Additionally, in our opinion, unless the property damage is significant, vandalism cases should be terminated for insignificance. In significant cases where the material damage was still relatively minor, we suggest introducing an article similar to Article 7.17 CAO that penalizes destruction or damage of other people's property or amending Article 7.17. Termination of the case with the appointment of a judicial fine also seems to us a reasonable compromise.

It became known in July that, back on May 17, a magistrate of Court District No. 16 in Mogochinsky Judicial District of Zabaykalsky Krai sentenced local resident Alexander Korus to a year of restriction of freedom. It follows from the verdict that Korus placed graffiti on fences of various Russian Railways facilities and automobile bridges calling Russian President Vladimir Putin a “fascist,” comparing supporters of his political course to zombies, criticizing the military action in Ukraine, expressing his support for Ukraine and protesting against the mobilization. He also painted “1984” on fences – as stated in his verdict, he intended to compare the events taking place in Russia to the plot of George Orwell's 1984, a novel about a totalitarian regime in a fictional state where people live under constant control. The damage caused by his actions did not exceed six thousand rubles.

On July 27, the Tula Regional Court sentenced Daniil Stepanov, a resident of Aleksin, to four and a half years in a minimum-security penal colony under Article 214 Part 2 CC and Article 275.1 CC (cooperation on a confidential basis with a foreign organization in order to assist it in activities known to be directed against the security of the Russian Federation). Stepanov was found guilty on four counts of anti-war graffiti placed on the city administration building and the military enlistment office discrediting the president and the government; he was also charged for setting fire to “patriotic banners.” Law enforcement agencies claim that they found the flags of Ukraine and the Freedom of Russia Legion (not yet recognized as a terrorist organization at the time) in his home, as well as correspondence with the Legion’s participants. The verdict in the Stepanov case has not yet been published, however, we doubt the legitimacy of this decision, not only under Article 214 Part 2 CC, but also under Article 275.1 CC. Stepanov's acts of vandalism may have inconvenienced local utility services but could hardly harm Russia's national security. Thus, the purpose of his confidential cooperation with foreign organizations, if any, is not clear. Perhaps the exact nature of the charges against him will become clearer if the text of the verdict is published.

Countering Organized Anti-Government Activities

Navalny's Supporters

In late July, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow placed Ivan Trofimov and Alina Olekhnovich, students of the Higher School of Economics, under house arrest. They are charged under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participation in the activities of an extremist organization). It was reported on social networks that law enforcement agencies consider the students to be involved in certain “underground headquarters” of Alexei Navalny created on the basis of the Navalny Headquarters network that was liquidated in 2021 and had previously operated officially throughout Russia. Law enforcement officials interpret the involvement in the “underground headquarters” as continuing the activities of the previously liquidated organization. In our opinion, the decision to recognize the structures of Alexei Navalny and his associates, including the Navalny Headquarters, as extremist was not sufficiently justified, and therefore we view the sanctions against the politician’s supporters under Article 282.2 CC for continuing their activity as inappropriate.

Displaying Banned Symbols

In mid-July, a report against activist Sergei Mamaev was filed in Yoshkar-Ola under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO (propaganda or public display of extremist symbols); he was detained by the police. The case was based on his post in support of Alexei Navalny. Mamaev was photographed on June 4 on Lenin Square in a T-shirt adorned with an English-language slogan calling for Navalny’s release; he then posted the photo on his VKontakte page. The Yoshkar-Ola City Court returned the report to the police on the same day. We regard sanctions for displaying the symbols of Navalny's team as inappropriate. Moreover, it is not clear on what grounds law enforcement agencies classify slogans in support of Navalny as symbols of his organizations.

Nevertheless, the Central District Court of Voronezh fined Vasily Nesterenko and his wife Galina a thousand rubles each in the second half of the month under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for a photo published in the “Team Navalny” Telegram channel. The couple posed next to the “I love Voronezh” monument in T-shirts demanding the release of Alexei Navalny.

In July, we learned about several cases opened under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for displaying a white-blue-white flag. Russian law enforcement agencies and courts view this flag as a symbol of the Freedom of Russia Legion recognized as a terrorist organization in Russia, even though the Legion’s version of the flag includes a clenched fist. The white-blue-white flag appeared among Russian emigrants in late February 2022 prior to the creation of the banned Freedom of Russia Legion and is still widely used as a symbol of opposition to the Russian authorities often with no connection to this organization. Thus, people are often punished without proper justification. In addition, it is quite possible that some of them did not deliberately display the white-blue-white flag but instead became victims of provocation. Apparently, activists operating in several regions place white-blue-white stickers on the license plates of parked cars.

• In early June, the Leninsky District Court of St. Petersburg fined Vladimir Verkhoturov two thousand rubles. As it turned out, a white-blue-white flag without additional images was placed atop his car license plates. The Petersburg resident claimed during the hearing that he did not know about the existence of the Freedom of Russia Legion or its symbols.
• In July, the Oktyabrsky District Court of Ufa, fined Anton Kovalyov 1,500 rubles under the same charges and confiscated his license plate frame.
• The Tsentralny District Court of Novokuznetsk placed 21-year-old Konstantin Yamboglo under arrest for five days for installing a white-blue-white flag as his VKontakte profile picture.
• The Nagatinsky District Court of Moscow placed Vladimir Borisenko under arrest for 15 days for a similar profile picture on Telegram. He was also fined under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO for certain photo and video materials published in chats.
• The Kirovsky District Court of Tomsk fined Maxim Balyuk 1,500 rubles for a white-blue-white flag patch on his backpack.

It was reported in July that, back in early June, the Magadan City Court fined Yevgeny Lebedev two thousand rubles under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for posting a short video with the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!” (apparently, an excerpt from the video by Andrei Nikolaev, the founder of the TTR online casino) on his YouTube channel. The court decided that this slogan was an attribute of the banned Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Ukrainian nationalists in general. We believe that charges under Article 20.3 CAO in such cases are inappropriate. This article penalizes displaying the symbols or attributes of banned organizations but not publishing their slogans. In addition, the slogan “Glory to Ukraine,” which came into use in the early 20th century, cannot be viewed solely as the motto of Ukrainian nationalist organizations banned in Russia. In recent years it has been ubiquitous in Ukraine and, since 2018, it has become an official greeting in the Ukrainian army and police. Lebedev was also fined under Article 20.3.3 Part 1 CAO.

In mid-July, the Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol found Eva Ranevskaya guilty under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO for publishing on Instagram stories a photograph of a banner with the Z symbol and the slogan “Work, brothers!” with a swastika drawn next to it. Ranevskaya used Nazi symbols as a means of political criticism – not to promote Nazism. We believe that people who promote Nazism should be the ones punished for the use of Nazi symbols.

In early July, the Almetyevsk City Court in Tatarstan fined local resident Vladimir Zemskov two thousand rubles under Article 20.3 Part 1 CAO. While inspecting his apartment, the police found a cross with the image of a swastika in his kitchen. According to the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose opinion was upheld by the court, the cross with the swastika was “in open access,” it was seen by Zemskov’s cohabitant. In our opinion, no public demonstration of the prohibited symbols took place in this case, since the cross with the swastika was not in any public space but at Zemskov’s apartment, where only a limited number of people could see it.

The Tverskoy District Court of Moscow placed Pavel Ivlev (rap artist Pasha Tekhnik) under administrative arrest for 13 days in early July. The ruling, published on the court’s website, indicates that the case was based on a photograph of Ivlev in his underwear showing the sig rune tattoo on his thigh. This photo was published in March by a Telegram channel named “Pasha Tekhnik.” In the case materials, Ivlev’s affiliation with this channel was confirmed by a report from a Counter-Extremism Center operative. However, the rapper claimed that this channel did not belong to him, and he personally as well as his subscribers, had repeatedly complained about its content to the Telegram administration. He also explained that at the time of publication, he was receiving drug addiction treatment in a rehab center. The Telegram channel referenced in the court order has only 21 subscribers, and clearly belongs not to Pasha Tekhnik but to his ill-wishers. Thus, evidently, the rapper faced sanctions for the information he did not post.

Protecting Historical Memory and Traditional Values, “Enforcing Tolerance”

“Rehabilitating Nazism”

On July 25, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia sentenced Sergei Drugov, a blogger and the author of the “War is a Cringe” Telegram channel to two years of compulsory labor with a three-year ban on administering websites on the Internet under Article 354.1 Part 4 CC for rehabilitating Nazism (dissemination on the Internet of disrespectful information about the days of Russia’s military glory and memorable dates related to the defense of the Fatherland). The case was based on the message of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance shared by Drugov on his channel. In a post entitled, “May 9th: The Misery Day, the Death Regiment, the Parade on Spilled Blood,” the activists criticized the commemoration of Victory Day, given the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, and announced alternative mourning actions for May 9. We maintain that critique of certain ways of celebrating Victory Day, not associated with Nazi propaganda, should not constitute grounds for prosecution.

In mid-July, it became known that a criminal case under Article 354.1 Part 4 CC (desecration of symbols of military glory of Russia using the Internet) had been opened in Nevinnomyssk of Stavropol Krai against Kirill Pilyugin, a resident of Moscow. He was placed under house arrest. According to investigators, in November 2022, Pilyugin sent to the “Visible Protest” Telegram channel a photograph of the local Hero’s Star monument in the Alley of Heroes of the Fatherland. A temporary sticker on the monument with the letter Z in the St. George Ribbon colors and the name of a participant in the military operation in Ukraine (obviously placed there to be later replaced with a permanent name plate) was covered with the word “Bucha.” We believe that criminal prosecution can be justified only in the case of crimes that pose a significant danger to society. In this case, it is not even clear whether the “Bucha” sticker was physically placed on the monument, or whether it was a collage, but the monument was not damaged in any case.

In late July, a criminal case under the same Article 354.1 Part 4 CC was initiated in the Omsk region against a 74-year-old retiree after she shared on Odnoklassniki a post from the “Russia Renewed Fascism” page. The post was found to contain signs of a “negative attitude towards a symbol of military glory of the Russian Federation” – the St. George Ribbon.

It is worth reiterating that in General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 (Freedoms of Opinion and Expression) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee expresses its concern regarding laws on such matters as, in particular, disrespect for symbols.

“Insulting the Feelings of Believers”

In early July, a criminal case was initiated in Ulyanovsk under Article 148 Part 1 CC (public actions expressing clear disrespect for society and committed in order to insult the religious feelings of believers) and Article 213 Part 1 CC (hooliganism motivated by religious hatred or enmity) against Said Abu Mustafa, a native of Egypt, who was placed under arrest. According to investigators, on the night of July 1, on the bridge across the Sviyaga River in Ulyanovsk, the defendant “committed public acts in order to insult the religious feelings of believers”: he trampled on the Quran, poured alcohol on it and then threw it into the river. He filmed all this and later published a video on the Internet, where he accompanied his actions with statements that the Quran was a “dirty book” that needed to be “thrown underfoot” and “trampled with old boots.”

We consider the criminal case opened against Said Abu Mustafa inappropriate. The SOVA Center opposed the introduction of Article 148 CC of insulting the feelings of believers, since, in our opinion, this vague concept does not and cannot have a clear legal meaning. For cases like the above, the legislation provides for administrative liability – a case against him could be initiated under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO (intentional public desecration of religious or liturgical literature). We also doubt that Abu Mustafa’s act falls under Article 213 Part 1 CC, since it was committed at night and obviously went unnoticed. Thus there was no gross violation of public order. The mere fact of posting a video on the Internet also does not form part of Article 213 CC. However, the reports about the completion of the investigation in the case, published in August, no longer mentioned the hooliganism charge.

In the second half of the month, the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar received a criminal case under Article 148 Part 2 CC (public insult to the religious feelings of believers, committed in places specifically designed for worship) against local blogger Sophia Burger. The criminal case was based on a video made in March. On it, Burger danced against the backdrop of a grave at the Vsesvyatskoe cemetery holding a cigarette in her mouth and making indecent gestures with both hands; she later posted the video on social media. The investigation concluded that she, “out of disrespect toward the Orthodox faith,” acted with the intent of offending the religious feelings of believers. It is not clear on what grounds the blogger’s actions were qualified under Article 148 Part 2 CC – unlike a temple, a cemetery should not be considered a place specifically designed for worship.

In late July, the Khamovnichesky Interdistrict Prosecutor's Office of Moscow opened a case under Article 5.26 Part 2 CAO against Maxim Melnikov, a 22-year-old transgender person. The case has already gone to court. The case was based on the fact that Melnikov's social network profile included a collage of an Orthodox icon with his photograph instead of the saint’s face. According to the prosecutors, the experts who examined the image concluded that it “is presented in a socially demeaning context and, in its understood meaning, expresses clear disrespect for the society committed in order to insult the religious feelings of believers.” In our opinion, posting such images online should not, in and of itself, be interpreted as a desecration of religious paraphernalia, since such posts involve no actions toward physical objects of veneration. It is also worth noting that the concept of “desecration” has never been legally defined.

Persecution against Religious Organizations and Believers

Jehovah's Witnesses

Prosecutions against Jehovah's Witnesses on the charges of involvement in the activities of local religious organizations banned as extremist continued in July. We believe that the decision to ban them had no legal grounds and consider it a manifestation of religious discrimination. It is worth reminding that, in June 2022, the ECHR ruled on the Jehovah's Witnesses’ complaint stating that the ban on Jehovah's Witnesses materials and organizations and sanctions against believers violated the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ECHR demanded the end to the criminal cases under Article 282.2 CC against Jehovah's Witnesses and the release of imprisoned believers.

We know of four sentences issued in July against nine believers.

• On July 11, the Kuznetsky District Court of Novokuznetsk sentenced Lyubov Serebriakova to four years' imprisonment under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC (participation in the activities of an extremist organization).
• On July 12, the Savyolovsky District Court of Moscow sentenced Anatoly Marunov to six years in a minimum-security penal colony under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC (organizing the activities of an extremist organization), and Sergei Tolokonnikov and Roman Mareev – to five and four and a half years in a penal colony, respectively, under Article 282.2 Part 1.1 of CC (involvement of others in the activities of an extremist organization).
• On July 27, the Kovrov City Court sentenced Boris Simonenko to two years and seven months of imprisonment under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. The term is considered already served, since the court took into account Symonenko's time in a pre-trial detention center, under house arrest and a ban on certain actions. So, only the additional punishment, one year of restriction of freedom, remains in effect.
• On July 28, the Petrozavodsk City Court sentenced four believers to fines under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC: Mikhail Amosov, Nikolai Leschenko and Dmitry Ravnushkin were sentenced to fines of 500 thousand rubles, and Mikhail Gordeev – 450 thousand rubles.

We also note several important decisions of second-instance courts.

• On July 6, the Sverdlovsk Regional Court once again considered the case of Alexander Pryanikov, Venera Dulova and Daria Dulova, charged under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC, and decided to cancel the guilty verdict issued by the lower court and return the case to the prosecutor to eliminate the violations. Earlier, the regional court fully acquitted the defendants, but the Supreme Court of Russia did not agree with this decision.
• On July 18, the Khabarovsk Regional Court considered the appeal of Alexei Ukhov and decided to suspend his six-and-a-half-year sentence previously issued by the Sovetskaya Gavan City Court under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC.
• On the same day, the Murmansk Regional Court considered the appeal of Denis Merkulov and reduced his fine, imposed by the Apatity City Court under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC, from 500 thousand to 400 thousand rubles.

New instances of persecution against Jehovah's Witnesses were reported in July. At least five people became defendants in new criminal cases.

• In late June, a criminal case under Article 282.2 CC was initiated against three believers from Tver – Maxim Barbazyuk, Alexander Kostyuk and Valery Tolmazov. Their homes were searched in the second half of July.
• In the first half of the month, a criminal case against Valery Klokov was initiated in Barnaul under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. In late July, the court ordered a preventive measure in the form of house arrest.
• In mid-July, Anton Virich from the town of Uzhur in Krasnoyarsk Krai was detained and then sent to a pre-trial detention center. It turned out that formally, since February 2022, he had been under house arrest as a defendant in a criminal case under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC. Virich claims that he did not know about the house arrest and never received appropriate notifications.

Tablighi Jamaat

It became known in mid-July that ten alleged followers of Tablighi Jamaat had been detained in Moscow and the Moscow Region. Three of them are suspects under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC and seven more – under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. According to investigators, three immigrants from Kyrgyzstan organized the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat cell in the Moscow Region and involved seven additional individuals in its work. The defendants in the case were detained, their homes were searched and religious literature confiscated. At least nine of them were arrested by the Ostankinsky District Court of Moscow.

Tablighi Jamaat was banned in Russia in 2009 without proper grounds. The association was engaged in the propaganda of fundamentalist Islam but not implicated in any calls for violence, and therefore we consider the prosecution against its followers inappropriate.

Followers of Said Nursi

Active monitoring of migrants continued in Moscow throughout the month. On July 30, the Moscow Investigative Committee reported that a certain group of people organized the work of a banned international religious extremist organization on the territory of the capital‘s Southwestern District and held meetings that involved studying religious literature in 2020 – 2022. While investigating the relevant criminal case, law enforcement officers raided one of the fight clubs in the southeast of Moscow and ran background checks on over 100 migrants from Central Asia from among its visitors. On August 1, we were informed of the detention of Zurab Dzhabrailov under Article 282.2 Part 1 CC and Dzheykhun Ikret Ogly Rustamov under Article 282.2 Part 2 CC. Both are suspected of participating in meetings of Muslims, where the attendees studied the books of the Turkish theologian Said Nursi, and thus, from the point of view of law enforcement officers, continued the activities of the banned association Nurcular. They were placed under arrest the next day.

Nurcular was recognized as extremist in 2008 based on a series of unreasonable bans against the books of Turkish Islamic theologian Said Nursi for promoting the superiority of Islam over other religions. In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that by banning these books Russian courts had violated Article 10 of the European Convention, which guarantees freedom of expression. We also believe that Russian Muslims who study Nursi's heritage do not constitute a single organization. Meanwhile, as a result of the ban against Nurcular, Muslims who read and discuss Nursi's books face criminal charges under Article 282.2 CC.

Hizb ut-Tahrir

On July 12, the Central District Military Court passed a sentence against three defendants in the Hizb ut-Tahrir case from Ufa. Farit Kharisov was sentenced to 16 years in a maximum-security penal colony under Article 205.5 Part 1 CC (organizing the activities of a terrorist organization), Timur Khabibullin and Radik Talipov – to 11 and 12 years in a maximum-security colony, respectively, under Article 205.5 Part 2 CC (participating in the activities of a terrorist organization). They were found guilty of holding religious meetings and talking to local residents in order to spread the party ideology.

We believe that there were no sufficient grounds for banning Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization since the party was never involved in terrorism. Accordingly, we view the charges against Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters under the “terrorist” articles of the Criminal Code, made solely based on their party activities (holding meetings, reading literature, etc.) as inappropriate.