

**Galina Kozhevnikova**  
**SOVA Center for Information and Analysis**  
<http://sova-center.ru>

# **The Hate Speech In And Out Of the Election Campaign**

**The Media Monitoring: September 2003 – March 2004**

Under the editorship of A. Verkhovsky

**The joint Project by SOVA Center for Information and Analysis,  
Moscow Helsinki Group,  
The Center for Development of the Democracy and Human Rights, and  
Social Information Agency**

**Moscow  
March 2004**

# Contents

<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>STANDARD MONITORING.....</b>	<b>5</b>
CHANGES IN METHODOLOGY.....	6
<i>Hate Speech Forms</i> .....	6
<i>Hate Speech Objects</i> .....	7
<i>Other Rubricates</i> .....	8
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS.....	8
1. <i>General Tables</i> .....	8
3. <i>Characters</i> .....	10
4. <i>Forms of Hate Speech</i> .....	11
5. <i>Objects</i> .....	13
6. <i>Form-Object Generalized Table</i> .....	16
7. <i>Dynamics</i> .....	17
<b>DEDICATED RESEARCH: PARLIAMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN.....</b>	<b>22</b>
GENERAL NOTES ON METHODOLOGY.....	22
1. TOTAL NUMBER.....	23
<i>Table 1.1. Total Number of Records in the DB</i> .....	23
<i>Table 1.2.1. Materials Related to Elections in Absolute Numbers</i> .....	23
<i>Table 1.2.2. Materials Related to Elections in Percentage</i> .....	23
<i>Table 1.3. Attitude to Elections</i> .....	24
2. FORMS OF HATE SPEECH.....	25
<i>Table 2.1. Forms of Hate Speech in Absolute Values</i> .....	25
<i>Table 2.2. Forms of Hate Speech in Percentage</i> .....	26
3. OBJECTS OF HATE SPEECH.....	28
<i>Table 3.1. Objects of Hate Speech in Absolute Values</i> .....	28
<i>Table 3.2. Objects of Hate Speech in Percentages</i> .....	28
4. FORM-OBJECT TABLE.....	32
5. CHARACTERS.....	33
5.1. <i>Political Orientation of Characters of Hate Speech</i> .....	33
5.2. <i>Orientation of Political Object of Hate Speech</i> .....	34
6. TABLE "CHARACTER-OBJECT ORIENTATION".....	35
7. TABLE "ORIENTATION OF CHARACTER OF THE HATE SPEECH / HATE SPEECH FORM".....	36
8. TABLE "ORIENTATION OF CHARACTER OF THE HATE SPEECH/ORIENTATION OF OBJECT FOR HATE SPEECH".....	37
<b>THE PARLIAMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN OUTSIDE THE MONITORING.....</b>	<b>39</b>
PARTY PROPAGANDA.....	39
<i>The LDPR</i> .....	39
<i>The CPRF</i> .....	40
<i>The Motherland ("Rodina") bloc</i> .....	40
<i>The United Russia ("Edinaya Rossiya")</i> .....	41
<i>Other Parties</i> .....	42
DISCUSSING PRE-ELECTION HATE SPEECH.....	42
<b>PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.....</b>	<b>45</b>
CONTENDERS.....	45
<i>Oleg Malishkin and the LDPR</i> .....	45
<i>Nikolay Kharitonov and the CPRF</i> .....	46
<i>Sergey Glazyev</i> .....	47
OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF HATE SPEECH.....	47
DISCUSSING HATE SPEECH USED IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.....	49

## Introduction

The small book you're holding in your hands constitutes a new stage of a joint project addressing the problem of ethnical and religious intolerance (the "*Hate Speech*") plaguing the media. Our project includes a press monitoring, analysis of trends in the *Hate Speech*, staging public discussions and actions.

The joint NGO team consisting of Moscow Helsinki Group (the "MHG"), the Center for Development of the Democracy and Human Rights (the "CDDHR"), the Panorama Center, and the Glasnost Protection Fund completed the first stage of the project in 2001-2002. The stage included monitoring of the federal and regional media, seminars attended by journalists, various actions in the regions to develop a "teach-yourself book" on journalist ethics<sup>1</sup>. The first stage ended with a dedicated conference held in Moscow and publication of the book "*Hate Speech – My Speech. The Problem of Ethnical and Religious Intolerance with the Russian Media*".

The second, "intermediary", stage included the monitoring of the federal press alone right after the hostage situation at Dubrovka Theater Center in Moscow ended; and it was conducted by the SOVA Center.

The third stage is currently implemented by the SOVA Center in conjunction with the MHG, the CDDHR, and the Social Information Agency (the "SIA") to include, beside studies, public discussions and actions arranged in various regions of the country plus a dedicated course for students of the Journalist Department of the MSU.

The SOVA Center has put its project-related website on the Internet – <http://sova-center.ru><sup>2</sup> where two newsreels are continuously maintained. The first one includes the most noteworthy cases of *Hate Speech* usage, the noteworthy being considered by us not only clearly improper use of words, but also controversial borderline cases. The purpose of our project is to initiate discussions on ways to treat ethnical and religious issues when writing rather than condemn journalists. The second one includes such discussions arranged in the media.

The study resulted in this book is a continuation of the monitoring of the federal and regional media conducted from October 2001 to April 2002 and the "intermediary" monitoring of the federal media covering four months after the Dubrovka hostage situation ended. Currently, the federal monitoring has been conducted by the SOVA Center, and the regional one – by MHG.

We did our work at the time when the Parliament election and the Presidential campaign were run in the country, which put a special color to this report. The report is divided into three parts:

The first one is consisted of a so-called standard monitoring directed, as before, to identifying and categorizing the *Hate Speech*. It was carried out in September-December 2003 to cover a limited number of publications and it was based on the methods worked out at the previous stages.

The second part is dedicated to study on the Parliament election campaign, which also began in September 2003. The study was focused on using the *Hate Speech* by the competitors. It was also built on increased number of sources of information. New classifiers were developed to allow more completely reflecting particular qualities of the *Hate Speech* used during the Parliament election campaign and identify its party and ideological orientation and characteristics.

The third part is a pre-election monitoring of the media conducted outside the formal structure of the study. Naturally, it's divided into time periods of the Parliament election and the Presidential campaigns.

The special feature of the current stage of the project is that we dropped the earlier practice of leaving authors of the *Hate Speech* unidentified. In the proposed report, the 'rating' of publications is included, although rating is used here with the inverted commas since the monitoring covered just a few publications, and those were not selected by xenophobia infection principle.

At all stages, we were particularly interested in the attitude of journalists themselves to the *Hate Speech*, both the specific cases of its usage and to the problem in general. Particularly, this was treated in a few chapters discussing the *Hate Speech*.

<sup>1</sup> The "*Hate Speech*" and the Freedom of Speech: The Interethnic and Interconfessional Issues with the Russian press / Professional Journalist Ethics: Work papers in 2 parts. By Yu.V. Kazakov. M.: Galeria, 2003

<sup>2</sup> See <http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E>. On the website of the project, there can be found results obtained at all of its stages.

The English version of this book is slightly abridged compared to the Russian original. Namely, we thought it appropriate to remove the most of data on time dynamics of the monitoring, data on specific publications, and analysis of the results in generalized categories of objects and forms of the *Hate Speech*.

We want to extend our gratefulness to the Media Program staff of the Open Society Institute (London) for support of our project.

## Standard Monitoring

Like in 2001-2002, in this monitoring we included federal newspapers<sup>3</sup>, as well as 5 newspapers published in each subject of the Russian Federation (the “region”): Krasnodar Area, Ryazan, Irkutsk and Perm regions and St. Petersburg. Therefore, consistency with the first stage was kept: four regions out of five (except the Irkutsk region) appeared to be among the five regions treated at the time.

Based on the past experience, publications void of cases of the *Hate Speech* was removed from the monitoring. As a result, only newspapers were covered in the monitoring.

For our monitoring we selected different newspapers, both daily and weekly, of different circulation and to varying degree of the reliability (from the newspapers ‘for decision makers’ to publications considered a gutter press), each of them more or less suspected of using the *Hate Speech*.

On the federal level, 8 daily newspapers and 2 weekly publications were sampled.

### Daily Newspapers:

Izvestia;  
Zhizn;  
Komsomolskaya Pravda;  
Moskovskiy Komsomolets;  
Nezavisimaya Gazeta;  
Noviye Izvestia;  
Sovetskaya Rossiya<sup>4</sup>;  
Rossiya<sup>5</sup>.

### Weekly Publications:

Argumenti i Fakti;  
Literaturnaya Gazeta.

The following publications were studied in the regions:

#### **Krasnodar area**

Volnaya Kuban  
Patriot Kubani  
Kuban Segonya  
Krasnodarskiy Kuryer  
MK na Kubani

#### **Ryazan region**

Ryazanskiye Vedomosti  
KP-Ryazan  
Novaya Gazeta - Ryazan  
Vechernaya Ryazan  
Efir

#### **Perm region**

Mestnoye Vremya  
Zvezda  
Permskiye Novosti  
Dosie 02  
Zhizn – Perm

#### **Irkutsk region**

Pyatnitsa  
Vesti

---

<sup>3</sup> We remind you the concept of the ‘federal level’ for newspapers is quite relative as they are frequently oriented to the Moscow region. This is deemed to cover publications issued in Moscow and positioning themselves as “All-Russian”.

<sup>4</sup> It is issued three times a week.

<sup>5</sup> From December 2003 it was issued three times a week, from January 2004 – once a week.

Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda  
Kopeyka  
KP – Irkutsk

**St. Petersburg**

Spb Vedomosti  
Spb Chas Pik  
Izvestia – Spb  
Metro  
Smena

## ***Changes in Methodology***

Like in the previous study, the presence of the *Hate Speech* in a text (defined broadly to include pictures, headings and announcements) is determined quite subjectively. We would suggest the monitoring team to gauge the *Hate Speech* by the extent it would be unpleasant to them to read a statement in question about the ethnical or religious group they considered themselves a part of. Also, the detailed *Hate Speech* classification developed and refined before was used.

On each publication, beside necessary output information, two main features of the *Hate Speech* were primarily noted – its form and its object.

### **Hate Speech Forms**

The forms of the *Hate Speech* varied from the hard core (in effect, criminal: calls for violence or discrimination by nationality or religion) to the mildest (like incorrect jokes on the nationality subject). Of course, we took it into consideration that the same text could contain a few forms of the *Hate Speech*. Therefore, no wonder in the tables below the aggregate of the *Hate Speech* forms is generally in excess of the total number of articles.

The changes to the '*Hate Speech* Forms' classifier made prior to the intermediary monitoring in 2002-2003 appeared to be so good there was no need to enter new forms of the *Hate Speech* this time. This makes the results of our monitoring commensurable to those of previous one (even despite there was no religious component then). At the same time the classifier is still quite flexible at times allowing subjectivity in form determination.

The following is a list consisting of 16 forms of the *Hate Speech* put in the order in which further statistics are to be cited.

- A. Calls for violence (i.e. in connection with a specific situation, the object of violence being pointed out; proclamation of violence in articles, documents, etc. to be permissible means to resort, including general calls like "Beat the Jew!");
- B. Calls for discrimination, including general slogans;
- C. Covert calls for violence and discrimination (propaganda of 'positive' examples of violence or discrimination taken from the present or from the past; expressions like "it would be good to do something to somebody" or "it's high time to...", etc.);
- D. Promotion of a negative image of a group (allegations are not stated expressly, but rather implied by the tone of the text);
- E. Justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination (expressions like "In 1915, the Turks killed Armenian in self defense");
- F. Questioning universally accepted historical facts of violence and discrimination (e.g. Holocaust or statements like 'Chechens were deported for their siding with Hitler');
- G. Statements about deficiency (lack of culture, intellect, creativity) of any ethnical or religious group as a whole (ideas like "A market is the only place Azerbaijanis are able to work in", "Kazakhs are a bit stupid");
- H. Statements about historical crimes of any ethnical or religious group as a whole (like "Muslims used to promulgate their faith with fire and sword", "Poles used to plot against Russians");
- I. Statements about criminality of any ethnical or religious group (e.g. "the Gypsy is a thief");
- J. Statements about moral deficiencies of any ethnical or religious group ("Jews are mercenary-minded", "Gypsy are cheats" – should be distinguished from the cultural or intellectual deficiency);
- K. Speculations about a disproportionately large number of representatives of any ethnical or religious group in terms of wellbeing, representation in authorities, the press, etc.;

- L. Allegation of any ethnical or religious group exerting a negative influence on the society, the state (“dilution of national identity”, “foreigners will turn Moscow into a non-Russian city”, “Mormons will undermine our Orthodox Church”);
- M. Mentioning a group or its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context (including criminal reports, or just mentioning an ethnicon);
- N. Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given area or a city (e.g. protests against building a mosque in a the “Orthodox city”);
- O. Citing clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments setting a demarcation line between the position of the interviewee and that of the journalist; likewise – giving a space in a newspaper for a clear nationalistic propaganda without any editorial comments or other dispute;
- P. Allegation of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts with respect to a group (literally, as compared to calls to disallow settlement in an area).

Further we will use such generalized concepts as ‘hard core’, ‘medium, and ‘mild’ *Hate Speech*. They are corresponding to as follows:

- ‘hard core’ – A, B, C, and N;
- ‘medium’ – E, F, H, I, K, Law, and P;
- ‘mild’ – D, G, J, M, and O.

### **Hate Speech Objects**

Unlike the forms classifier, the objects classifier of the *Hate Speech* was slightly changed in the monitoring. Like in the first monitoring, the ‘General Religious Xenophobia’ object covering non-directional hostility (‘non Orthodox’, ‘non Muslims’) was singled out of the ‘Other Religious Groups’ category. Of course, making changes when the work was under way could have distorted the whole picture. However, the activities on this category were small, which made the error insignificant.

It’s worthwhile reminding the objects are, strictly speaking, not ethnical or religious groups proper, but their images created by the media (e.g. not Chechens, but people called Chechens by journalists). This results in the fact the borderline of a group and its image may not coincide, or there may emerge generalized (e.g. ‘blacks’, that is people singled out on a text by color of their skin, no matter the country of origin, or ‘all other’, that is ‘the general ethnical xenophobia’) or highly blurred images to which no group can not be attributable (e.g. ‘Americans’ who are no ethnos, but to whom authors attribute an ethnical hue).

Like in the previous study, *the objects of the Hate Speech* (with short descriptions) will be listed in the order as the related statistics will be further cited:

1. Blacks
2. Americans
3. Western Europeans
4. Jews
5. Ukrainians
6. Russians
7. Gypsies
8. Tadjiks
9. Chinese
10. Vietnamese
11. Chechens
12. Armenians
13. Azerbaijani
14. Iraqis
15. Arabs (except Iraqis)
16. Meskhetian Turks
17. Other peoples of Caucasus (other than Chechens, Armenians or Azerbaijani)
18. Caucasians as a whole
19. Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)
20. Other ethnic categories (i.e. more or less concrete objects except those already listed)
21. General ethnic xenophobia (i.e. without reference to a particular object)
22. Orthodox Christians
23. Muslims

24. Catholics (and Uniats)
25. New and small religious groups
26. Other religious categories (other religious groups)
27. General religious xenophobia ("non-Orthodox Christians," "non-Christians," "non-Muslims" etc).

### **Other Rubricates**

Apart of the form and the object, the monitoring team was also supposed to pinpoint the author(s) of the text, 'characters' of the article, i.e. all persons generating the *Hate Speech*. Those can be journalists themselves (including where any of them, directly or indirectly, supports a statement created by someone else in the spirit of a *Hate Speech*, although the concepts of the 'author' and the 'character' are fundamentally different.

Accordingly, it was required to point out author's attitude the *Hate Speech* in his text. Like in the previous studies, the attitude was divided into three categories: 'rather positive (rather approving the *Hate Speech*), 'rather negative' and 'neutral'. We'll keep in line with this classification as we further deliver results of our study.

## ***Analysis of Results***

### **1. General Tables**

4 months of work resulted in entering overall 870 records in the database, including federal-related - 748, and regional-related -122<sup>6</sup>. Since some materials provided a few forms and objects of the *Hate Speech*, necessitating a few records to be entered, this number is larger than the number of the materials selected.

**Table 1.1. In absolute figures**

	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Total
Federal level	529	138	81	748
Krasnodar territory	28	16	2	46
Ryazan region	39	1	1	41
Perm region	3	1	2	6
St. Petersburg	16	4	9	29
Total	615	160	95	870
Including discussion on HS <sup>7</sup>	4	1	11	16

**Table 1.2. Taken as a percentage**

	Positive		Neutral		Negative		Total
	To this category	To the total	To this category	To the total	To this category	To the total	
Federal level	86,02	60,80	86,25	15,86	85,26	9,31	85,98
Krasnodar territory	4,55	3,22	10	1,84	2,11	0,23	5,29
Ryazan region	6,34	4,48	0,625	0,11	1,05	0,12	4,71
Perm region	0,49	0,35	0,625	0,11	2,11	0,23	0,69
St. Petersburg	2,6	1,84	2,5	0,46	9,47	1,03	3,33
Total	100	70,69	100	18,39	100	10,92	100

These figures are twice as much as those provided by the monitoring conducted in 2001-2002 (the 'First Monitoring') (870/452<sup>8</sup>) and quite comparable with the results of the monitoring conducted in the end of 2002 – beginning of 2003 (the 'Second Monitoring') (870 (including 748 found in federal

<sup>6</sup> On the Irkutsk region, there were just a few statements, all of them either raising doubts as to containing the *Hate Speech* or being borrowed from the federal press. Therefore, we decided to exclude them from analysis of the data.

<sup>7</sup> HS stands for *Hate Speech* for the purposes of the table.

<sup>8</sup> Excluding the Kemerovo region.



newspapers)/ 804). However, the First Monitoring dealt with six, rather than four months period, and there were greater number of publications of the federal level involved, whereas the Second Monitoring was conducted in a much more heated political atmosphere: after the hostage situation in Moscow and at the climax of the Iraqi crisis.

**Table 1.3<sup>9</sup>. Comparison of the results of three stages of the monitoring<sup>10</sup>**

		Positive		Neutral		Negative		Total
		Number	In % to Total	Number	In % to Total	Number	In % to Total	
R1	Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	452 <sup>11</sup>
	Including R1F	120	55.05	26	11.93	72	33.03	218
R2		416	51.74	263	32.71	125	15.55	804
R3	Total	615	70.69	160	18.39	95	10.92	870
	Including R3F	529	70.72	138	18.45	81	10.83	748

Comparison of the federal media component with the regional one in the first and current monitorings suggests the following: while in the first monitoring those were almost equal with the regional component even slightly exceeding the federal one (234 and 218 respectively), the current monitoring shows a considerable reduction of the former (122 and 748, i.e. slightly more than 14% of the total of records). The dramatic reduction of the *Hate Speech* in the regions is pointed out by the research team too.

Substantial change in authors' attitude to the *Hate Speech* is easily detectable when comparing the results of all three stages of the monitoring with each other on the federal level, the number of the '*Hate Speech* Disapproval' records not only reducing (the negative dynamics here continued through all three periods of the study), but the 'Neutral Attitude' one in the last monitoring fell 1.7 times compared with the second. Also, while earlier authors' attitude was determined by the monitoring team's senses, now, according to the researchers, support of the *Hate Speech* is often deliberately stressed in a text (e.g. an expression like "*the crime was committed by a resident of the Moscow surrounding area, who's also a national of Tajikistan (or Azerbaijan, etc.)*") is nearly everyday part of the criminal news.

While quantitative indicators of the second monitoring in relation to the first one could be attributable to the 'Dubrovka aftereffect' (supported by its monthly dynamics), no event like Dubrovka occurred in the period considered in the current monitoring. Theoretically, the splashes of the *Hate Speech* could be caused by the Tuzla and 'Ukos' case' events. However, the current monitoring's dynamics (see below) shows no sharp deviation. It will be demonstrated further nothing happened but redistribution among the objects of the *Hate Speech*.

Table 1.1. also shows as the number of articles discussing the *Hate Speech* in the press were generally growing (16 vs. 9 in the Second Monitoring), **for the first time** there appeared in the category materials in which their authors showed a **positive** attitude to the *Hate Speech*, such materials counting a quarter of the total. Journalists' reflection seems to be developing, and latent disagreements come to the surface. It's possible it's just about the general change in journalists' attitude to the *Hate Speech*, which is discussed later in the book.

<sup>9</sup> The tables show the share of the regions percentage wise is so small it can be neglected in further comparison with the Second Monitoring results. Therefore, the comparison of the second and the third stages of the study seems to be quite appropriate, even with the 'regional' component taken into account.

<sup>10</sup> For short and convenience of comparing the results, the following abbreviation will hereinafter be used: The 2001-2002 monitoring – R1, including its federal component – R1F, the regional excluding the Kemerovskaya region - R1R, the intermediary monitoring on the federal press – R3. This monitoring – R3 including its federal component – R3F, the regional one – R3R.

<sup>11</sup> Since, in the generalized results of the First Monitoring, it's impossible for us to single out the Kemerovo newspapers' statements broken down into authors we decided to limit ourselves with a general indicator. The regional results of the First Monitoring were as a whole the following: 'approval' – 355, 'neutral' – 93, 'disapproval' – 97, total – 545 statements.

Also, considering the amount of pre- election materials in this monitoring is quite insignificant<sup>12</sup> (71) – i.e. the materials published prior to the elections did not have any material effect to the amount of the *Hate Speech*, there's not just a positive dynamics we can state. The use of the *Hate Speech* in newspapers (at least those at the federal level) is becoming deliberate, with attempts to justify it being made.

### **3. Characters**

Like publication, the table is sorted out in descending powers of the 'approval' and 'neutral' aggregate.

		Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
1	Journalist	367	43	9	419
2	Common Citizen	41	32	27	100
3	Cultural Worker	20	21	10	51
4	Politician	18	14	17	49
10	Public Figure	7	2	17	26
5	Expert	16	9	0	25
6	Law Enforcement Agent	7	7	4	18
7	Government Official	9	3	2	14
8	Military	6	5	2	13
9	Newspaper Cartoonist , Photographer	10	0	0	10
11	Historical Character	6	1	1	8
12	Religious figure	5	1	0	6
13	Entrepreneur	1	2	0	3
14	Total	513	140	89	742

Journalists are the natural leaders in the list. No surprise, common citizens are the second to the top as their statements (readers' letters, the 'street voice') are selected by editors.

If we, like in the first two monitorings, take a look at the state's and society's contribution to the *Hate Speech*, the following picture will appear before us. The state represented by the government official, the law enforcement agent and the military provides us with a total of 45 statements, whereas the society (the public and the religious figures, the expert, the entrepreneur and the cultural worker) – 111. Like ever before, we exclude politicians out of the comparison as they can be related to both the state and the society. Therefore, the main producer of the *Hate Speech* is still the society, rather than the state represented as indicated above. Let's compare the ratio of the state to the society for 2001-2002.

	R1	%	R2	%	R3	%
State	22	26.8	43	22.3	45	28.8
Society	60	73.2	150	77.7	111	71.2
Ratio	0.37		0.29		0.41 <sup>13</sup>	

The ratio shows that although the 'society' component in the last monitoring is slightly reduced (even quite noticeably in quantitative terms), it's still premature to treat it as a trend.

Authors' reaction to the *Hate Speech* generated by characters of different forms is still varying. If we compare the ratio of the aggregate indicator to 'disapproval' of the *Hate Speech* on all three stages, we'll see the following<sup>14</sup>:

	R1			R2			R3		
	A	D	A/D	A	D	A/D	A	D	A/D

<sup>12</sup> In this monitoring, however, the results related to the regional (Moscow and Ryazan) election campaigns were not taken into account as pre-election-related materials. But considering the majority of the Moscow campaign's figurants had everything to do with the Parliament elections, the 'per-election' error is not too big.

<sup>13</sup> On the regional level, the ration is 12/13.

<sup>14</sup> In the table the following legends are used for convenience: A – aggregate indicator, D – disapproval, A/D – in aggregate/disapproval.

State	15	7	2.14	28	15	1.87	37	8	4.63
Society	49	12	4.08	108	42	2.57	84	27	3.11

The table shows the extent to which journalist's attitude to the *Hate Speech* generated by the state and the society has changed. While, according to the First and the Second Monitorings, the disapproval of the *Hate Speech* generated by state's representatives was quite substantial, it dropped two times by the end of 2003. Also, that was the first time in all three stages that the 'state' became less criticized for the *Hate Speech* than the 'society'. It might be regarded as a peculiar reflection of changes in the general political atmosphere of the country. It also follows from the table the reduction of the 'public *Hate Speech*' was by no means due to journalists' negative attitude thereto – compared with the Second Monitoring the *Hate Speech* became less disapproved.

Also, our concern is a change in journalists' attitude to some characters. For instance, while at the first stage of the study the share of 'disapproval' by common citizens was almost equal to the aggregate (23 to 24 respectively), at the end of 2002 – beginning of 2003 the ratio was 28/76. It was practically unchanged in the current monitoring too (27/73). The figures suggest in the first monitoring the *Hate Speech* in the articles quoted as saying by 'people from the street or taken from readers' letters was referred to as a negative example in half the cases, and beginning from the second monitoring it seemed to serve to inspire journalists to generate their attitude. It's interesting that incorrect statements by experts making up almost quarter of all statements did not meet any disapproval **at all**. But then most of experts come up with author's articles (i.e. pose themselves as journalists) for publication, so how can you expect them to disapprove of themselves. And some of experts take the position of the 'government' (like in case of a psychologist expert from a state-owned scientific and research institute discussing problems related to 'totalitarian sects'). This is just one more proof that journalists prefer to leave 'state persons' out of their disapproval.

The share of disapproval of the *Hate Speech* generated by politicians is traditionally large.

	Total	Disapproval
R1	52	23
R2	26	7
R3	49	17

Comparison of all three stages with each other shows that politicians disapproval level, having dropped by 2003 in Dubrovka emergency heated atmosphere, now have rebounded to where it used to be. Apparently, it is politicians that take the most of journalist's attention.

#### **4. Forms of Hate Speech**

Like in the previous monitorings, put in bold the absolute values exceeding 20, and in percentage – over 5.

**Table 4.1. Statements in absolute values**

	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Calls for violence	<b>250</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>25</b>	343
Calls for discrimination	10	10	<b>22</b>	42
Covert calls for violence and discrimination	<b>140</b>	<b>29</b>	18	187
Promotion of a negative image of a group	<b>73</b>	18	11	102
Justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination	6	3	10	19
Questioning universally accepted historical facts of violence and discrimination	<b>38</b>	6	7	51
Statements about deficiency of a group	6	1	6	13
Statements about historical crimes of a group	<b>27</b>	5	6	38
Statements about criminality of a group	<b>52</b>	14	5	71
Statements about moral deficiencies of a group	<b>71</b>	12	5	88
Speculations about the disproportionately large number of representatives of a group	<b>25</b>	2	5	32
Accusations of a group of exerting a negative influence	11	3	3	17

Mentioning a group of its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context	1	0	2	3
Calls to not allow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given region	3	4	2	9
Quotation of clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments	<b>33</b>	4	1	38
Accusation of a group of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts	0	0	0	0
	746	179	128	1053

**Table 4.2. Statements in percentage<sup>15</sup>**

	Approval		Neutral		Disapproval		Total
	To this category	To the aggregate	To this category	To the aggregate	To this category	To the aggregate	
Calls for violence	0.80	0.57	1.68	0.29	<b>7.81</b>	0.95	1.80
Calls for discrimination	1.34	0.95	<b>5.59</b>	0.95	<b>17.19</b>	2.09	3.99
Covert calls for violence and discrimination	1.48	1.04	1.68	0.29	2.34	0.29	1.61
Promotion of a negative image of a group	<b>6.97</b>	4.94	<b>7.82</b>	1.33	3.91	0.47	6.74
Justifying historical cases of violence and discrimination	0.13	0.10	0	0	1.56	0.19	0.28
Questioning universally accepted historical facts of violence and discrimination	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Statements about deficiency of a group	<b>9.79</b>	<b>6.93</b>	<b>10.06</b>	1.71	<b>8.59</b>	1.05	9.69
Statements about historical crimes of a group	0.80	0.57	0.56	0.10	4.69	0.57	1.23
Statements about criminality of a group	<b>9.52</b>	<b>6.74</b>	<b>6.70</b>	1.14	3.91	0.47	8.36
Statements about moral deficiencies of a group	<b>18.77</b>	<b>13.30</b>	<b>16.20</b>	2.75	<b>14.06</b>	1.71	17.76
Speculations about the disproportionately large number of representatives of a group	3.35	2.37	1.12	0.19	3.91	0.47	3.04
Allegation of a group of exerting a negative influence	3.62	2.56	2.79	0.48	4.69	0.57	3.61
Mentioning a group or its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context	<b>33.51</b>	<b>23.74</b>	<b>37.99</b>	<b>6.46</b>	<b>19.53</b>	2.37	32.57
Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given area	<b>5.09</b>	3.61	3.35	0.57	<b>5.47</b>	0.66	4.84
Quoting clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments	0.40	0.29	2.24	0.38	1.56	0.19	0.85
Allegation of a group of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts	4.42	3.13	2.24	0.38	0.78	0.09	3.61
	100	70.85	100	17.00	100	12.15	100

<sup>15</sup> We entered a new column in the Percentages table. The percentages were calculated not only within a category (the ratio to the *Hate Speech*), but also on the aggregate.

As compared with the second monitoring, the leaders remained almost unchanged. 'Mentioning a group or its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context' is the unrivaled favorite of the group followed by 'Statements about moral deficiencies of a group' counting 5 times fewer. Then follow 'Statements about deficiency of a group' and 'Statements about criminality of a group'. Only these four ones and 'Promotion of a negative image of a group' overcame the 5% borderline to total number of records.

Interestingly, 'Statements about criminality of a group' dropped to the fourth place from the third and the second in the second and the third monitorings respectively. Formerly the most expected and very popular form of the *Hate Speech* is gradually losing its leading position giving the way to milder and objectless forms of the *Hate Speech*. If not for a quantitative growth, this could be considered a positive trend.

Among other results, there should be noted a reduction of a negative attitude of authors to 'Calls for violence', which can not help being disturbing as this is the most cruel, in fact criminal, form of the *Hate Speech*. Still, it's in the three where the aggregate is below 'disapproval'. The remaining two are 'Calls for discrimination' and 'Justifying historical cases of violence and discrimination', the latter being referred to just three times.

At the same time, 'Questioning universally accepted historical facts of violence and discrimination' appears to be totally absent.

Also, it's striking that 'Allegation of a group of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts' soared 4 times compared with the previous monitoring, with the number of disapprovals of such statements not increased as we see it just once. It means typical 'anti-migration' sentiments with ethnic hue are not only growing in people, but also received backing of journalists.

Below is the disapproval ratio dynamics of the *Hate Speech*'s 'cruel' form in all three stages of the monitoring<sup>16</sup>:

Form of <i>Hate Speech</i>	Calls for violence	Calls for discrimination	Calls to not allow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given region	Covert calls for violence and discrimination
R1	80% <sup>17</sup>	59.22% <sup>18</sup>	59.03%	24.32%
R2	65.71%	53.84%	32.65%	27.27%
R3	52.63%	52.38%	13.72%	17.64%

The table clearly shows the disapproval of the 'cruellest' form of the *Hate Speech* has been steadily decreasing, which is the most disturbing trend demonstrated by our research: journalists not only tend to relate statements some of them could be well classified as criminal in nature, but also uphold them.

## 5. Objects

Table 5.1. Objects in absolute values

	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Blacks	12	10	7	29
Americans	43	14	2	59
Western Europeans	36	7	1	44
Jews	46	14	19	79
Ukrainians	41	5	1	47
Russians	41	17	10	68
Gypsies	28	6	4	38
Tadjiks	22	4	7	33
Chinese	42	11	1	54
Vietnamese	14	4	1	19
Chechens	38	13	6	57
Armenians	14	4	3	21

<sup>16</sup> 100% is attributed to the total of statements of this form of the *Hate Speech*.

<sup>17</sup> On the aggregate of 'Calls for violence and discrimination' and 'Covert calls for violence and discrimination'

<sup>18</sup> On the aggregate of 'Calls for discrimination' and 'Covert calls for discrimination'

Azerbaijani	<b>39</b>	6	6	51
Iraqis	3	0	0	3
Arabs (except Iraqis)	9	4	0	13
Meskhetian Turks	4	2	0	6
Other peoples of Caucasus	<b>37</b>	8	4	49
Caucasians as a whole	<b>71</b>	13	8	92
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	<b>33</b>	11	6	50
Other ethnic categories	<b>70</b>	13	10	93
General ethnic xenophobia	<b>33</b>	10	17	60
Orthodox Christians	9	2	1	12
Muslims	20	1	4	25
Catholics (and Uniats)	7	2	0	9
New and small religious groups	16	3	3	22
Other religious categories	9	2	2	13
General religious xenophobia	3	0	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>740</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>1049</b>

Table 5.2. Objects in percentage

	Approval		Neutral		Disapproval		Total
	To this category	To the total	To this category	To the total	To this category	To the total	
Blacks	1.62	1.14	<b>5.38</b>	0.95	<b>5.69</b>	0.68	2.76
Americans	<b>5.81</b>	4.10	7.53	1.33	1.63	0.19	5.62
Western Europeans	4.86	3.43	3.76	0.67	0.81	0.10	4.19
Jews	<b>6.22</b>	4.39	<b>7.53</b>	1.33	<b>15.45</b>	1.81	7.53
Ukrainians	<b>5.54</b>	3.91	2.69	0.48	0.81	0.10	4.48
Russians	<b>5.54</b>	3.91	<b>9.14</b>	1.62	<b>8.13</b>	0.95	6.48
Gypsies	3.78	2.67	3.23	0.57	3.25	0.38	3.62
Tadjiks	2.97	2.10	2.15	0.38	<b>5.69</b>	0.67	3.15
Chinese	<b>5.68</b>	4.00	<b>5.91</b>	1.05	0.81	0.10	5.14
Vietnamese	1.89	1.33	2.15	0.38	0.81	0.10	1.81
Chechens	<b>5.14</b>	3.62	<b>6.99</b>	1.24	4.88	0.57	5.43
Armenians	1.89	1.33	2.15	0.38	2.44	0.29	2.00
Azerbaijani	<b>5.27</b>	3.72	3.23	0.57	4.88	0.57	4.86
Iraqis	0.41	0.29	0	0	0	0	0.29
Arabs (except Iraqis)	1.22	0.86	2.15	0.38	0	0	1.24
Meskhetian Turks	0.54	0.38	1.08	0.19	0	0	0.57
Other peoples of Caucasus	<b>5</b>	3.53	4.30	0.76	3.25	0.38	4.67
Caucasians as a whole	<b>9.59</b>	<b>6.77</b>	<b>6.99</b>	1.24	<b>6.50</b>	0.76	8.77
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	4.46	3.15	5.91	1.05	4.88	0.57	4.77
Other ethnic categories	<b>9.46</b>	<b>6.67</b>	<b>6.99</b>	1.24	<b>8.13</b>	0.95	8.87
General ethnic xenophobia	4.46	3.15	<b>5.38</b>	0.95	<b>13.82</b>	1.62	5.72
Orthodox Christians	1.22	0.86	1.08	0.19	0.81	0.10	1.14
Muslims	2.70	1.91	0.54	0.10	3.25	0.38	2.38
Catholics (and Uniats)	0.95	0.67	1.08	0.19	0	0	0.86
New and small religious groups	2.16	1.53	1.61	0.29	2.44	0.29	2.10
Other religious categories	1.22	0.87	1.08	0.19	1.63	0.19	1.24
General religious xenophobia	0.41	0.29	0	0	0	0	0.29
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>70.54</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>17.73</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11.73</b>	<b>100</b>

Here the values exceeding 20 and the percentages over 5 are highlighted in bold.

Even at the first glance it can be seen that while the number of the *Hate Speech* usage cases is practically corresponding to that of the previous monitoring (it was 1063 then), its distribution inside the table changed noticeably.

First, the number of the *Hate Speech* disapproval cases reduced considerably. The 'Blacks' are the only exception here. The second and the current monitorings are quite comparable in racist statements (27 and 29 statements respectively). However, while in the second monitoring there were only three cases of disapproval, now they count 7. But then, if taken as a percentage it's worse than in the first monitoring anyway, where these values were 20 and 9 respectively.

Secondly, 'Chechens' hold just the sixth (!) place in the table. The number of cases of their mentioning dropped 4 times, this being the case with all categories of the 'attitude'. However, the number of the *Hate Speech* statements remaining the same means nothing but structural changes in addressing the *Hate Speech*. The dozens of statements that "fell to 'Chechens' lot" after Dubrovka incident now dragged, without any major provoking event, the most of objects referred to in the table: the number of the 'General ethnic xenophobia' cases, 'Tadjiks' and 'Azerbaijani'-related ones increased three times, 'Gypsies' and 'Peoples of Asia' – two times.

It may mean as the number of xenophobia statements becomes somewhat steady they gradually lose their focus on specific enemies paying increasingly equal attention to different objects. This is evidenced by the place of the generalized 'Other ethnic categories' – the number of ethnicons missing the table appeared to be so large that their total made this object the leader – 93 statements (in the first monitoring, the number of a similar group was 54, and in the second – 47). As high as this, the number does not imply a 'hidden' enemy not defined separately in our rubricate got into the 'other' category: beside Hindus, Mexicans, and other characters normally avoided by the media, 'Tatars', 'Turks' (other than 'Meskhetian Turks'), 'Moldavians' 'Estonians' (the latter mainly as anecdote's characters) have a rather equal representation.

Among specific categories in the table 'Caucasians as a whole' is the leading one. Here, we can state a considerable (twice as few) reduction of the number of authors disapproving the anti-Caucasian rhetoric. If combined, all the Caucasus-related objects would make up over a quarter of all the statements.

A steady growth in the *Hate Speech* can be detected with respect to 'Jews', where, with the total of anti-Semite statements increased 1.5 times, the number of disapproval cases, like with respect to 'Caucasians', decreased two times. In part, it can be explained will participation in the monitoring of the Ryazan region and the Krasnodar area, where the anti-Semite rhetoric is widespread traditionally; partly with the 'UKOS' case whose anti-Semite implication was once exaggerated by the media<sup>19</sup>. 'Jews' even slightly outstripped 'Chechens' and 'Americans'.

No doubt, the political factor played against 'Ukrainians' too. The numbers related to them nearly tripled as compared with the second monitoring, the incorrect statements peaking in October when the relations with Ukraine were the tensest. At the same time, the double increase of the *Hate Speech* with respect to Russians is absolutely unexplainable. Though, it's possible the increase was partly due to Moskovskiy Komsomolets. (Newspaper, apparently demonstrating political correctness understood in its own way, became stressing 'Russians nationals' in its criminal news reports).

'Iraqis' number appeared to be next to zero, and that of 'Meskhetian Turks', if compared with the first stage of the monitoring, quite low as the official propaganda campaign once having launched in the Krasnodar area has been cut down almost completely by now.

It's interesting to note on all three stages of the monitoring people of the Caucus origin<sup>20</sup>, 'Jews' and 'Americans'<sup>21</sup> are continuously in the top five most frequently subject to the *Hate Speech*. The continuous Caucus people's 'leadership' is not surprising – we are considering an integrated category. But the more unpleasant thing is, compared with the second monitoring, the current one shows a slight decrease on this form of the *Hate Speech* (268 and 249 respectively<sup>22</sup>), despite the Dybrovka's aftereffect has long since been behind. The amount of the *Hate Speech* towards 'Chechens' having decreased four times means other Caucus representative have advanced – the

<sup>19</sup>“The Case of Khodorkovskiy” and “The Jewish Capital” // SOVA Center, 2003. November 18 (<http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/213988B/2A1E21B>).

<sup>20</sup> Meaning the total of statements on all categories of people originating from Caucus ('Caucasians as a whole', 'Armenians', 'Azerbaijani', and 'Other peoples of Caucus', 'Chechens', 'Meskhetian Turks', 'Kurds').

<sup>21</sup> Both by the total number of statements and the aggregate.

<sup>22</sup> The aggregate.

generalized concept of 'Caucasian' first of all, which, as mentioned above, is itself leading among other objects.

It's also interesting that while at the first two stages 'Europeans' were also present in the top five, now they have been forced out by 'Chinese' – another evidence of anti-migrants sentiments' growth at the expense of the political situation.

If we consider the statements giving rise to the strongest aversion of journalist, the most of 'disapproval' is demonstrated with respect to 'General ethnic xenophobia', 'Blacks', 'Jews' and 'Muslims'. In the previous monitoring, 'Jews' was the only category found in the top five (also, they held the third place), and the strongest aversion of journalists was caused by statements directed to various religious groups (other than 'Muslims').

However, if we compare the current objects in the top five with the numbers of the same objects in the monitoring staged at the end of 2002 – beginning of 2003, the results of the comparison is as follows:

	General ethnic xenophobia	Blacks	Jews	Tadjiks	Muslims
R2	31.8% <sup>23</sup>	11.11%	45.2%	10%	10.81%
R3	28.33%	24.14%	24.05%	21.21%	16%

Even though 'General ethnic xenophobia' holds the first place by the amount of disapproval, the respective percentage has decreased compared to the second monitoring. The same applies to anti-Semite statements. They still cause a strong aversion, but not as strong as a year ago. As far as 'Blacks' are concerned, one can hardly be sure saying the disapproval of racist statements is growing. Their number is quite insignificant, and no shift to one side or another by a few points would not change the ratio substantially. The same applies to 'Tadjiks' and 'Muslims'. Of course, one would feel good about the percentage, though.

## **6. Form-Object Generalized Table**

From now on, with no break-down by authors' attitude to the *Hate Speech*, the aggregate numbers of 'disapproval' and 'neutral' cases are used. In this table we highlighted in bold the numbers exceeding 5.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Total
Blacks	0	1	0	4	0	0	1	0	2	3	0	0	<b>11</b>	1	0	0	23
Americans	0	0	0	<b>6</b>	0	0	<b>15</b>	2	0	<b>29</b>	0	5	<b>8</b>	0	1	2	68
Western Europeans	0	0	0	2	0	0	<b>11</b>	0	0	<b>21</b>	0	4	<b>13</b>	0	0	1	52
Jews	1	1	2	<b>16</b>	0	0	1	2	5	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	0	2	7	83
Ukrainians	0	1	0	2	0	0	<b>7</b>	0	0	<b>12</b>	0	0	<b>25</b>	0	0	1	48
Russians	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>7</b>	1	2	<b>30</b>	0	0	<b>20</b>	0	0	0	61
Gypsies	1	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	<b>13</b>	4	1	0	<b>20</b>	0	0	0	45
Tadjiks	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	5	0	0	<b>17</b>	4	0	0	32
Chinese	0	1	2	3	0	0	<b>13</b>	1	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	0	1	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	1	<b>14</b>	71
Vietnamese	0	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	0	<b>11</b>	1	0	0	21
Chechens	1	0	1	4	0	0	0	1	<b>14</b>	1	0	1	<b>34</b>	2	0	0	59
Armenians	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	2	0	<b>7</b>	5	0	0	22
Azerbaijani	0	3	0	2	0	0	3	0	<b>7</b>	3	2	0	<b>28</b>	<b>8</b>	0	0	56
Iraqis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Arabs (except Iraqis)	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	<b>6</b>	3	0	1	3	1	0	0	17
Meskhethian Turks	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	7
Other peoples of Caucasus	2	2	1	2	0	0	5	0	1	5	0	0	<b>28</b>	3	0	1	50
Caucasians as a whole	0	1	0	<b>7</b>	1	0	2	0	<b>14</b>	3	2	2	<b>61</b>	<b>7</b>	0	0	100
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	0	2	1	2	0	0	<b>8</b>	0	3	<b>10</b>	1	0	<b>18</b>	2	0	5	52
Other ethnic categories	2	3	0	5	0	0	<b>18</b>	0	4	<b>16</b>	0	2	<b>42</b>	3	1	3	99
General ethnic xenophobia	0	<b>9</b>	5	5	0	0	0	0	4	5	<b>7</b>	1	4	<b>10</b>	1	1	52

<sup>23</sup> In the table, the total of statements 'against' is taken for 100%, no matter an author's position.



Orthodox Christians	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	11
Muslims	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	5	0	1	8	4	0	0	24
Catholics (and Uniats)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	3	9
Newly emerged small religious groups	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	7	4	0	12	3	2	0	0	32
Other religious categories	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	1	0	1	12
General religious xenophobia	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	5
<b>Total</b>	12	32	16	73	1	0	10	7	10	19	31	36	39	66	7	39	1114

The first and foremost that strikes the eyes is that 'General ethnic xenophobia' (its amount tripled compared with the previous stage) is not only the leading category in the *Hate Speech* traditionally qualified as 'cruel' (calls for discrimination, covert calls for discrimination, etc.), but these forms of the *Hate Speech* are where it becomes the most apparent, like "Speculations about the disproportionately large number of representatives of a group' or 'Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given area'. Even 'Chechens' did not "succeed" as much in the previous monitoring. Here are typical statements of the kind: *"Till when will Russians have to please minor ethnoses serving a lubricant between them and an extinguisher to their arrogance?! Till when will we be judged wholesale and apiece as this is the order established by Kremlin rulers since the time of the civil war?! Till when will we be made to believe in our alleged guilt whereas there's nothing of the kind?! Till when will we be forbidden to have our national interests, national institutions, and a structure of Russia designed to serve the interests of the only state-forming nation – Russian?!..."*<sup>24</sup> *"When in Rome, do as the Romans do. But see what's happening on our streets! How insulting is the behavior of those having arrived from the former Soviet Republics! They think they are allowed everything. ...That's why the youth has to unite, so the Russians are not annihilated"*<sup>25</sup>.

For more defined objects, priorities generally remained. The claims to 'Russians' and 'Orthodox believers' are mainly moral in nature. 'Americans' and 'Europeans' are blamed by turns in moral, intellectual and cultural deficiency (with respect to the latter, 'Europeans' have become closer to 'Americans'), 'Chinese – in the territorial expansion, 'Caucasians', 'Chechens' and 'Gypsies' – in criminal behavior. 'Jews' are of course guilty of power seizure attempts and disproportional representation. Yet, all these groups are mainly subject to defamation. For instance, as far as so widespread object of the *Hate Speech* as 'Azerbaijani' is concerned, 'Mentioning a group or its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context' four times outweighed both 'Statements about criminality of a group' and 'Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given area'.


It's not ethnical objects that are alleged 'of exerting a negative influence', but rather 'Newly emerged small religious groups'. The last mentioned allegations are quite traditional, and their growth, compared with the first two stages of the study, can be accurately explained: in October 2003, a widely publicized conference "Totalitarian Sects – The Weapon of Mass Distraction" was held in Moscow. Also, a large coverage was given by the media to protests against construction of a Krishna church in Moscow.

## **7. Dynamics**

<sup>24</sup> Anatoliy Smirnykh. Still guilty? Enough is enough // Vechernaya Ryazan October 2, 2003.


<sup>25</sup> Russia: No Harbor For Fylfog // Zhizn, November 18, 2003.

**Diagram 1. Dynamics  
Hate Speech By Months**



	September	October	November	December
Disapproval	29	27	20	19
Neutral	41	56	39	24
Approval	161	191	142	121
Total	231	274	201	164

**Diagram 2. Dynamics of Hate Speech by Federal Press**




	September	October	November	December
Disapproval	26	19	18	18
Neutral	32	46	38	22
Approval	127	167	117	118
Total	185	232	173	158

Diagram 1 shows the general dynamics of the *Hate Speech*, and Diagram 2 – the dynamics of the *Hate Speech* in the federal media. It's easy to detect the *Hate Speech* outcrops on the federal

media more evenly than on the media generally. This is due to practically total disappearance of the *Hate Speech* in the regional media in December. Even if the pre-election *Hate Speech* did not make up a major part of the regional *Hate Speech* (see Section “Pre-election Monitoring”), the election anyway were bound to be a strong catalyst for incorrect statements to appear in the regions. At the same time, both diagrams provide a clear demonstration of even distribution of the *Hate Speech* for over all four months of the monitoring (the slight decrease in December – the result of completion of the election campaign and preparation to the New Year celebration). This again suggests the conclusion: having once overstepped a certain level of incorrectness (after Dubrovka), the newspapers were unable to get back. No matter if the media forms xenophobia sentiments in the society or, in the contrary, meets ever growing social demand, the fact remains: the *Hate Speech* level in the federal media is so high that there’s no need in any out-of-the-ordinary political provocations to make it higher.


Now, let’s take a look at the distribution by months of mentioning some objects worthwhile, in our opinion, being paid attention in this monitoring. .

**Diagram 3.**  
**Object - 'General Ethnic Xenophobia'**




	September	October	November	December
Aggregate	11	10	13	9
Disapproval	2	6	2	7

**Diagram 2. Dynamics of Hate Speech on Federal Press**



**Diagram 4.**  
**Object - 'Jews'**



	September	October	November	December
Aggregate	17	17	20	6
Disapproval	10	6	1	2

It's easy to note that, compared with general numbers, the peak of statements on these two objects, like the largest bracket between the aggregate and disapproval falls to November.


As far as 'Jews' are concerned, a link to the 'Case of Khodorkovskiy' can easily be traced – 15 aggregate mentioning and no disapproval of the *Hate Speech* fall to the first half of November (i.e. the first two weeks after the head of UKOS was arrested).

As far as 'General ethnic xenophobia' is concerned, it is, with rare exceptions, a fruit of politicians – election campaign participants. So, no surprise its intensity increases as the election date approaches. The disapproval level, low as it is, is no surprise too – no advertisement, whether express or implied, is intended to criticize the goods advertised.

Below is the distribution of incorrect statements in respect of natives of Caucus<sup>26</sup>:

<sup>26</sup> This generalized category includes 'Caucasians as a whole', 'Chechens', 'Armenians', 'Azerbaijanis', 'Meskhetian Turks' and 'Other people performe Caucus'.

**Diagram 5.**  
**Object - Natives of Caucus**



	September	October	November	December
Aggregate	61	65	56	49
Negative	10	11	4	2

The diagram shows the *Hate Speech* level towards them was quite steady, with some deviations in the range of 12. ‘Chechens’, going through the calm see in September (by aggregate – 6, 16, 15, and 14 statements), demonstrate a slightly different yet steady dynamics. This is all the more significant since two terrorist attacks (electric trains’ explosions on September 3 and December 5) and Dubrovka’s anniversary occurred during the monitoring. Newspapers’ reaction to these events was highly correct.

In general, the outcome of the standard monitoring is not comforting. There are just three positive points worthwhile noting. First, a sharp reduction of the *Hate Speech* in the regional publications (however, it may be linked to the common problems of the regional media – relations with local authorities, etc.); secondly, a gradual decrease of caucus phobia; third, gradual a quite steady increase of the share of the “mildest” forms of the *Hate Speech* (from half the *Hate Speech* in the first monitoring to two third in the last one).

Other phenomena noted by us (the *Hate Speech* stabilization (particularly, its cruelest forms – open and covert calls for violence and discrimination) in the federal media, growth of anti-Semite and anti-migrants sentiments, the *Hate Speech* diversity on objects etc.) can’t help disturbing.

# Dedicated Research: Parliament Election Campaign

## **General Notes on Methodology**

As we already said, beside the general monitoring of the *Hate Speech* in the Russian press, a study of the *Hate Speech* covering pre-election materials (the “pre-election monitoring”) was conducted. The materials were selected in the newspapers involved in the standard monitoring, as well as in other prints having the mass media status.<sup>27</sup>

In general, the pre-election monitoring was conducted on the basis of the methodology and using the general rubricates developed for the standard monitoring. The researchers were also guided by subjective evaluation of offensiveness of statements, and they also classified them by the form, object of the *Hate Speech*, etc. The same principles were laid down in building the generalized tables by forms and objects of the *Hate Speech*.

However, a few rubricates were added to reflect the pre-election trends of the *Hate Speech*. First, the pre-election materials selection criteria were defined, as it’s obvious any election campaign gives rise to a great number of publications formally having nothing to do with the elections in question, but in effect promoting or speaking against a candidate. Therefore, a publication was classified as ‘pre-election’ material if, in researcher’s opinion, it was either directly or indirectly related to Parliament election campaign: those were either articles about the elections, statements of those involved in the election process or references to them, statements of their representatives, etc.

Also, new terms defining political views of the election campaign’s participants were added to the database. There were included specific names of parties and blocs (The CPRF, “Rodina” bloc), and ideological features of the *Hate Speech* characters whose party affiliation was impossible to identify from publications (“national patriots”, “state-minded/centrists”).

Also, the pre-election monitoring methodology contains something that makes it fundamentally different from the standard monitoring. While in the latter case we were the most interested in the attitude to the *Hate Speech* on the part of authors of publications (i.e. in coming to the total we did not take into account the category of the *Hate Speech* disapproval), now first of all we pay attention to characters – participants and commentators of the political process. We look into what kind of the *Hate Speech* they use, who they apply it to and how active they are in doing that, rather than their appraisal by journalists – authors of publications. Therefore, in analyzing the pre-election *Hate Speech*, we’ll use the total number of statements, no matter authors’ attitude towards them.

Overall, 74 newspapers and magazines, including 35 newspapers covered by the standard monitoring, were studied during the pre-election monitoring. Other 39 publications were classified as follows:

### **Federal level:**

Magazines – 7

Daily newspapers – 3 (including the newspaper “Vremya-MN”, of which the issue was terminated in November 2003)

Weekly publications – 2 (including “Novaya Gazeta” issued twice a week)

Other – 7 publications having the mass media status, yet created clearly to suit the elections (including the newspaper URP “Rus”, by People’s Party and Mikhail Dvornikov personally, who was a candidate)<sup>28</sup>.

### **Regional level:**

The Krasnodar area – 6 newspapers

The Ryazan region – 5 newspapers

The Perm region – 5 newspapers

St. Petersburg – 4 newspapers.

The *Hate Speech* was not used at all in 40 publications out of the total covered.

<sup>27</sup> On-line media materials, as well as fliers, posters, etc were not considered in the DB. Their short review is provided separately (see Section “Party’s Propaganda Outside Scope of Monitoring”). The most offensive case of this category can be found on SOVA Center’s website.

<sup>28</sup> For short, we’ll call such newspapers party ones regardless of what party, bloc or specific candidate they represent.

## 1. Total Number

Overall, 941 articles were entered in the DB during the monitoring. We draw your attention to the fact these numbers include both the standard and pre-election monitorings which somewhat overlap, and therefore, when combined, can not be considered a total.

**Table 1.1. Total Number of Records in the DB**

The tables are broken down into attitude of publication's author to the *Hate Speech*

Regions	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Federal level	551	145	102	798
Krasnodar territory	34	17	2	53
Ryazan region	48	1	2	51
Perm region	4	3	2	9
St. Petersburg	16	4	10	30
Total	653	170	118	941

127 records were entered to the DB as directly-related 'pre-election materials'.

**Table 1.2.1. Materials Related to Elections in Absolute Numbers**

Regions	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Federal level	47	19	31	97
Krasnodar territory	8	2	1	11
Ryazan region	17	0	1	18
St. Petersburg	0	0	0	0
Perm region	0	0	1	1
Total	72	21	34	127
Including discussion on HS	2	0	9	11

**Table 1.2.2. Materials Related to Elections in Percentage**

In %	Approval		Neutral		Disapproval		Total
	In % to category	In % to total	In % to category	In % to total	In % to category	In % to total	
Federal level	65,28	37,01	90,48	14,96	91,18	24,41	76,38
Krasnodar territory	11,11	6,30	9,52	1,58	2,94	0,79	8,66
Ryazan region	23,61	13,39	0	0	2,94	0,79	14,17
St. Petersburg	0	0	0	0	2,94	0,79	0,79
Perm region	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	56,69	100	16,54	100	26,77	100

Therefore, the share of the pre-election monitoring is just 13.5% of the total number of records in the DB. Besides, the percentage of the federal media did not remained as high as in the standard monitoring. While it was about 86% there, it's low here by 10% even, and on the category 'the *Hate Speech* approval' – by 20% even. The most of these percents were generated by the Ryazan region. It means while on the federal level propagandists articulated things more correctly and enjoyed less support by journalists, it was quite the reverse with the Ryazan region where the election campaign gave rise to a multitude of xenophobia statements. The *Hate Speech* was inspired by elections in the Krasnodar area too. In contrast, in the Perm region, incorrect statements were totally out of the pre-election propaganda, and in St. Petersburg – just once.

It should be noted the share of the *Hate Speech* disapproval in the pre-election monitoring is much more than in the standard monitoring (26.77% and 10.92% of the total respectively). However, this is most likely explained by that politicians are the main characters of the *Hate Speech* in this monitoring, whom journalists normally treat severely.

The pre-election materials were allocated as follows:

**Table 1.3. Attitude to Elections**

	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Candidate or party's representative to be <i>Hate Speech</i> source	38	13	23	74
<i>Hate Speech</i> towards candidate or party's representative	7	0	4	11
In article, candidate or party's representative referred to in connection with <i>Hate Speech</i>	9	3	5	17
About elections without candidate or party's representative being mentioned	19	5	4	28
Total	73	21	36	130 <sup>29</sup>

So, half the cases relates to incorrect statements by pre-election campaign's participants themselves.


The diagram shows the pre-election *Hate Speech* peaked in November and the first week of December. It sharply livened up from the second week of November till December 6 and further kept on about the same level (the last four weeks prior to the elections – 20, 13, 16 and 20 statements). This is no surprise – the propaganda campaign was ascending and livened up sharply the last month prior to the elections making the *Hate Speech* rise simultaneously.

A high (more than half) level of candidate's *Hate Speech* approval by journalists and a fast growth of the approval cases as December 7 approached can't slip one's attention. This is mainly linked to a rather high level of party publications involved in out monitoring. Again, the most of pre-election material was express or implicit advertisement which is not expected to criticize the "goods" advertised.

<sup>29</sup> Since a few items were allowed to indicate in the rubricate, the total of statements somewhat exceeds that of the materials.



### Dynamics of Preelection Hate Speech



	September	October	November	1-7 December <sup>30</sup>
Approval	1	12	34	12
Neutral	0	7	6	3
Disapproval	0	3	11	5
Total	1	22	51	20

## 2. Forms of Hate Speech

### **Table 2.1. Forms of Hate Speech in Absolute Values**

Here, we highlighted in bold the absolute values over 10, and percentages в % – over 5

	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Calls for violence	0	0	2	2
Calls for discrimination	6	5	6	17
Covert calls for violence and discrimination	4	2	2	8
Promotion of a negative image of a group	8	1	2	11
Justification of historical cases of violence and	0	0	2	2

<sup>30</sup> Overall, there were 28 cases of the *Hate Speech* in December, 8 of them, however, being retrospective.

discrimination				
Statements about deficiency of a group	5	1	4	10
Statements about criminality of a group	<b>14</b>	1	4	19
Statements about moral deficiencies of a group	9	3	7	19
Speculations about the disproportionately large number of representatives of a group	<b>11</b>	2	3	16
Accusations of a group of exerting a negative influence	10	2	5	17
Mentioning a group of its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context	9	4	9	22
Calls to not allow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given region	10	3	3	16
Quotation of clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments	1	0	0	1
Accusation of a group of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts	<b>12</b>	2	2	16
<b>Total</b>	99	26	51	176

**Table 2.2. Forms of Hate Speech in Percentage**

	Approval		Neutral		Disapproval		Total
	To category	To total	To category	To total	To category	To total	
Calls for violence	0	0	0	0	3.92	1.14	1.14
Calls for discrimination	<b>6.06</b>	3.41	<b>19.23</b>	2.84	<b>11.76</b>	3.41	9.66
Covert calls for violence and discrimination	4.04	2.27	<b>7.69</b>	1.14	3.92	1.14	4.55
Promotion of a negative image of a group	<b>8.08</b>	4.55	3.85	0.57	3.92	1.14	6.25
Justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination	0	0	0	0	3.92	1.14	1.14
Statements about deficiency of a group	<b>5.05</b>	2.84	3.85	0.57	<b>7.84</b>	2.27	5.68
Statements about criminality of a group	<b>14.14</b>	<b>7.95</b>	3.85	0.57	<b>7.84</b>	2.27	10.80
Statements about moral deficiencies of a group	<b>9.09</b>	<b>5.11</b>	<b>11.54</b>	1.70	<b>13.73</b>	3.98	10.80
Speculations about the disproportionately large number of representatives of a group	<b>11.11</b>	<b>6.25</b>	<b>7.69</b>	1.14	<b>5.88</b>	1.70	9.09
Allegation of a group of exerting a negative influence	<b>10.10</b>	<b>5.68</b>	<b>7.69</b>	1.14	<b>9.80</b>	2.84	9.66
Mentioning a group of its representatives within a pejorative or insulting context	<b>9.09</b>	<b>5.11</b>	<b>15.38</b>	2.27	<b>17.65</b>	<b>5.11</b>	12.5
Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given region	<b>10.10</b>	<b>5.68</b>	<b>11.54</b>	1.70	<b>5.88</b>	1.70	9.09
Quoting clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments	1.01	0.57	0	0	0	0	0.57

Accusation of a group of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts	12.12	6.82	7.69	1.14	3.92	1.14	9.09
<b>Total</b>	100	56.25	100	14.77	100	28.98	100

“Priorities” applied by pre-election campaign’s participants to the *Hate Speech* form selection depending do not, apart of their amount, defer from those identified in the standard monitoring. Here, ‘Insulting context’ is also the leading form followed by ‘Statements about criminality of a group’ and ‘Statements about moral deficiencies of a group’. However, the quantitative difference between the leading forms of the *Hate Speech* is not as much in the pre-election monitoring as that in the standard one. Moreover, the numbers on 7 forms following the “leader” vary in the 3 point range which is less than 1.5%. The most disturbing is that among these 7 there are 2 out of 4 *Hate Speech* cases classified as ‘cruel’ – ‘call for discrimination’ (17 references) and ‘Calls to disallow settlement of migrants...’ (16 references). The slogans ‘We are for poor, we are for Russians’ and complaining that ‘the mother-Russia is pestered with someone’ are almost as frequent as incorrect usage of words, inappropriate reference to ethnicons, etc.


It also feels disturbing the attitude towards the *Hate Speech* adopted by authors relating statements made by pre-election campaign’s participants: the value for the *Hate Speech* disapproval is just twice as much as the aggregate value (in ‘Calls for violence’ and ‘Justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination’)<sup>31</sup>. But then, it’s not much different from what we had in the standard monitoring where, other than these two forms, ‘disapproval’ also prevailed in ‘calls for discrimination’.

Interestingly, the pre-election *Hate Speech* was totally absent of ‘Statements about historical crimes of a group’.

It seems important the percentage share of cruelest forms of the *Hate Speech* is twice as much as that obtained in the standard monitoring. If the cruelest and mildest forms are deducted, the ‘medium’ balance is also about twice as high as that for the standard monitoring. This contrasts with stability of the cruelest *Hate Speech* share and the steady trend of decreasing the ‘medium’ share in the standard monitoring.

It’s interesting to look into development of ‘Calls for discrimination’ (as the most popular of the cruelest forms) through the entire election campaign.

**Hate Speech form - 'Calls for discrimination'**



	September	October	November	December <sup>32</sup>
Approval	1	0	4	1
Neutral	0	2	2	1

<sup>31</sup> We remind you the “aggregate value” is understood to be the sum of the neutral attitude towards the *Hate Speech* and its approval.

<sup>32</sup> From now on, the data is understood to be for the whole month, including pre-election slogans in retrospect.

Disapproval	1	0	0	5
Total	2	2	6	7

Again, we can see a growth in intensity of these calls as December 7 was approaching. It's significant they practically did not meet journalist's disapproval until that time. And it's only after unexpected success of "Rodina" bloc and the LDPR, when journalists attempted to analyze the ingredients of their success, that those calls were disapproved almost unanimously.

### 3. Objects of Hate Speech

**Table 3.1. Objects of Hate Speech in Absolute Values**

Here, we also highlighted the numbers over 10, and percentages over 5.

	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Blacks	1	0	0	1
Americans	5	1	1	7
Western Europeans	5	2	0	7
Jews	<b>13</b>	4	6	23
Ukrainians	1	0	0	1
Russians	2	0	4	6
Gypsies	1	0	1	2
Chinese	5	2	2	9
Vietnamese	1	1	0	2
Chechens	4	1	4	9
Armenians	1	0	1	2
Azerbaijani	3	0	1	4
Meskhethian Turks	0	1	0	1
Other peoples of Caucasus	2	1	1	4
Caucasians as a whole	7	2	1	10
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	2	1	4	7
Other ethnic categories	3	2	2	7
General ethnic xenophobia	<b>19</b>	4	<b>11</b>	34
Orthodox Christians	1	1	0	2
Catholics (and Uniats)	2	0	0	2
New and small religious groups	3	1	3	7
Other religious categories	2	0	0	2
Total	83	24	42	149

**Table 3.2. Objects of Hate Speech in Percentages**

	Approval		Neutral		Disapproval		Total
	To category	To total	To category	To total	To category	To total	
Blacks	1.20	0.67	0	0	0	0	0.67
Americans	<b>6.02</b>	3.36	4.17	0.67	2.38	0.67	4.70
Western Europeans	<b>6.02</b>	3.36	<b>8.33</b>	1.34	0	0	4.70
Jews	<b>15.66</b>	<b>8.72</b>	<b>16.67</b>	2.68	<b>14.29</b>	4.03	15.44
Ukrainians	1.20	0.67	0	0	0	0	0.67
Russians	2.41	1.34	0	0	<b>9.52</b>	2.68	4.03
Gypsies	1.20	0.67	0	0	2.38	0.67	1.34
Chinese	<b>6.02</b>	3.36	<b>8.33</b>	1.34	4.76	1.34	6.04
Vietnamese	1.20	0.67	4.17	0.67	0	0	1.34
Chechens	4.82	2.68	4.17	0.67	<b>9.52</b>	2.68	6.04
Armenians	1.20	0.67	0	0	2.38	0.67	1.34

Azerbaijani	3.61	2.01	0	0	2.38	0.67	2.68
Meskhethian Turks	0	0	4.17	0.67	0	0	0.67
Other peoples of Caucasus	2.41	1.34	4.17	0.67	2.38	0.67	2.68
Caucasians as a whole	<b>8.43</b>	4.70	<b>8.33</b>	1.34	2.38	0.67	6.71
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	2.41	1.34	4.17	0.67	<b>9.52</b>	2.68	4.70
Other ethnic categories	3.61	2.01	<b>8.33</b>	1.34	4.76	1.34	4.70
General ethnic xenophobia	<b>22.89</b>	<b>12.75</b>	<b>16.67</b>	2.68	<b>26.19</b>	<b>7.38</b>	22.82
Orthodox Christians	1.20	0.67	4.17	0.67	0	0	1.34
Catholics (and Uniats)	2.41	1.34	0	0	0	0	1.34
New and small religious groups	3.61	2.01	4.17	0.67	<b>7.14</b>	2.01	4.70
Other religious categories	2.41	1.34	0	0	0	0	1.34
Total	100	55.70	100	16.11	100	28.19	100

Here, dispersion is more vivid than with the forms of the *Hate Speech*. 'General ethnic xenophobia' is the unrivaled "leader". It's followed by 'Jews' lagging behind it as much as outstripping other objects. 'Caucasians' are respectively three and two times behind the two "leaders". Moreover, even the integral value combining all the objects – native of Caucasus, is not the biggest (30). It should be noted, the level of authors' disapproval on statements about the first two groups is quite high – third and quarter of all the statements respectively, whereas a negative reaction was detected just once on ten 'anti-Caucasian' statements.


Interestingly, there are a few objects that did not show up in the pre-election rhetoric at all. The absence of 'Iraqis' and 'Arabs' is not surprising as their share in the standard monitoring was not large. On the contrary, the absence of 'Muslims', given particular features already noted by us, makes one to surmise the following: abstract slogans like "Russia's for Russian" / "We are for the poor, we are for Russians" and gambling on anti-Semite sentiments (connected with a social discord) seemed to politicians (not unreasonably as it turned out later) safer from the legal perspective<sup>33</sup> and more convenient in terms of the electorate than anti-Caucasians and anti-Muslims rhetoric that would make them lose considerable part of electors.

It's inconceivable why no 'Tajik' happens to be an object of anti-migrants rhetoric in the standard monitoring. They may be simply forgotten by those who preferred to raise anti-migrants (partly, anti-Chechens) sentiments on the same concepts of abstract, and hence safe, 'non-Russians' and 'Caucasians'? Or it might be difficult to link them (as opposed to 'Jews' and 'Azerbaijani') to the social rhetoric on which the propaganda campaign of the most of the election campaign's participants were built (redistribution of property, the mineral rent, fighting oligarchs, etc.). It's also worthwhile noting the share of 'Meskhethian Turks' is surprisingly small – just one reference (as it's small, though, in the standard monitoring's results too), the Krasnodar area generally leading by the *Hate Speech* among other regions being taken into account.

The above let us suggest since the federal elections rhetoric is for the most part void of specifics, the election's participants preferred to focus on abstract and semi-mythological objects rather than specific ones, some of them even being electors ('Muslims').

<sup>33</sup> At one of the TV debates, V. Zhirinovskiy put it bluntly saying statements like this ("Migrants – out", "We are for the poor...") are not subject to criminal charges. The Freedom of Speech // NTV December 5, 2003.


### General ethnic xenophobia



	September	October	November	December
Approval	2	5	10	2
Neutral	1	1	1	1
Disapproval	2	0	4	5
Total	5	6	15	8

The diagram is a clear demonstration of the extent of aspiration with which politicians wanted to defend Russia against “non-Russians” by the end to the election campaign. But in the case of ‘Jews’, the matter is quite the reverse.

### Object - Jews



	September	October	November	December
Approval	6	0	7	0
Neutral	2	2	0	0
Disapproval	4	0	1	1
Total	12	2	8	1

The election campaign's participants most frequently spoke of them negatively in September, particularly in the first half (8 statements vs. 4) of the month. This can be given quite a specific explanation: at that time it was announced electors residing in Israel were allocated to an electoral district of the Tula region. A stormy reaction to the decision made by the Central Election Committee was not failed to be reflected (with different analysis, of course) not only by national and patriotic but also traditionally liberal press (e.g. "Moscow News"). Also, the echo of the 100 anniversary of the "Protocols of the sages of Zion" fell to the beginning of September.

Then, the anti-Semite rhetoric comes to naught completely having slightly livened up in November. However, while, according to the standard monitoring, anti-Semite statements peaked in the first half of November (which is directly linked to Mikhail Khodorkovskiy's arrest), the pre-election anti-Semite *Hate Speech* dispersed itself very evenly (2 statements a week), mainly in Ryazan and the Krasnodar area (6 out of 8). In December, such statements ceased to be made (the only negative reference is related to "discussing the *Hate Speech*").

#### 4. Form-Object Table

Unless the table is broken down by author's attitude to the *Hate Speech*, a sum of all statements is further indicated, no matter the attitude of a publication's author thereto. In the table we highlighted numbers exceeding 5.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Total
Blacks	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Americans	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	4	1	0	0	2	11
Western Europeans	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	3	0	0	0	1	10
Jews	0	1	2	4	1	0	0	0	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	4	0	0	<b>6</b>	41
Ukrainians	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russians	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	10
Gypsies	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Tadjiks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chinese	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	0	<b>5</b>	12
Vietnamese	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Chechens	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	<b>5</b>	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	13
Armenians	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
Azerbaijani	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	8
Iraqis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arabs (except Iraqis)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Meskhetian Turks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other peoples of Caucasus	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	5
Caucasians as a whole	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4	3	0	0	13
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	10
Other ethnic categories	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	8
General ethnic xenophobia	0	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	1	0	0	1	0	2	3	<b>7</b>	3	1	<b>7</b>	1	0	42
Orthodox Christians	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Muslims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catholics (and Uniats)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
New and small religious groups	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	2	0	1	11
Other religious categories	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
General religious xenophobia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2	24	8	13	2	0	15	0	23	22	16	25	22	18	1	22	213

It follows from the table how popular were variations of the slogan "Russia's for Russian" in this election campaign – the object 'General ethnic xenophobia' is in fact a monopolist with respect to 'Calls for discrimination' (11 references). If 'Covert calls for violence and discrimination' (5 references) are added to the value, 'non-Russians' become unrivaled record-holders since nobody else managed to overcome the 7 points threshold on any form of the *Hate Speech*. Laying aside the Zhirinovskiy's slogan already referred to many times here, the following can be cited as an example of such statements: "Our nation, our state is in time trouble – unless resolute measures are taken immediately, the Russian Federation as it is will not be around in 20-25 years. And not later than in 30-40 years, the territory where they speak Russian now will be populated by people with different languages (S. Baburin, "Rodina" bloc<sup>34</sup>). Apart of statements like this, 'General ethnic xenophobia', along with 'Jews' absorbed the main bulk of allegation of disproportional representation (7 references

<sup>34</sup> Vladimir Polyakov. "Foreign Deputies" // Literaturnaya Gazeta. September 17, 2003.



each). But then, these two categories became objects to almost all forms of the *Hate Speech* set forth in our rubricate. As far as ‘non-Russians’ are concerned, no pre-election *Hate Speech* statement contained ‘Calls for violence’, ‘Justification of historical cases of violence and discrimination’ typically not numerous (and which are hardly applicable to this object at all), and allegations of territorial expansion (of quite specific anti-migrants kind). Concerning ‘Jews’, there were no calls for violence (i.e. slogans like “Beat the Jew...” were not used), statements about deficiency, as well as ‘Calls to disallow settlement of migrants belonging to a group in a given region’ and ‘Quoting clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments’ (which actually is not surprising as the first is typically anti-migrant, the second – appraisal of the position of the press editors, rather than that of a politician).

It should be mentioned ‘Jews’ appeared to be an object approached by our characters not only carefully, but with a great deal of creative power as well. Examples of their creativity speak for themselves:

“Afraid lest they should be punished  
(Especially RAO UES and Gasprom),  
To Israel Jews would like be vanished –  
Their money’s long been invested abroad...”<sup>35</sup>.

If back to the table, there should be noted allegations of ‘Chinese’ of territorial expansion and statements about criminality of ‘Chechens’ (5 references each).

## 5. Characters

(in the descending order of the aggregate)

Character	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Politician	19	12	22	53
Journalist	16	5	4	25
Common Citizen	8	4	0	12
Expert	3	1	1	5
Public servant	2	1	4	7
Government official	3	0	0	3
Cultural worker	1	0	1	2
Historical character	1	0	2	3
Newspaper cartoonist, photographer	1	0	0	1
Total	54	23	34	111

Undoubtedly, the main characters of the pre-election campaign are politicians. Therefore, no wonder it’s them leading as *Hate Speech* characters in the pre-election monitoring.

Still more interesting, their statements encountered an adequate level of disapproval (22 out of 53 statements). Journalists’ approach to public servant’s statements (6 disapprovals out of 14 statements) was still stricter. And now the state (represented by ‘Government official’) which, due to the nature of the election campaign of 2003, did not enter into any discussions, although could not help making incorrect statements (3 cases), did not encounter any disapproval.

Such strictness to politicians and public servants might well be caused by the scandalous election legislation considerably (at least at the first stage of the propaganda campaign) limiting the press in publishing election-related materials. Also, it would be appropriate to recall a number of government officials’ statements, and the President’s himself, on inadmissibility of national rhetoric usage in propaganda<sup>36</sup>.

However, it’s quite indicative the picture of ‘political preferences’, disapproved by journalists.

### **5.1. Political Orientation of Characters of *Hate Speech***

(in descending order)

<sup>35</sup> M. Kevsalinskiy. “If Stalin was back” // Sovetskaya Kuban. November 8, 2003.

<sup>36</sup> “President Putin Set ‘Anti-Nationalistic Tune’ For Forthcoming Parliament Elections” // Novie Izvestia. September 4, 2003, “The Government Promises to Ensure Glasnost and Safety of the Elections” // Ibidem.

Source orientation	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
CPRF	19	1	3	<b>23</b>
Not mentioned / Not defined	8	5	9	<b>22</b>
LDPR	3	4	11	<b>18</b>
National-patriots	13	0	2	<b>15</b>
United Russia ( <i>Edinaya Rossiya</i> )	4	4	1	<b>9</b>
Centrists / Etatists	4	1	3	<b>8</b>
"Motherland" block	3	3	1	<b>7</b>
People's Party ( <i>Narodnaya Partiya</i> )	2	2	1	<b>5</b>
"Rus" party	4	0	1	<b>5</b>
Party of Life / "Revival of Russia"	2	0	1	<b>3</b>
Liberals / Democrats	1	0	1	<b>2</b>
Agrarian Party of Russia (of M. Lapshin)	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
Union of Right Forces ( <i>SPS</i> )	0	0	1	<b>1</b>
Party of Borodin and Niyazov	0	1	0	<b>1</b>
Other	6	0	0	<b>6</b>
Total	71	21	35	<b>127</b>

The CPRF is the leader in using of the *Hate Speech*. It's followed by the category 'Undefined' i.e. characters not advertising their political views clear for the researchers to identify, but at the same time discussing the elections. The LDPR has to be sufficed with the third place. 'National-Patriots', although collective category, are just a little bit behind the LDPR. 'Yabloko's' representatives did not the *Hate Speech* at all.

However, aside of indefinite and collective categories, the concrete political parties leading in *Hate Speech* reproduction are the CPRF (23), the LDPR (18) and the United Russia (9), i.e. the parties elected to the State Parliament. If we compare the ratio of the aggregate value to '*Hate Speech* disapproval', we see the United Russia is in fact ranks the **last** (8/1). Therefore, figures speaking for the 'party of power' (the state) again confirm the trend detected in the standard monitoring: journalists stopped criticizing 'state' people for the *Hate Speech*.

It strikes the eyes a high degree of journalists' support of the *Hate Speech* by CPRF and National-Patriots' representatives. This is undoubtedly the consequence of that we studied the 'party' press in our monitoring. Even URP "Rus" was represented by its party newspaper "Pro-Rus". However, we mean "Sovetskaya Rossiya" first of all.

Also, we would like to draw your attention to still two more items. First, it's 'National-Patriots'. The researchers classified them by their rhetoric, rather than by self-identification of characters, as was the case with other generalized groups. Second, it's 'Liberal/Democrats' category. Established in the rubricate as one of the "collective" categories, it ultimately reflected statements of one specific person – Boris Fedorov, a candidate nominated by quite a liberal bloc "New Policy – The Motor Russia". But his party's newspaper "Russia – Up" we've already mentioned, giving the space mainly to authors with unknown political preferences rather than him was classified as 'National-Patriotic' due to the nature of articles printed. Is there any other name to the publication in which, on the first page alone, you can find 4 examples of the *Hate Speech* three of which are catchy headlines like "An Azerbaijani Raped and Gave a Girl a Bad Time"? Here are some other examples: "Azerbaijan vegetable mafia tracks all the foodstuff coming to Moscow"; "Chechens kill people on Moscow's streets", "The third version (of the case of Khodorkovskiy – G.K.) has been made public in "Novaya Gazeta" close to Jewish and human rights defending circles". And so on, and so forth – 8 pages.

We'd like to draw our readers' attention to the fact that, contrary to 'characters', 'liberal/democrats' as a *Hate Speech's* object (see below) have nothing to do with B. Fedorov – it's 2 statements addressed to the URF (Union of Right Forces), Yabloko and everybody supporting them.

## **5.2. Orientation of Political Object of Hate Speech**

(The objects are put in descending order)

Object's orientation	Approval	Neutral	Disapproval	Total
Not mentioned / Not defined	54	20	29	<b>103</b>
United Russia ( <i>Edinaya Rossiya</i> )	5	0	0	<b>5</b>



Caucasians as a whole	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	9
Peoples of Asia (outside or inside the CIS except those clearly listed)	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
Other ethnic categories	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
General ethnic xenophobia	0	0	2	8	1	0	1	0	9	3	3	1	0	0	3	0	31
Orthodox Christians	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Muslims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catholics (and Uniats)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
New and small religious groups	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	7
Other religious categories	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
General religious xenophobia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	2	25	16	2	8	11	7	27	7	11	6	2	1	6	6	137

So, let's see who the political process' participants dislike most of all, starting with leaders.

The CPRF dislikes most of all 'Jews' (12 references). There's no other participant to compare.

The LDPR (9) and so called 'National-Patriots' (8) are ready to defend interests of 'Russians' to spite everybody else.

However, the United Russia ("*Edinaya Rossiya*"), ranking the "honorable" third, has not yet determined specific enemies. It slapped 'Caucasians' and 'non-Russians' (3 references each), Chinese (2 references), and a variety of 'Non-Orthodox Believers' ('Catholics', 'Sects', 'Protestants').

On the other hand, 'Jews' are, apart of the CPRF, disliked by 'National-Patriots'<sup>37</sup>, centrists, the LDPR, and specifically Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, the Co-Chairman (along with Pavel Borodin) of the "The United Russia – The Euro-Asian Union" bloc, fully endorsing the anti-Semite statements by Makhakhitra, the Prime Minister of Malaysia.

Apart of the LDPR and 'National-Patriots', 'Russians' are up to be protected with equal fervor (3 references each) by Motherland ("*Rodina*") bloc, the United Russia ("*Edianaya Rossiya*") and "Rus" party followed by the CPRF. The S. Mironov-G. Seleznev's bloc is making the first step in this direction.

'Chechens' were had a dig by the LDPR, the APR, the CPRF, and Boris Fedorov personally, whereas Chinese were by the United Russia, Motherland ("*Rodina*") and the LDPR (twice each), the Peoples Party, the centrist, and the CPRF (one reference each).

## **7. Table "Orientation of Character of the Hate Speech / Hate Speech Form"**

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Total
<i>Yabloko</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>SPS</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
CPRF	0	0	1	5	1	0	1	0	6	4	8	4	3	2	1	5	41
National-patriots	1	1	2	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	4	2	2	0	0	1	19
Liberals / Democrats	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Centrists / Etatists	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	0	1	10
Not defined	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	3	0	1	2	0	0	2	15
<i>Narodnaya Partiya</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	2	9
LDPR	0	4	2	1	1	0	1	0	3	2	1	3	3	1	0	1	23

<sup>37</sup> No wonder, considering special features of their classification.

"Motherland" block	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	0	2	8
<i>Edinaya Rossiya</i>	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	12
Party of Life / "Revival of Russia"	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Agrarian Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Party of Borodin and Niyazov	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
"Rus" party	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	7
Other	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	7
Total	1	1	8	1	2	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	162
		5		1			0		8	7	6	7	8	4			

Like on the rest of the figures, the CPRF is leading in making allegations of any kind (41). The LDPR is behind with a considerable lag (23), then – National-Patriots (19) and the United Russia (“Edinaya Rossiya”) (12).

Let’s see how good the allegers are at fantasizing. The CPRF uses practically the entire alleging arsenal we have in our database. It’s armed with 12 out of 14 forms of the *Hate Speech* delivered during the elections, i.e. all except open calls for violence and discrimination. Yet, most frequently communists discuss disproportional superiority of some (actually, quite specific) group in wellbeing, representation at authorities, the press, etc., blending ethnic allegations with social pathos, make statements on criminality of a group, ‘promote a negative image of a group’ and ‘allege of territorial expansion or power seizure attempts’. The following statement by Igor Rodionov is a typical example of the communist *Hate Speech*: “*Russia has two possible ways to go. The first is preserving its state integrity, shaking off the occupational Zionist regime, letting Russian and other native peoples take care of the country’s future...*”<sup>38</sup>

LDPR’s fantasy is as rich as that of CPRF. They also use 12 out of 14 forms. They lack just calls for violence and ‘Quoting clearly xenophobic statements and texts without due comments’. The rest of the specter is present with no particular preferences. The most frequently used is ‘Calls for discrimination’ especially if combined with ‘Covert calls...’ (i.e. versions of the slogan “We are for the poor, we are for Russians”). Then, there are found with equal frequency ‘pejorative or insulting context’, ‘moral deficiency’, ‘allegations of negative influence’. However, all this is exceptionally thanks to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In our database there is just one example of LDPR’s *Hate Speech* belonging to other than Vice-Speaker of the State Parliament. At one of the meetings, Aleksey Mitrofanov demanded “the American dogs to get out of the sacred Iraqi land.”<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, the United Russia (“Edinaya Rossiya”) prefers to call for discrimination and disallowance settlement of a group in a certain area (i.e. gives its preference to the cruelest forms of the *Hate Speech*). For instance, Dmitriy Sablin, a member of the party, ordered a sociological poll in which he, among other things, questioned his potential electors if they are concerned about “dominance of the native of Caucasus”<sup>40</sup>, and Konstantin Zatulin, when commenting the idea of courts moving to the Far East, said: “*As if Arbitration court judges could help fight off border penetrating Chinese with their folders*”<sup>41</sup>.

It should as well be noted that so called national-patriots in their allegations focused on disproportional superiority and promotion of negative image of a group (see newspaper “Russia – Up!”).

## **8. Table “Orientation of Character of the Hate Speech/Orientation of Object for Hate Speech”**

(Sources – in columns)

<sup>38</sup> “For Russia and For Russian - Quick March!” // Moscow News, September 9, 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Anatoliy Gross. “Yankee Unwilling To Go” // Moskovskiy Komsomolets, September 27, 2003.

<sup>40</sup> Voldemar Statski. “Everyone in Pain In His Own Way” // We Are to Live Here, October 24, 2003.

<sup>41</sup> Olga Petrova. “The Plot Against Moscow” // Moskovskiy Komsomolets, October 29, 2003.

Sources \ Objects >	Yabloko	SPS	CPRF	National-patriots	Liberals / Democrats	Centrists / Etatists	Not defined	Narodnaya Partiya	LDPR	"Motherland" block	Edinaya Rossiya	Party of Life / "Revival of Russia"	Agrarian Party	Party of Borodin and Niyazov	"Rus" party	Not defined	Other	Total
Yabloko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
CPRF	0	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	12	0	23
National-patriots	0	0	1	1	0	0	6	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	4	0	15
Liberals / Democrats	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Centrists / Etatists	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	8
Not defined	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	11
Narodnaya Partiya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
LDPR	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	18
"Motherland" block	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	7
Edinaya Rossiya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	9
Party of Life / "Revival of Russia"	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
Agrarian Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Party of Borodin and Niyazov	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
"Rus" party	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	5
Not defined	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	11
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
Total	0	5	3	1	2	2	11	1	3	1	5	0	0	0	0	92	1	127

As we've mentioned before, "Yabloko" party appeared to be the most politically correct. On the other hand, it was not under attack on the part of anyone<sup>42</sup>. Also, there were no allegations by political opponents towards a few more parties: Seleznev-Mironov bloc, APR, Borodin-Niyzov bloc and "Rus" party.

The CPRF, the most active producer of the pre-election *Hate Speech*, dislikes most of all the United Russia ("*Edinaya Rossiya*") (3), conditional centrists (2), and the LDPR (2). The Union of Right Forces and conditional liberals got it from the CPRF too (on statement for each).

It was just once that the LDPR attacked Irina Khakamada personally.

National-Patriots attacked the United Russia ("*Edinaya Rossiya*", the CPRF, and the LDPR).

At the same time, the United Russia was quite correct towards its political opponents – its statements were not directed to political objects.

<sup>42</sup> Apart of the two cases mentioned above when they were referred to along with all the liberals.

# The Parliament Election Campaign Outside the Monitoring

## *Party Propaganda*

Due to formal limitations, we were unable to collect all examples of the pre-election *Hate Speech*, and we did not task ourselves with that. However, in our opinion, we need to outline what was left outside our study, at least to confirm the accurateness the beliefs of those involved in the campaign were reflected in the monitoring. After all, posters, flyers, booklets, commercials and, on top of that, TV debates are an integral part of any propaganda campaign. Although, it should be noted the amount of print at the elections was smaller than at the previous ones. Let's review a few statements made by some of elections' participants.

### The LDPR

The party ranked the second by the monitoring results was much more noticeable outside the monitoring. It happened 100% thanks to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy who, true to his habits, would inevitably turn any TV debates he participated in into a scandal.

The LDPR's propaganda campaign was built on the slogan "*We are for the poor, we are for Russians*" (reproduced, by the way, on different prints of the party with different punctuation). It decorated party's posters and booklets exhibited at Manezh in the beginning of September 2003.

The following are excerpts from the program of the party reproduced in flyers and posters with slight variations:

*"The Russian issue becomes increasingly acute with each year passed. It's not only hard to be the Russian in the "democratic" Russia. To be the Russian is also humiliating. There's also no prestige in being Russian..."*, *"We should encourage Koreans, or Japanese to say the least, to move to the Far East of Russia, and put a barrier to coming Chinese by any means possible... All foreigners should be dispersed over the territory without being permitted (exactly as in the text) to live in big communities – 3-5 people, no more". "A great number of other nationals have rushed to Russia in search of a better life (Caucasians, Chinese, Afghans, etc.). This makes worse the life quality of the Russian population"*.<sup>43</sup>

The LDPR's propaganda peaked in the last two weeks of the campaign. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy articulated the following points of his program on TV. *"Every day we need to call – Wake up, Russians!... Deport whoever interferes with us here... to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, China, Vietnam, Afghanistan..."*, - he was listing on RTR until his time was over.<sup>44</sup> *"Chinese, Vietnamese, Azerbaijani, Georgians, Armenians have laid hands on all key posts in the country, all banks, trade centers, hotels, whatever is good out there... You don't care a damn about Russians!"* – he continued on NTV the next day<sup>45</sup>. The electrical train's explosion in Kislovodsk that happened on the day of propaganda completion gave the LDPR's leader an opportunity to articulate the idea of joint responsibility for terrorists: *"Here's a terrorist-lady. She blew the train up. Find her house, her parents. Take the whole family under arrest. Put her in jail long way from Caucasus and say: "If one more terrorist blows up another train with our passengers we'll slaughter the entire village. The whole village will be destroyed. Only this will make them calm down. Since she can kill herself... But once she knows all her relatives are to be killed... Only this way – by way of the most terrible elimination..."*

*Here's the example: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was no sense in bombing the Japanese cities. But Americans said: if you kill one more American soldier... Now you have two of your cities in ruins. It's peace and quiet. 50 years of peace. Japan has not killed a single American soldier since then. Therefore, only hard measures towards the family..."*<sup>46</sup>

The same idea was in fact used by Zhirinovskiy in launching his Presidential campaign on the TV show "To the Barrier" broadcast on December 11.

Interestingly, Zhirinovskiy did not avoid anti-Semitism, but doing that out of a camera's focus. In fact, during a brawl raised at a commercial break he turned to general Shpak saying: "Jews have

<sup>43</sup> To citizens of Russia! The Pre-election Manifesto. M., 2003. Page 14, 16, 19.

<sup>44</sup> TV Debates // RTR. November 20, 2003.

<sup>45</sup> Freedom of Speech // NTV. November 21, 2003.

<sup>46</sup> Freedom of Speech // NTV. December 5, 2003.

killed your son in Chechnya, and you're helping them"<sup>47</sup>, and, during the pre-election trip to Yekaterinburg he fully upheld anti-Semite statements by the President of Malaysia: *"He told the truth, there are half a billion Muslim in the world, and what they see is the forth world war is waged against them. They believe it's inspired by Israel and there's a good reason for that. The newspapers saying bad things about Islam... Semite nationals are in charge of them. Major banks, global corporations are also under their leadership", told the Russian politician to those present... The nation counting maximum 16 million people took power over the world. All banks, companies, key positions – they've grabbed everything, our country is no exception,"* said Vice Speaker of the State Parliament saying in closing that *"anti-Semitism today is a tool for Muslim peoples to get united in the face of the common threat"*<sup>48</sup>.

### **The CPRF**

Unlike Zhirinovskiy, Copra's people looked more reserved when interviewed live. They normally avoided the "National issue", while the reasoning provided by Elena Drape, Copra's representative, on the TV debates on the subject of "The National Policy of the Russia Today" were more than correct. It happened only once the Gennadiy Zuganov could not control himself saying during debates on RTR that "Russophobia became official policy of the current political power"<sup>49</sup>.

On the other hand, unlike Zhirinovskiy's team, Communists used press much more actively. This is no wonder since the CPRF has a well developed party press, both on the federal level (The Soviet Russia – "Sovetskaya Rossiya") and in the regions. We won't deal with incorrect publications in the Soviet Russia ("Sovietskaya Rossiya") since they are reflected in the standard monitoring. However, It's worthwhile noting G. Zuganov, along with his party's publications, did not squeamish about services of one of the most radical press of the Orthodox nationalistic orientation – the Orthodox Russia ("Rus Pravoslavnaya"). Early September, prior official start of the election campaign, he gave interview to Konstantin Dushenov, the Chief Editor of a newspaper with a peculiar name "The Saint Rus and the Kingdom of Koschei". The publication was due to coming to light of G. Zuganov's book with the same name (the presentation of which became one of Communist Party's propaganda actions). The following is a few excerpts from the interview: *"Zionazation of the state power is what, among other things, has let to the disastrous situation country is going through, mass impoverishment and extinction of its population... The people of our country are not blind. They can't help seeing that Zionazation of the state power is what, among other things, has let to the disastrous situation country is going through, mass impoverishment and extinction of its population. They can't keep their eyes closed at the aggressive role of the Zionist capital in Russia's economy's falling apart and misappropriation of the wealth belonging to the entire nation. They pose a fair question: how could that happen that key positions in a number of industries appeared to be seized by mostly representatives of just one nation."*<sup>50</sup>.

It's important there was practically no anti-Semite statement in this interview given to the Soviet Russia ("Sovetskaya Rossiya") (on August 26). Moreover, those who participated in the interview did not touch upon the "National Issue" at all.

Undoubtedly, The Kingdom of Koschei is indicative of G. Zuganov's fierce fight for electorate, including its extreme nationalistic wing. In his fighting Zionazation, G. Zuganov was actively helped by other communists known for their nationalistic views – Igor Rodionov and Nikolay Kondratenko. Although, they preferred to make their statements in the provinces – Mariy El and Krasnodar, respectively. When it came to Moscow, Nikolay Kondratenko attempted to convince the public that he's no nationalist. And he was doing it – to the extent of his talent: *"Some Jew would write "he is nationalist". And everybody all together cries: He's a nationalist, he is a nationalist"*<sup>51</sup>.

### **The Motherland ("Rodina") bloc**

Like TV debates, other propaganda media showed its heterogeneity. Suffice it to say, Sergey Glazyev, a leader of the bloc, were spotted out as making incorrect statements only twice. However, his "brothers-in-arm's" statements were what made (and rather fairly) his bloc notorious for being nationalistic. For instance, when asked on TV debates how to fight the national discord and there is to be done to skinheads, Sergey Baburin, the forth in the Motherland federal list, stated: "We have no

<sup>47</sup> Nana Pliyeva. "Zhirinivskiy Got It in His Ear" // Novaya Gazeta. November 20, 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Boris Alekseyev. "When in Ural, Zhirinovskiy Told About Everything and Everybody" // Utro.ru. October 29, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> Elections - 2003 // RTR. November 25, 2003.

<sup>50</sup> Konstantin Dushenov – Gennadiy Zuganov. "The Saint Russia and the Kingdom of Koschei" // Rus Pravoslavnaya. September – October 2003. No.75-76.

<sup>51</sup> Shagen Ogadzhanyan. "The Red Day on the Calendar" // Izvestia. October 20, 2003.



national discord, but there is Russophobia stirred up by the media. During the scandal raised by Zhirinovskiy on The Freedom of Speech TV show, KGB ex-general Nikolay Leonov, an expert at the Russian House TV show attempted to deal with the LDPR leader's offences as follows: *"Isn't it strange, here we are discussing the problems of Russia, and there's just one Russian sitting on the podium by the mike – Sergey Glazyev"*. N. Leonov might have developed his thought, but he was interrupted by the showman outright pointing for the candidate that was a nationalistic statement.<sup>52</sup>

Now, the 6 minutes commercial of the bloc prepared by N. Leonov in co-authorship with his colleague at the Russian House TV show (now at the parliament) Aleksander Krutov shown on December 3 at the end of the propaganda campaign on the TVTs channel was clearly anti-Caucasus, anti-Dagestan to be more correct (The Motherland was not likely to rely on Dagestan electors or was sure they would not see it out there in Dagestan). It was about one of the Russian House theme – *"the problems"* of a village in the Kaluga region *"relating to natives of Dagestan"*. Shots of Dagestans presented as aggressive, slovenly, lazy and insolent were accompanied with allegations of *"robberies, assaults, team rapes"*. Moreover, the show made a hero of a local convicted of assault of a "Dagestan" who thus became invalid. The commercial ended quite unexpectedly – with an anti-Semite chord: *"What kind of brotherhood are we talking about? Between plutocrats-oligarchs Abramovich and Khodorkovskiy on one hand and an impoverished farmer Ivanov and engineer Petrov on the other hand?"*<sup>53</sup>

The Motherland bloc's representatives used anti-Caucasus rhetoric, quite comparable with G. Sterligov's slogans, in their flyers too: *"[Our contender] in his personal meeting with the mayor stated his disagreement in respect of changing the historical face of the white-stone Moscow, turning it into a "caravanserai"... "The city in which the pointer of a teacher,...the scalpel of a surgeon, or worker's hands are worth less than the daily revenue of a watermelon seller is seriously ill... Stop enacting laws and telling "success stories" in the interests of the thievish minority."*<sup>54</sup>

### **The United Russia ("Edinaya Rossiya")**

The United Russia officially refused to attend the debates, its contenders did not express themselves, giving TV and newspapers the opportunity to independently cover their pre-election trips. So, the party did not come up with any vivid examples of the *Hate Speech*.

Its absence in Moscow was quite likely due to ongoing governorship competition between Yuri Luzhkov and German Sterligov building his propaganda on open calls for shooting and deportation from the city of native of Caucasus and Gypsies.

Besides, it was all the more difficult to track the United Russia's *Hate Speech* as the mass joining the party not only by government officials but scientists, cultural workers and sportsmen normally is not made public (we mean personal "confessions" rather than statistics). Who could know of ballerina Anastasia Volochkova's party affiliation if not for her leaving the Bolshoy Theater happening right at the moment the formation of party's contenders list was under way, along with the rumor (possibly released by herself) that she was going to participate in the Parliamentary elections. In the meantime her entire PR campaign was driven by the slogan the 'non-Russian' management of the Bolshoy Theater has fired the Russian ballerina!<sup>55</sup>

On the other hand, Aleksandr Khinshtain – a Moskovskiy Komsomolets' correspondent and now a deputy of the State Parliament, on the contrary, did not conceal his political creed, but, pursuant to the law, he stopped having himself published in the newspaper from September 7. However, he made it up for with two articles published right before the Parliamentary campaign. The first, published in June, exposed the corrupt Moscow militia, yet was full of anti-Caucasus, anti-Chechen in particular, statements to the extent that it was later readily reprinted (under a different name, though) in the "Russia, Up!" book by Boris Fedorov. The article described a Moscow-based "terrorist center" in which eight suicide bombers involved in the Nord-Ost hostage seizure allegedly lived (meaning one of the multiple dormitories in which illegal migrants and Caucasian newcomers tend to live). Khinshtain is full of anger: a "stripping" should have been carried out there long time ago: *"since not only seven suicide bombers did live in the military camp but also a lot of other Chechens and Caucasians"*. The captions under the pictures accompanying the article say: *"Chechens are by a check-point. Their number has not decreased since the Nord-Ost"* Some gangsters are identified in the article as *"Chechen people's*

<sup>52</sup> Freedom of Speech // NTV. November 21, 2003.

<sup>53</sup> Elections - 2003 // TVTs. December 3, 2003.

<sup>54</sup> Flyer by Nikolay Moskovchenko, contender to a deputy of the State parliament nominated by the Motherland bloc.

<sup>55</sup> Three New Reasons To Enjoy Life // Komsomolskaya Pravda. December 15, 2003.

representatives". In closing, the author sadly states that although "*Chechens and Chinese have left Ilovayskaya, they won't be left without a shelter.*"<sup>56</sup>.

The second publication, that can hardly be even called publication, but rather a small note, appeared in August, after explosions in Tushino. A. Khinstain described an uncovered Chechen plot targeting the nuclear installations of Kurchatov Institute<sup>57</sup>. The MK Editors was happy to put the material, highlighted in bold, letter size, and color background, on the front page. The article (the content of which, of course, was not confirmed subsequently by anybody) was so catchy that it became a subject for discussions (and disapproval!) by Novoye Vremya in its weekly press review section.

### **Other Parties**

The 'second tire parties' having participated in the election campaign did not distinguish themselves with any vivid display of the *Hate Speech*. Particularly, we'd like to draw your attention to the United Russian Party (URP) Rus which was building its propaganda on promoting 'cultural nationalism', on declarations stating that they are a party of 'Russians' meaning allegedly everybody who "*love Russia, speak and think Russian*". Analysis of the political texts by the party shows this is not true, and 'Russian' is understood in the ethnic way, party's slogans sometimes almost literally repeating those of the LDPR:

<p>The URP "Rus":          "The Rus party thinks it the most important to achieve a revival of the Russian nation. No nation or nationals can live well in Russia as long as the living of Russians is poor".</p>	<p>The LDPR:          "We are the advocates of Russians – the state-forming people. If Russians live well in Russia, all other nations will feel comfortable here".</p>
---	---

The short review provided herein shows our pre-election monitoring having generally reflected all major trends of the *Hate Speech* used in pre-election propaganda campaigns – its forms and direction, its activity (relative calm in the first months and a surge after November 20). It's just TV appearances of Zhirinovskiy that covered a larger range of objects than newspaper publications.

It's also important the "decline of propaganda" caused by special features of our laws regulating elections was forestalled by rather intensive surge of "early propaganda" (left outside of our monitoring) when the Central Election Committee did not yet officially started tracking it, when there was no need in accounting for money expenditures, and when no explanation had not yet been made (it came around late August.) that such early propaganda is illegal.

### ***Discussing Pre-Election Hate Speech***

It should be noted the nationalistic rhetoric used by the parties and contenders in the course of the election campaign was actively discussed by journalists. To journalist community's credit, nationalistic slogans were unambiguously disapproved in a majority of the articles. Vechernaya Ryazan newspaper referred to by us above many times was the only exception to the rule once saying that a one-mandate contender was about to be refused the registration for raising national discord. In the article "The Russians are Coming... To the Power", the newspaper attempted to make it clear as to the nature of the claims to the contender, for which purpose it fully and without any comments published the very text of appeal (with a distinctive name – "You Become Russian!") by Leonid Kanayev<sup>58</sup> – a Unification ("Edinenie") party's contender, which text raised a criticism by the DA's Office<sup>59</sup>.

The second (and maybe the most important) feature of publications discussing the pre-election *Hate Speech* is that they appeared not only after December 7, when first attempts were made to find the reason underlying success of the LDPR and the Motherland bloc, but also in the course of the entire election campaign and even prior to its official start. Particularly, as we have noted before,

<sup>56</sup> A. Khinstain. "Black Widows under Petrovka's "Roof": Underground Nest for Chechen Soldiers To Have Been Established on Spetsstroy Military Detachment's Area // Moskovskiy Komsomolets. June 23, 2003.

<sup>57</sup> Aleksandr Khinstain. Warriors of Allah Targeted Nuclear Installations // Moskovskiy Komsomolets. August 11, 2003.

<sup>58</sup> Still, there was no reference to Unification ("Edineniye") in the newspaper pointing out L. Kanayev is a member of the National-Sovereign Party of Russia (NSPR) whose registration was revoked by the Ministry of Justice of the RF.

<sup>59</sup> "The Russians are coming... To the Power" // Vechernaya Ryazan. November 20, 2003.

literally in a few days after A. Khinstain's article about the "nuclear" plot, there appeared a response thereto in *Novoye Vremya*. In the review by Boris Tumanov, not only was it pointed out to inadmissibility of any reference to ethnic roots of those involved in the criminal episode, but it stated a concern that such publications can contribute to anything other than growth of national discord: "...After the publication by MK, in Moscow any observant resident of the capital can easily [catch a terrorist – G. K.] as, from now on, he will immediately pick up his ears at the sight of a Chechen asking the price of a sprinkler or a firefighting vehicle. And if, on top of that, the suspicious Chechen is dressed in so easily cognate belt of a warrior of Allah or asking passers-by which is the shortest way to Kutchatov Institute...any Muscovite will realize it right away there's a terrorist in front of him."<sup>60</sup>.

Izvestia was no less quick in responding to publication of 'The Kingdom of Catechu'. As early as on September 01, Andrei Kolesnikov draw readers' attention to inadmissibility of such rhetoric and analyzed the target audiences which the CPRF was trying to win using the anti-Semite sentiments<sup>61</sup>

Journalists' response to billboards with LDPR and the URP "Rus"'s slogans on Moscow streets was also immediate. However, the first reaction to those posters was rather ironic covering first of all advertisers, whose actions were considered as a failure, rather than politicians: "*The first that stroke my eyes was advertisement of his party by journalists' pet Zhirinovskiy. Here are just a few words: "We are for Russians, we are for the poor" It hurts, really. Why does he think that Russian necessarily means poor?... Now is a poster by some other party whose name I did not have time to make out (that's exactly the 'Rus' party – G.K.): "We are the largest country. We are the most educated nation. Together – Russians." It's true, the country is big. But if we are so educated why is there no hyphen after 'we'? And after all, what does it mean at all 'together we – Russians'? If together, then Russians, and there are still separate persons named Tatars and Yakuts, unfortunately?"*<sup>62</sup>. "...Now is a poster: "We are the largest country. We have the most educated nation. Together we – Russians" is read by even those who consider themselves, whether together or separately, Tatars, Jews, Georgians"<sup>63</sup>.

However, the very first publications suggested discussion on appropriateness of 'playing the ethnic card' in advertisement and possible consequences of that.<sup>64</sup>. In the discussion, journalists were joined by Kamiljan Kalandarov, the Director General of the Human Rights Institute, who said the attitude of mind formed by the slogans used in LDPR's and URP 'Rus' advertisement "*is dangerous as they inevitably start the boomerang machinery of destruction... The authors of the slogans, simple in manner but fearful in matter, should stop hunting electorate and recall there are 176 nations and nationalities living in the multinational Russia*"<sup>65</sup>.

In the course of the election campaign journalists were getting more and more disturbed. Sure, that was the true position taken by authors, rather than a reaction to instructions "from above". V. Putin's September statement on inappropriateness of nationalism in pre-election campaign and his orders to the government and law enforcement agencies that followed<sup>66</sup> were presented by the majority of the newspapers covered by our monitoring as information agencies' news coverage, and subsequently we saw no reference to those statements in the articles studied. Moreover, the notorious statement by Putin<sup>67</sup> on "dummies" and "instigators" was criticized as having come, to put it mildly, a bit too late, as some of those meant in the statement have already obtained the deputy immunity.

There was only one newspaper – Izvestia, that would state consistently and regularly on inappropriateness of the politically (and any other) nationalist rhetoric. It's the newspaper's reporters – Andrey Kolesnikov, Yuriy Bogomolov and Aleksandr Arkhangelskiy, who regularly addressed the issue on newspaper's pages. Such addressing ranged from simple statement of the fact "*the concept of Jew and masonic, Zionist plot is still around and doing fine all by itself, and, even in the absence of other fruitful debut ideas, appears to be the core of electoral platforms of some visible parties*"<sup>68</sup> to extensive discourse of nationalism as an ingredient of the national idea many politicians, including

<sup>60</sup> Boris Tumanov. "Special Features of National Breath" // *Novoye Vremya*. August 24, 2003 No.34, page 6.

<sup>61</sup> Andrey Kolesnikov. "John Divine and the Kingdom of Koschei" // *Izvestia*. September 1, 2003.

<sup>62</sup> Olga Bakushinskaya. "The Aroma of Horse's Bam" // *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. June 28, 2003.

<sup>63</sup> Kseniya Rozhdestvenskaya. "Our Future – It's Alive and Stirring" // *Novaya Gazeta*. August 11-13, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> Andrey Kolesnikov. "The War of Shaggy Tongues" // *Izvestia*. August 4, 2003.

<sup>65</sup> Kamiljan Kalandarov. "No Nationalizm!" // *Regions.ru*. August 5, 2003.

<sup>66</sup> "President Putin To Have Given the "Anti-Nationalist Directions" For the Forthcoming Parliamentary Elections // *Noviye Izvestia*. September 4, 2003; "The Government Committed to Glasnost and Safety of Elections" // *Ibidem*.

<sup>67</sup> "Direct Line with the President of Russia" (verbatim) // Channel 1. December 18, 2003.

<sup>68</sup> Andrey Kolesnikov. "The Ageless Protocols" // *Izvestia*. September 15, 2003.

quite respectable ones, are nowadays in the market for. Here is what Yuriy Bogomolov wrote: "Gleb Pavlovskiy and Boris Fedorov won't say Jews, fuck, have grabbed it all, filled up everything, there is no salvation from them on TV. Big business – same thing. What they say is *"Russians must finally realize they are Russians. They must feel themselves masters of their own country. National self-consciousness of a Russian man calls for a national and sovereign setting"*, - stating that *"the search for a national idea has changed lately into the search of a national enemy"*.<sup>69</sup> He's echoed by Aleksandr Arkhangelskiy stating that in the search of a new national ideology they attempt to create it by contraries" to trends in the contemporary Russian life, e.g. in the advertisement: *"The advertisement offends the national dignity of the Russian consumer. A German in Russia is given a licking, has his shoes soiled, etc., the only thing he appreciates is beer he's served. The Russian in Russia is reminded: look, it's not made locally, it's made intelligently, the true German quality, the Swedish choice, the French taste. They dislike even our words: "strakhovaniye" is derived from the word "strakh" (fear) in contrast to "insurance"... That's what, in A. Arkhangelskiy's opinion, creates a soil for nationalism: "It hurts, hurts so much... We need to change it. Send somebody to "Mars". Beat a snickers out of somebody. Out of blacks maybe, who's singing here, there and everywhere. "I am a chocolate hare I am an affectionate rascal". Yes, that's what we keep saying too"*<sup>70</sup>.

Of course, debating the subject did not end with the end of the election campaign. On the contrary, its results provided journalists and political scientists with one more reason to ponder over the role of the national rhetoric in achieving those results. For instance, they ones again, now more seriously than in August, have turned to commercials of parties and blocs, trying to determine which tunes became so much appealing to electors<sup>71</sup>. Novaya Gazeta has attempted to make a point that slogans like "Russia's for Russians" are not new dating back to ideologists of the Union of the Russian People and the Union of Michel Archangel (unfortunately, having found no better time to refer to the defiantly negative image of those organizations in the monarch Russia than when the elections were over)<sup>72</sup>.

There were also allegations directed to V. Putin. To be more correct, a reference to that his aggressive rhetoric (may be quite correct) is interpreted and understood as a certain message sent. *"Is it worthwhile electing? Sure, no sound person would say that "Chechens needs to be killed in a toilet"*, - Novaya Gazeta quotes a school essay adding: *"It's important the 'sound person' in question did not speak about Chechens, but terrorists. However, the nation did not hear what was said, it heard what was meant"*<sup>73</sup>..

Closing the review of articles discussing the pre-election *Hate Speech*, sadly enough they failed to become a foundation for a broad readers' or political scientists' discussion. Even Izvestia that, in our opinion, has a good feedback with their readers (whose letters addressing one or another publication appear on newspaper's pages on a daily basis) did not publish any response to the articles in question. Of course, it's likely to be due to the general apathy of the society to the Parliamentary elections and, accordingly, whatever is associated with them. But it's also likely the most of authors and readers are not concerned with using nationalistic rhetoric.

<sup>69</sup> Yu. Bogomolov. "Xenophobia As It Was Said" // Izvestia. November 3, 2003.

<sup>70</sup> A. Arkhangelskiy. "Want to Take Away? Try It" // Ibidem. November 4, 2003.

<sup>71</sup> Vera Zvereva. "Image of People in Political Advertisement" // Power. December 1-7, 2003. No. 47.

<sup>72</sup> Valeriy Shirayev. "Okhotniy Ryad People One Yundred Years Later" // Novaya Gazeta. December 18, 2003.

<sup>73</sup> Boris Vishnevskiy. "Schoolboys Teach Authorities" // Novaya Gazeta. December 11, 2003.

## Presidential Campaign

The RF President Elections campaign was very sluggish. There were almost no flyers, billboards, “pre-election” newspapers. Part of commercials have moved to the Presidential campaign practically unchanged. TV debates on Channel One and RTR channel were pre-recorded, and proposed live debates on TVTs channel between pairs of contenders often failed to materialize because of failure of the contenders themselves to attend.

However, incorrect statements were pronounced in this campaign too.

### Contenders

#### Oleg Malishkin and the LDPR

The LDPR’s representatives were unrivaled “leaders” in xenophobic statements made in the campaign. Oleg Malishkin himself made almost no incorrect statements in public. It was only once, on the first day of propaganda, speaking on February 13 TV debates he said about his intention “*to put a barrier to Chinese’s ethnic aggression*” in the Far East.<sup>74</sup> At the same time, in prints signed by him the *Hate Speech* was found much more frequently. The LDPR’s contender took the elections under the well known from the Parliamentary campaign but slightly changed slogan “*Remember Russians, take care of the poor*” In the short version of O. Malishkin’s program our attention was drawn to the phrase “*Keep defending our compatriots abroad and Russians inside Russia*”<sup>75</sup>. In our opinion, it clearly indicates that to the LDPR, like many others, the concept of ‘compatriot’ sounds like an ethnic category.

Also, we want to note the slogans like those of the LDPR encourage their political opponents to make incorrect statements. In fact, on December 2003, Boris Nemtsov, making comments on if it’s possible for Zhirinovskiy to run for the RF Presidency himself, could not help being sarcastic: “Poor and Russian? Is he really?”<sup>76</sup>

Now back to O. Malishkin. His complete program declaration is much more interesting. In the document, assertions that the LDPR stands against igniting a national discord are combined with statements making you doubt in ethnical and religious tolerance of the contender:

*“1. Russia’s for everybody, so everybody lives well, without any discrimination...”*

*2. ...The Russian nation is a state-forming one. From its inception, the LDPR kept making the point that, in today’s humiliated and robbed country, Russians – the most oppressed of all the nations of the former Soviet Union – must get rid of the so call ‘small people’s’ occupants and oppressor complex imposed on them and feel themselves the masters of the entire country. If Russians are over, Russia is over too. And if Russia is finished, there will be no Tatars, no Udmurts, no Yakuts...*

*18. ... the LDPR can’t live with the Russian’s monopoly to patriotism. Everybody can love Russia, whether it a Tatar, Jew, or a Yakut’...*

*42. We must not live in isolation. Sure, we need international ties, primarily with t brother-nations (the Slavs and Orthodox believers). It would be a good corridor: Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria Here is a union of Slavic and Orthodox states. Since Czechia – Catholics, Poland – Catholics. But a corridor to Balkans could well be formed, and Romanians would agree since we formally will return them Bessarabia... (! – G.K.)*

*43. We are against any expanding of NATO... What are we going to get? NATO troops would be stationed from Smolensk to Belgorod. Chinese would be deployed in the Far East, Turks would advance to Kazan and Voronezh...”<sup>77</sup>*

Reading that, you can’t help noticing an influence, and maybe authorship, of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The latter, despite he was not allowed to become O. Malishkin’s representative, used actively his position as Vice Speaker and the Chairman of the LDPR<sup>78</sup> to promote his party and his

<sup>74</sup> Elections - 2004 // Rossiya. February 13, 2004.

<sup>75</sup> The Program of Oleg Aleksandrovich Malishkin, the presidential contender nominated by the LDPR // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. March 4, 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Boris Nemtsov: “No former KGB officer is able to run the country” // Gazeta. December25, 2003. By the way, the interview can be found on Boris Nemtsov’s website (<http://www.nemtsov.ru/?id=701831>). Neither he nor any of his colleagues seemed to have seen anything wrong in the text.

<sup>77</sup> O.A. Malishkin: My goal is welfare and happiness of each Russian // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. February 27, 2004.

<sup>78</sup> Be reminded, the parties having nominated their contenders to the Presidential elections also received free TV time and newspaper advertisement places.

“brother-in-arms”-contender. His phraseology was not much different from his statements made in 2003. Even before nomination of party contenders when Zhirinovskiy was considered a sure participant at the forthcoming elections, he articulated the idea of joint liability for terrorists. It was crystal clear the terrorists were meant to be native of Caucasus: *“Have they found the killer, the suicide bomber? [meaning explosion in the electrical train on December 5 – G.K.]. We need to find the village she lives in and take under arrest the whole family. Like they do it in Israel”,* - he stated on December 11, 2003 arguing with Valeria Novodvorskaya<sup>79</sup>. And practically at the same time he said his group at the State Parliament was intended to live up to its pre-election promises, namely *“imposing a visa entry to Azerbaijani and Armenians, deport Georgians from Moscow staying their without visa”*<sup>80</sup>. On March 4, 2004, speaking at the show “To the Barrier!”, he said Malishkin was purely Russian. And to the question by Vladimir Solovyev if the LDPR’ leader meant genotype by Russian nationality, Zhirinovskiy answered positively<sup>81</sup>.

However, the LDPR’s representatives are well aware that the rhetoric presented in incorrect color can be subject to court proceedings. At the time of the Parliamentary campaign, this was demonstrated by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (see the Section “Pre-Election Monitoring”), and late in 2003 – by Aleksey Mitrofanov. The following is a dialog that took place between him and Vladimir Solovyev, presenter of “To the Barrier” show:

**A. Mitrofanov:** *The war [meaning the Great Patriotic War – G.K] – is an open aggression of the West. Those who make drunkards of Russian people...*

**V. Solovyev:** *- And who makes drunkards of Russian people?*

**A. Mitrofanov:** *- Well, THEY...*

**V. Solovyev:** *- Who are THEY? (Gennadiy Gudkov, prompting from out of camera: - Zionists)*

**A. Mitrofanov:** *- Well, once I say that, you’ll bring charges... This is a public case. Everybody knows. The viewers would understand. Whoever’s read Solzhenitsin knows.*

**V. Solovyev:** *- Who makes drunkards?*

**A. Mitrofanov:** *- Both those and these.*

**V. Solovyev:** *- Who?!*

**A. Mitrofanov:** *- Both these and those*<sup>82</sup>.

### **Nikolay Kharitonov and the CPRF**

Like O. Malishkin, Nikolay Kharitonov, CPRF’s contender was building his propaganda on defending ‘Russians’, he outright failing in his attempts to stay out of the framework of ethnic rhetoric. For instance, during TV debates on Channel One he said the slogan “Russia’s for Russians” can become a national idea for Russia. He even repeated the phrase a few times seemingly demonstrating his being internationalist. However, when asked to specify the slogan, N. Kharitonov immediately got off the course to speaking about humiliation of the Russian people: *As long as the Russian people feel uncomfortable in Russia, everybody will feel uncomfortable. If the Russian today or tomorrow feels comfortable and the most finance, gas and petroleum fields are managed by Russians, Russians, - he said twice, - besides having the dirtiest jobs... then all national minorities will feel comfortable in Russia”.*

Incorrect rhetoric was used in the program of the contender nominated by the CPRF: *“I guarantee fairness and equality of rights in national relations. I guarantee protection of culture, language, beliefs, and customs of all peoples in Russia. I will save citizens from being humiliated with assigning an individual number. The Russian, humiliated and subject to slander, driven out of culture, separated from the press and authorities today, is getting the place he deserves in all spheres of social and political life”*<sup>83</sup>. In this phrase N. Kharitonov, assigning primary importance to defending Russian’s interests also failed to create a soft version to the slogan “Russia’s for Russians”.

The pre-election *Hate Speech* was also used in debates hosted by Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper. For instance, some authors were outraged by Vladimir Putin’s statement that those using nationalistic rhetoric are ‘dummies’ or ‘instigators’: *“After all, Russia is for Russians, Vladimir Vladimirovich”,* - wrote some A.V. on December 2003 trying to prove the slogan expresses the

<sup>79</sup> The Freedom of Speech // NTV December 5, 2003, “To the Barrier!” // NTV. December 11, 2003. By the way, it should be noted the form of collective punishment applied in Israel is different – destruction of terrorists’ houses.

<sup>80</sup> Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: “We want the First Vice Speaker and Five Committees” // Izvestia. December 10, 2003.

<sup>81</sup> “To the Barrier!” // NTV. March 4, 2003.

<sup>82</sup> To the Barrier!” // NTV. February 12, 2004.

<sup>83</sup> “For the Home Land and People’s Freedom!” The Political Platform of Nikolay Kharitonov, a presidential contender, nominated by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. February 20, 2004.

*“geopolitical realization of the Russian people”*<sup>84</sup>. In January 2003, the whole page of *“Otechestvenniye Zapiski”*, a supplement to *“Sovetskaya Rossiya”* was dedicated to *“The Provocators and the Dummies”* by A. Kirsanov. The author *“sees no prejudice to rights of other nations living in Russia”*. Apart of standard allegations of ‘domination’ of ‘non-Russians’ and a discourse of a great mission of the Russian people, demands to the future president of Russia are formulated clearly: A. Kirsanov would like to see on this position an *“Orthodox leader who would take charge... of the great state belonging to the great Russian people”*<sup>85</sup>. Of course, G. Zuganov did not stayed out of the pre-election propaganda. Like others, though, he produced nothing special reiterating whatever was articulated during the Parliamentary elections: *“Today Russians are the most humiliated, the most wretched, the most cloven nation on the planet... It feels like we have no Russian in the government any more”*<sup>86</sup>.

Unlike the leader of the CPRF, Aleksandr Prokhanov not only defends ‘Russians’, but also is in search of a specific enemy. Upon explosion in the Moscow subway he tried to convince the readers of *“Zavtra”* newspaper and those of *“Sovetskaya Rossiya”* having reprinted the article in that *“the city governor office protects Chechen clans, their gambling and hotel business, trade in children and women”* funding *“corruption”* and support of Barayev’s detachments. *“Gigantic Jew and Caucasus money”* are coming out of shadow, while Russians *“are left without capital, leaders, TV channels”* thereby turning into social outcasts bound to extinction<sup>87</sup>.

### **Sergey Glazyev**

Sergey Glazyev could not help using the *Hate Speech* too. For instance, right after the explosion in Moscow subway on February 06, 2004 he said: *“To put an end to terrorism, we need to uproot terrorism financially, which is now fed by sources located in Moscow. Everybody knows about those people working on Moscow markets, and collecting our money and then funding their solders so they keep killing our people. Therefore, the place to stifle terrorism is here”*. However, on February 10 he abandoned the nationalistic components of his statement: *“When I spoke of terrorism’s roots here in Moscow, I did not mean market tradesmen. I spoke of shadowy mafia structures controlling markets in big cities. Terrorism is sponsored by organized crime. To eliminate it, we need to destroy its funding sources”*<sup>88</sup>.

A month later, S. Glazyev practically held with Nikolay Kharitonov in defending rights of the ‘Russian people’. On March 3, during TV debates on RTR, when asked by the CPRF’s contender *why you can hear just a few Russian names among those managing oil&gas complex, banking system, financial system*, Sergey Glazyev answered: *“The Russian people is used to work hard without thinking how to profit from that. The human qualities like greed, acquisitiveness, striving for wealth by robbing the country are not characteristic of the Russian man”*<sup>89</sup>.

However, that was the last incorrect statement S. Glazyev was spotted out. In the extensive political program published by *“Rossiyskaya Gazeta”* and other speeches on TV debates he was quite correct focusing mainly on criticizing the economic policy of the current President of Russia. One has an impression that, unlike N. Kharitonov and O. Malishkin, the ‘national issue’ is no priority for Sergey Glazyev. On the other hand, he does not avoid protecting ‘Russian’ when his opponents succeed in provoking him to that obviously sensing it would be a lucky political move.

### ***Other Manifestations of Hate Speech***

The remaining presidential contenders practically did not use the *Hate Speech* except for one of the sections of Sergey Mironov’s program that raises perplexity: *“The work immigration is not to create any ethnic enclaves alien to our culture, working for destruction of established ethnic and cultural balance of different areas of the country”*. This is the only case of using dubious ethnically colored statements made by Vice Speaker of the Council of Federation whose advertisement activity, at least in the federal media, was much more intensive than that of other contenders (except Putin, of course).

<sup>84</sup> *“Russia’s not for Russians?”* // *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. December 25, 2003.

<sup>85</sup> A. Kirsanov. *“The Instigators and the Dummies”* // *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*. Issue No. 1/ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. January 15, 2004.

<sup>86</sup> G.A. Zuganov. *“There’s Stabilization of Eltsinizm in Russia”* // *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. February 10, 2004.

<sup>87</sup> A. Prokhanov. *“Chechen’s Underground in Kremlin”* // *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. February 10, 2004.

<sup>88</sup> *“Glazyev Outraged With “Polit.ru” and Rogozin”* // *Polit.ru* January 10, 2004.

<sup>89</sup> *Elections -2004* // RTR. March 3, 2004.

Also, we'd like the reader to be reminded that the CEC (Central Election Commission) had a formal pretext to disallow the Moscow "coffin maker" German Sterligov to participate in the elections. In December 2003, the latter unsuccessfully ran for Moscow governorship openly calling to forceful deportation and even physical elimination of natives of Caucasus and Gypsies living in Moscow. At that time, for the purposes of his propaganda campaign he received free time on Moscow TV being able to openly advertise his views. However, the attempt to accuse him of inspiring national discord was unsuccessful.<sup>90</sup> Within a short period of time between German Sterligov's statement of his intention to run for the presidency and the formal denial of his registration by the CEC he was on time to make a few more statements simply changing their scale and amending the main paragraph of his program "*discontinuance of colonization of the City of Moscow by natives of Caucasus and the Middle East*" by changing "*colonization of the City of Moscow*" into "*colonization of the Russian land*".

There were also other propagandistic statements and materials related to the presidential campaign, but not directly relating to contenders.

First of all, we need to say a few words about Dmitriy Rogozin. The Glazyev-Rogozin coalition's split was exactly due to the question about the contender to whom the Motherland bloc would render its support. Dmitriy Rogozin supporting Vladimir Putin, after the terrorist attack of the Moscow subway, said live on NTV that today in Russia terrorist attacks are carried out by "*people all belonging to one nation*" (and, by the way, was interrupted by Savic Shuster, the presenter of the show) also saying that to the best of his knowledge there's a lot of terrorists' accomplices among Moscow Chechens<sup>91</sup>.

To speak of other examples, we can say about flyers-stickers<sup>92</sup>, distributed in St. Petersburg stylized after the CEC posters. The flyer with the text "The President has promised... to protect the safety and integrity of the state. The oath by the President of Russia" pictures three persons with vividly expressed ethnic features. Apparently, this is supposed to imply they are the people having filled up Russia, whereas the current President does not live to his promise to ensure safety of the country. The Flyers were likely to be distributed in other cities other than St. Petersburg. At least we happened to see the same flyers, but made on the social subject rather than the ethnical one. The flyer had no date-line, of course.

However, all these are just separate cases. Without having a greater number of examples, we can hardly speak of them as manifestations of any systematic xenophobia propaganda.

The bottom line is as follows:

First, despite the extreme apathy of the RF presidential election propaganda campaign, the *Hate Speech* manifestations there were visible. Like in the Parliamentary campaign, representatives of the LDPR and the CPRF, that started the presidential run under the same slogans they used in the Parliamentary one, became "leaders" as to the number of such manifestations. Accordingly, 'non-Russians', 'Caucasians' and 'Jews', although deferring in ratio compared to autumn 2003, became the main objects of the contender-related *Hate Speech*.

Second, the amount of the *Hate Speech* spoken in the pre-election propaganda campaign of 2004 can be explained, in our opinion, exceptionally with that there was essentially no campaign at all. Almost literal reiteration of the autumn 2003 slogans gives a good reason to suggest a slight acceleration of the presidential run would result in increase of the same statements.

<sup>90</sup> The court finds German Sterligov does not inspire a national discord // SOVA Center. December 1, 2003.

<sup>91</sup> "The Freedom of Speech" // NTV. February 6, 2004. Verbatim of the show has been published on NTV's website (<http://www.ntv.ru/programs/publicistics/svbslv/index.jsp?part=Transcript&iid=1502>).

<sup>92</sup> Courtesy by Antuan Arakelyan, Program Coordinator of the European Committee "The Human Rights in the Regions of Russia" on St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region .



## **Discussing Hate Speech Used in Presidential Campaign**

Unlike the Parliamentary campaign, the “presidential” *Hate Speech* has practically not been discussed in the federal media. The exception is indignation against xenophobic statements by politicians of different level related to the blast in the Moscow subway in February 2004.<sup>93</sup> However, no commentator linked them with presidential propaganda.

Out of four publications related to the campaign to varying degree, three concern the LDPR’s representatives.

On March 2004, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” published an article called “The Third Force” by Leonid Radzikhovskiy in which particularly it is said: *“I won’t call by name the candidate who could star in a movie “The Skinhead’s Father”. I think it’s clear who I mean anyway. His boorish rumbling was especially noticeable against remaining land-dwelling Ribkins (politician’s name, can be translated from Russian as ‘tiny fish’) who openly tried to keep the distance to their violent partner. And nobody had a courage to contravene him – all of them together cursed the absent President. I just was glad Putin did not soil his suit standing by the “protector of Russians, protector of the poor”. The only thing that comes to mind listening that person is ‘where is the militia?’ “It’s important, though, such observation by L. Radzikhovskiy did become a reason for discussions on inappropriateness of nationalistic rhetoric, but rather was used to prove author’s idea of Russia’s needing a “strong hand”<sup>94</sup>.*

Three days later, “Rodnaya Gazeta” published materials of the round table dedicated to “the LDPR phenomena”. Among other things there were also discussed the slogans used by the party. Experts attending the debates expressed their opinion that Zhirinovskiy’s rhetoric is nothing more but a game, “propaganda, rather than an ideology”. The fact Zhirinovskiy’s nationalistic pranks don’t meet a proper level of disapproval on the part of authorities can be explained by that the authorities either don’t care since the LDPR has never given a reason to doubt its loyalty to the current regime, or even is taking advantage of that Zhirinovskiy “channels nationalistic sentiments... As a result the steam goes all to the whistle, no victims, everybody’s happy”. Let’s put a note, we are quite satisfied with such political appraisal of the LDPR’s place in the political system of the country. But the assertion that a nationalistic propaganda has nothing to do with real victims does not look quite convincing.

Now, the journalists of “Rossiyskaya Gazeta”, the government newspaper”, providing coverage of the presidential elections did not notice Oleg Malishkin suffering the nationalistic rhetoric: “Malishkin seemed to the multinational south more appealing the leader of the party who was not in much favor up there due to his propositions on the national issue” – says one of the notes drawing the electoral bottom line<sup>95</sup>

The only, in our opinion, meaningful publication dedicated to the nationalistic rhetoric and nationalism generally, in the context of the presidential campaign is the article called “Happiness without foreigners” by Maxim Sokolov<sup>96</sup>. The author quite emotionally disapproves usage of the slogan “The Russia’s for Russians” in any form: *“The forced (it’s always pronounced after multiple reprimands) reservation that the slogan “Russia’s for Russians” should be understood in cultural rather than in the racial sense can’t stand facing the purifying practice. In theory, no matter if I am a negro of advancing years, if I consider Russia my native country and respect the Russian culture, language and customs, then I am Russian. In practice, nobody cares about self-consciousness of a foreigner. Skinheads hit on the face rather than on self-consciousness. Militia clears the pockets rather than self-consciousness. And even a targeted man identified as a racially alien citizen reads them by heart the entire “The Lay of Igor’s Warfare”, it won’t help him”.*

M. Sokolov points out to the fact that there are objective social and demographic processes that make the presence of “others” vitally important to the country. Of course, M. Sokolov notes, there’s a problem of so called “ethnic crime”: *“However, the point is criminal ethnic groups do not suffer in any way from the militia or skinheads, but live a happy life in care of the absolutely non-criminal municipal administration. Teachers of national-socialism along with storm-troopers can not bring any order to those people, and what we need under the circumstances is absolutely different – still operating, although not in the best condition, the justice and the police”.*

Therefore, we can say incorrect statements made by the RF presidential contenders and their advocates/opponents did not draw to themselves anybody’s attention.

<sup>93</sup> Mikhail Fedotov. “The Savage Virus” // Noviy Izvestia February 9, 2004; Aleksandr Kolesnichenko. “Meeting Trains and Turn Them Away” // Ibidem.

<sup>94</sup> Leonid Radzikhovskiy. “The Third Force” // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. March 2, 2004.

<sup>95</sup> Tamara Shkel, Vladislav Vorobyev. “The CEC Tightened the Belts” // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. March 16, 2004.

<sup>96</sup> Maksim Sokolov. “Happiness without Foreigners” // Izvestia. February 26, 2004.