Galina Kozhevnikova. Summer 2008: Anti-Extremism, Real and Fake
Edited by Alexander Verkhovsky
Wе publish our seasonal report on radical nationalism and counteraction to it in summer 2008. As usual, the report is based on the results of the SOVA Center daily monitoring.
Summary
Manifestations of radical nationalism : Violence : Public activity of right-wing radical groups
Counteraction to radical nationalism : International organizations : Government's measures of counteraction
Excessive and unfounded sanctions against extremism : Criminal prosecution : Prosecution of religious organizations : Persecution of mass media : Other enforcement mishaps
Appendices. crime and punishment statistics
SUMMARY
Right-wing radicals were less active last summer than the previous two years. The number of racist attacks notably decreased. The change was due both to the law enforcement activity and to internal conflicts and splits in right-wing radical organizations. The same internal conflicts also influenced public activity of the ultra-right: during the summer they were not able to organize a single coordinated public event, and their actions were limited to a few media provocations. The impact of such provocations is usually stronger when they are linked to massive clashes caused by grassroots conflicts - traditionally, in the summer such clashes are more frequent than at any other time (a recent incident occurred in the village of Karagai, Perm Oblast) - or by youth fights.
As regards to the latter, we have observed a fairly new development in late spring and particularly in early summer: groups of young men - natives of the Caucasus - have been acting similarly to Nazi skinheads by actively provoking (and participating in) massive ethno-nationalist fights. Their activity has been limited so far (although strongly exaggerated by the ultra-right media), but there is no doubt that they will become increasingly active.
Hardly any new developments were observed in the efforts to counteract radical nationalism. Even though the government's :anti-extremist; activity is increasing, it appears to be a make-believe, rather than effective action.
We note some small improvements in the way the authorities are suppressing xenophobic propaganda. There were fewer inappropriately mild probation punishments and inappropriately tough prison sentences. As a landmark development, two law enforcement officers were convicted under art. 282 of the Criminal Code.
Yet, inappropriate or at least questionable anti-extremist enforcement persists. New items continue to be hastily added to the federal list of extremist materials. Not only are many bans clearly unfounded, but in our opinion the list lacks identification data and is generally vague, making it likely that someone may inadvertently break the law. Equally alarming is the emerging practice of criminal prosecution and sentencing of individuals for their comments on web forums and blogs, even though the most visited and influential right-wing radical websites continue unchallenged. Similarly, mass media are increasingly targeted by anti-extremist enforcement, even for quoting someone's opinion without endorsing it.
And finally, as an emerging new trend observed in late spring and early summer, anti-extremist warnings and criminal investigations have targeted religious organizations, allegedly for :promoting religious hatred.;
MANIFESTATIONS OF RADICAL NATIONALISM
Violence
Racist violence dropped by more than half from last year. In the summer of 2008, a total of 70 victims, including nine deaths, were reported; for the sake of comparison: in the summer of 2007, 176 victims, including 17 deaths, were reported. There is no doubt that in Moscow, the epicenter of racist violence, the wave of attacks reported earlier in the year was eventually suppressed by law enforcement authorities. Yet we find it pretty obvious that many attacks are never reported - e.g. no violent incidents were reported on the Navy Day celebration, even though some attacks probably occurred on that day as usual. Furthermore, the typical scenarios of neo-Nazi attacks have changed; for example, many young women have recently joined neo-Nazi gangs, making it easier to provoke a fight under the pretext of :defending a girl from a violent assault;. Racist attacks combined with robbery are also increasingly common, etc. These factors make it more difficult to identify racist incidents through crime reports.
Racist attacks in the first 8 months of 2008 resulted in at least 68 deaths, and 262 or so persons were injured.
As to the hotbeds of violence, these continue to include Moscow (41 killed, 129 injured) and St. Petersburg (14 killed, 31 injured); Voronezh comes third once again, after two years of less violence (1 killed, 13 injured). Natives of Central Asia continue to be the main targets of racist attacks, accounting for more than a third of all victims (38 killed, 83 injured).
Once again, after a long break, neo-Nazi raids in suburban trains were reported; the skinhead attackers apparently followed some of the numerous instructions published on right-wing radical websites. In the summer, also after a long interval, a few attacks against hostels of non-Russian immigrants were reported; the attackers used bottles with inflammable liquid and firecrackers.
There are hardly any published reports of neo-Nazi skinhead attacks against members of youth subcultures and antifa. However, unconfirmed reports (mainly rumors) spread from time to time about massive fights between these groups. As opposed to racist attacks, the lack of reports of such fighting means that they are seen from both sides as an ongoing :guerilla war; in which neither party is willing to disclose its casualties. This street war, however, does not only escalate violence between opponents, but causes accidental victims among bystanders.
We increasingly hear reports of violent attacks committed by non-affiliated xenophobic individuals. The most publicized case in summer was a series of attacks in Perm by a mentally disturbed man involved with neo-Nazi ideas. After having watched crime reports on television, he manufactured a gun out of a steel pipe and used it to shoot passers-by with non-Slav appearance. He killed at least one person and wounded three, but the investigators believe there are more victims.
A new trend observed since early summer is the activity of groups formed by young natives of the Caucasus who either intentionally provoke fights with the ultra-right or readily take the latter's challenge. A least one pre-planned fight reported in Mitino, Moscow, involved up to 200 people on both sides (reports of a few other incidents appear to present grassroots conflicts as nationalist clashes). In fact, such groups of :Caucasus youth; were first noticed back in 2007 (e.g. the fighting in Slavyanskaya Square on 22 June 2007). In the spring of 2008, there were a few provocative warnings of would-be fights, but in most cases it was difficult to tell mere provocation from intentional lies. Some experts warned a while ago that the failure of law enforcement authorities to suppress xenophobia and skinheads' racist violence may push some of their actual or potential victims to responding in a violent, nationalist manner. The warnings came true. Now we see such groups based on the same shared characteristics - region and phenotype (Caucasus, :appearance of a Caucasus native;[1]) - by which neo-Nazi skinheads target their victims. Very often, such groups imitate the neo-Nazi's conduct by provoking a fight, filming it on their mobile phones and posting on the web.
A few spontaneous massive conflicts were reported in summer. Even though most of them were grassroots, interpersonal conflicts, they were presented as interethnic clashes. The conflicts occurred in Saratov, Sverdlovsk and Perm Oblasts. Only one of the incidents, however, may be described as a truly interethnic conflict. A grassroots fight in the village of Karagai, Perm Oblast, on 19 July in a local restaurant led to a series of massive fights clearly driven by ethnic hatred on both sides. The conflict in Karagai also highlighted the destructive role of mass media reporting the situation as :infringement upon the rights of the indigenous population; and :dictate by criminal Diasporas.; [2]
As before, vandalism targeting places of worship and memorial installations was a common outlet for hatred. We did not observe any increase of vandalism from last year, however. We only mention Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where such incidents were more numerous than elsewhere (at least 10 of the 56 cases reported in Russia since the beginning of 2008, of them 8 incidents of vandalism in Nizhny Novgorod occurred in end-May and in summer). Vandals in Nizhny Novgorod targeted Jewish and Muslim buildings, and World War II memorials.
Public activity of right-wing radical groups
The most noticeable public action by right-wing radicals in the summer of 2008 was the unification conference of the Russian National Movement held on 8 June in Moscow. The conference featured the establishment of a new coalition including the non-registered Great Russia Party (led by Andrei Savelyev), Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) (led by Alexander Belov), the "People' Russian Liberation Movement (led by Alexey Naval'ny and Sergey Gulyaev), and the Russian Public Movement (ROD) (led by Konstantin Krylov). However, the new coalition's prospects are unclear: firstly, its DPNI core has been going through a major split over the past few months; secondly, DPNI, ROD and the Great Russia Party had always acted together anyway, so the only new ally they added to the coalition was the "People' Movement - a small and extremely diverse group of people with democratic and leftist views who describe themselves as :civilized nationalists.;
Right-wing activists have also set up some ostensibly :neutral; organizations which formally do not voice any xenophobic slogans and are therefore accepted by, and collaborate with, the :non-nationalist; part of the opposition to the current political regime. For example, an activist of the Popular Union and the leader of My Courtyard (Moi Dvor) organization Mikhail Butrimov appears side by side with Yabloko's new leader Sergey Mitrokhin at public protests against infill development, while Roman Yelizov, DPNI leader of the Amur region (convicted and sentenced in end-summer) was also the leader of an environmentalists' club and a member of the United Civil Front (OGF).
However, the overall public activity of ideological groups was low in the summer of 2008, except for the media coverage of the above mentioned fights. Some of their visible actions included anti-Georgian statements and events, and a few thematic pickets (e.g. they organized pickets in Moscow on 28 June and in Stavropol, Voronezh and Tula between 28 and 31 August in support of officers Arakcheyev and Khudyakov).
Of course, the downturn was largely caused by the split of DPNI in mid-May, which grew even worse over the three summer months. The leaders' declared attempts to overcome the internal conflict eventually failed. Regardless of the two :unification; congresses, [3] by mid-September the organization was not reunited and currently exists as three separate segments. The first group led by brothers Belov and Basmanov seek to transform DPNI into a more conventional political party; the second group led by former leader of the Moscow chapter Alexey Mikhailov prefer to keep DPNI an informal network, while the third group led by former leader of the Bryanks chapter Dmitry Zubov attract the most radical neo-Nazi members and prefer an informal structure, like A. Mikhailov, but plan to engage in totally illegal activities. However, the general public associates the widely publicized DPNI :brand; with the group led by Belov and Basmanov.
Regardless of the internal differences, in August 2008 DPNI called upon the authorities to identify and intern as prisoners of war those Georgian nationals who lived in Russia at the time, and to launch police inspections of businesses owned by ethnic Georgians, etc. Some lists of Georgian nationals and businesses were published on the web, and there must have been violence involved, even though hardly any was reported, which reminds us of the 2006 anti-Georgian campaign. [4] DPNI's activities did not attract the attention of law enforcement authorities. Moreover, an :anti-extremist; warning was issued to Novaya Gazeta v Peterburge paper for publishing a report critical of the ultra-right actions and declarations. The warning sent a signal to all mass media that any coverage of the anti-Georgian activity is highly unwelcome.
COUNTERACTION TO RADICAL NATIONALISM
International organizations
Between July and August 2008, Russia submitted its periodic report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. At the same time, 33 Russian NGOs submitted a shadow report to the UN Committee. The latter was very critical of Russia's official report as reflected in its Concluding Observations published on 20 August 2008. In particular, the Committee recommends that Russia should undertake a thorough independent investigation of the anti-Georgian campaign of 2006, consistently punish public officials and others involved in discrimination, improve reporting and statistics of racist crimes, etc. [5]
Government's measures of counteraction
Criminal prosecution
Violence
Just one trial ended in convictions in the summer of 2008 in a racist violence case. A group of teenagers in Yekaterinburg were sentenced to long prison terms for a hate murder (art. 105, part 2, subp. g, l) of a man whom they perceived to be :a Caucasus native.;
In total, since the beginning of the year 2008, at least 15 trials ended in convictions against 50 offenders, with the hate motive recognized.
On 6 June, a jury passed a non-guilty verdict in a high-profile trial of Colonel Kvachkov and his two supporters. The verdict was celebrated by the ultra-right and triggered a new wave of xenophobic propaganda. Even the mainstream mass media made Kvachkov their hero for a few days. However, on 26 August, the Russian Supreme Court quashed the non-guilty verdict and sent the case back for a new trial.
Propaganda and campaigning
The Russian authorities were much more active in suppressing xenophobic propaganda, as opposed to violent racist crimes. Over the summer months, at least 10 trials convicted - appropriately, as we believe - 12 offenders under art. 282, plus at least five trials convicted 6 offenders under art. 280 (calls to extremist activity). The Russian courts relied on art. 280 more than ever. Most offenders were charged both with xenophobic propaganda and calls to extremism, since the former is often accompanied by criticism of the current government, treated by courts as :extremism.;
In two cases, former police officers were convicted. In Stavropol, a local police chief was sentenced to one year of settlement colony for failing to intervene, but instead yelling racist comments and encouraging drunken traffic police officers as they were beating a man with non-Slav appearance. [6] In Leningrad Oblast, a trial against a (now former) police Captain who had built a neo-Nazi website two years ago, ended in a probation sentence. These were the first known to us convictions of police officers for racist offenses.
In total, at least 28 sentences were meted out for xenophobic propaganda only (art. 282) in the first half of 2008, the same as in the entire 2007.
We also noted comparatively fewer excessively tough prison sentences. Just one such sentence was meted out to the leader of DPNI chapter in Blagoveschensk who was sentenced to one year of settlement colony for publication and dissemination of a xenophobic paper. We first noticed this positive trend back in the spring of 2008. Also positive is the fact that fewer probation sentences allowed the offenders to get away without additional penalties: just five of the 19 convicted under art. 282 and 280 (as opposed to six of the 15 convicted in spring).
However, the positive practice of restricting :hate promoters; from their professional occupation (i.e. journalist, teacher) remained limited, with just two of the 15 sentences for :racist propaganda.;
We are concerned about another emerging trend - namely, criminal investigations into web forum postings (however offensive and xenophobic). At least two such cases were reported in summer. We have noted on numerous occasions that this type of selective enforcement is usually ineffective, excessive, and perceived by the public as intimidation and censorship, particularly in view of the fact that really dangerous and offensive webpages appear to raise no concerns of the Russian law enforcement authorities.
Extremist materials
Due to reorganization of the federal executive authorities, they stopped updating the :banned; list in early summer (in May, the responsibility for maintaining and updating the list was delegated to the Ministry of Justice). However, starting in late June, new items were promptly added to the list; in August it was updated three times and grew from 151 to 255 items. We still believe that many texts were banned inappropriately, usually after the book or brochure was found in the home or office of a suspect in an :extremist; case.
However, there are other problems with the list, which increasingly affect individuals and organizations.
Firstly, it is virtually impossible to identify most banned materials, particularly Muslim texts, due to absence of publication details. Some items have been entered twice (we have found at list six duplications).
Secondly, the list includes a few locally distributed leaflets, often lacking any details of the author and publisher. The only way to identify them is by the first and last sentences, therefore the ban is extremely easy to bypass. The official list contains at least 50[7] (one fifth of the total!) leaflets - a fact that strongly suggests that some authorities merely pretend to be fighting against extremism.
Thirdly, the authorities increasingly ban relatively old religious texts, history research papers for containing quotations by Nazi criminals (e.g. Hitler's Table Talk[8]), books written in the early XX century (e.g. G. Butmi, Kabala ili Svoboda[9]) or more recent works of radical political leaders (e.g. Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy). This policy is likely to hinder research in many humanitarian spheres, such as history, religion, political science, etc. Attempts to address the problem by setting up expert bodies, for example, :on Muslim literature; - as it was the case in Adygeya in early September - is likely to make the problem even worse, rather than offer a solution: not only because experts may differ in their opinions, but also for reasons of (in)equality before the law: why should Muslims benefit from an expert body, but not Jehovah's Witnesses or Pyotr Kuznetsov's followers?
And fourthly, it remains unclear whether liability for dissemination of a banned material begins at the moment of it is found extremist by a court or after it is included in the Federal list. As a result of this uncertainty, in July, Moscow-based publisher Aslambek Ezhayev faced criminal charges for publishing The Personality of a Muslim in the autumn of 2007 - after the book was found extremist by a court (in August), but before it was included in the federal list of banned materials (29 December).
And finally, no procedures have been adopted as to how libraries should store and issue such books and brochures. Consequently, a number of libraries faced prosecutorial warnings, including 17 warnings issued to libraries in Saratov Oblast and at least 23 warnings in Altai Krai. These libraries, in fact, were made responsible for the authorities' failure to adopt necessary administrative procedures pursuant to the law. [10] Similarly to the bans of leaflets described above, attacks against libraries allow authorities to pretend they are fighting extremism[11].
The situation may change after the legal conflict in the summer of 2008 with Vladimir Istarkhov's Udar Russkikh Bogov, a popular book among right-wing radicals. Within a few days' period, two courts, equal in status but located in different regions, adopted diametrically opposed judgments: one found the above book extremist, while the other found it acceptable. Apparently, the case will be considered by the Russian Supreme Court, and hopefully, they will upgrade the procedure whereby courts may ban extremist materials.
Other measures of counteraction
The authorities take some other measures to suppress aggressive xenophobia.
Prosecutor's offices issue :anti-extremist; warnings to schools for lack of security guards and to municipalities for failure to include :anti-extremist; provisions in their charters. It is unclear whether such measures are necessary or effective, but admittedly, they are consistent with the law, just like the abovementioned warnings issued to libraries.
Admittedly, some administrative sanctions have been effective. For example, in Leningrad Oblast in June some municipal officials in the town of Pushkin were warned for failure to erase neo-Nazi graffiti from the walls of local buildings.
After a brief pause caused by Rossvyazokhrankultura's transformation into Rossvyazkomnadzor, [12] more anti-extremist warnings were issued to mass media. In total, at least 19 warnings were issued in the first eight months of 2008. However, some of them are clearly unlawful, and some others are questionable. Furthermore, the authorities keep them posted on their website, without any comments, including those warnings which have been eventually quashed by courts. For example, they warnings keep posted on the website which were issued before the 2007 elections to two papers in Saratov, namely to Saratovskii Reporter for its famous :Putin as von Schtirlitz; collage and to Novie Vremena v Saratove.
EXCESSIVE AND UNFOUNDED SANCTIONS AGAINST EXTREMISM
The emerging positive practices of counteraction to hate crime and right-wing radical activity coexist with unlawful enforcement.
Criminal prosecution
The summer of 2008 was marked by two anti-extremist verdicts which we consider unfounded.
On 7 July, a city court in Syktyvkar sentenced blogger Savva Terentyev to a year of probation, and on 19 August a court of second instance upheld the judgment. A few days before the verdict of the second-instance court, a similar case with clearly political motives was opened in Kemerovo Oblast against Oborona Movement activist Dmitry Solovyev for hateful comments against police and FSB in the Live Journal.
On 25 June in Bashkortostan, after a trial which lasted for more than two years, two opposition members, Airat Dilmukhammedov and Victor Shmakov, were sentenced to two years of probation each on charges of incitement to extremist activity and riots [even though no riots occurred]; the charges were triggered by the publication of their articles strongly critical of Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov.
Also in August, a court found Pyotr Kuznetsov, leader of Penza sectarian recluses, guilty under art. 282, because the judges found incitement to religious hatred in his books presumed to be extremist. Pyotr Kuznetsov was found guilty and sentenced to involuntary psychiatric treatment. We are not familiar with his books, but the expert opinion, which the prosecutor and the court relied on, read that the books :may elicit negative emotions, affect one's mental state, trigger various behavioral reactions, and in special circumstances may provoke aggressive, agitated, and immoral conduct; (emphasis added, G. K. ).
At least five members of the oppositional National Bolshevik Party in Moscow, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, and Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur face criminal charges under art. 282-2 (participation in a banned extremist organization).
Prosecution of religious organizations
In their prosecution of religious organizations, the authorities do not bother to find any threat of terrorism or violence, but rely on :affirmation of religious superiority; - legally an extremist offense in Russia, even though it is natural for many believers to consider their faith superior to any other - as the SOVA Center has pointed out on a number of occasions. [13] Until recently, only faith groups suspected of political opposition - Muslim groups and some Marii El pagans - were targeted, but recently even politically neutral organizations have been affected.
Within a few weeks in late May and early June :anti-extremist; warnings were sent to Jehovah's Witnesses groups in Yekaterinburg and Taganrog (Rostov Oblast), and soon afterwards a criminal investigation was opened in Sverdlovsk Oblast into alleged incitement to religious hatred by Jehovah's Witnesses. Also in June in Moscow an :anti-extremist; warning was issued to Baptists.
On 25 August, the Civil Law Judicial Collegium of the Samara Oblast Court sent a judgment back to the court of first instance for reconsideration. What we consider an absurd judgment found the website Islam as It Is extremist just for publishing an article which expressed an opinion that Muslims should not celebrate Nowruz. Nevertheless, we do not rule out that this article may be found extremist anyway, and its dissemination may trigger criminal charges.
Persecution of mass media
In the summer of 2008, authorities increased pressure on independent mass media of the North Caucasus. On 6 June, Kuntsevsky Court in Moscow ordered closure of Ingushetiya.Ru website - even though the court proceedings were seriously flawed and the grounds for banning the website were questionable - and instructed all Russian internet providers to block access to the website (as of this writing, they have not done so yet). [14] Virtually no one doubts that the independent website came under pressure for political motives. A tragedy followed: on 31 August, the website owner Magomed Yevloyev was killed in Magas under circumstances suggesting a political assassination.
In summer, the authorities attacked Chernovik - a paper in Dagestan known for its criticism of the local situation. The paper received two anti-extremist warnings - from Rossvyazkomnadzor and the prosecutor's office - and its editor-in-chief faced criminal charges under art. 282. We find both the warnings and the criminal charges unfounded. The paper came under pressure for being critical of the Dagestan government and law enforcement agencies, in particular of their methods of fighting terrorism, and also for quoting a rebel fighter on its pages. [15]
Ura.Ru, a web-based news agency, received two anti-extremist warnings from Rossvyazokhrankultura within a short period, and was forced to stop its live interaction with the audience through the web forum. [16]
After a long break since the election campaign, the authorities resumed their practice of confiscating entire print-runs of papers :to check them for extremism;; on 28 and 29 August they confiscated two leftist papers - Za Rabochuyu Vlast'! Marksistskaya Gazeta and Chto Delat'? - both published in St. Petersburg.
However, the most outrageous, in our opinion, was the above-mentioned warning of Novaya Gazeta v Peterburge issued just a few hours (sic!) after they published a strongly critical report about DPNI. Apparently, by doing so Rossvyazkomnadzor set a record of early response, closely matched only by the prosecutor's office in Volgograd: they took just one day in 2005 to issue an (equally unfounded) warning to the local Gorodskiye Vesti paper for publishing certain cartoons. In the recent case, Rossvyazkomnadzor was upset about a quotation from a DPNI activist, used by the author without any endorsement just to illustrate a point he wished to make in the article.
Other enforcement mishaps
In addition to the intentionally inappropriate enforcement of the anti-extremist legislation described above, a number of enforcement mishaps were due to the vagueness of the law against extremism and to its absurdly literal interpretation by some officials. For example, a reconstructor in Novosibirsk, participant of a mock combat between Nazi and Soviet tanks, and a collector in Samara trying to sell a few coins of the Third Reich both faced monetary fines for extremism. Even more absurd was a warning issued to a multimedia store in St. Petersburg for selling Zone 88 Japanese anime films; the prosecutor's office perceived the combination of a cross (which did not resemble a Nazi swastika at all) and the 88 number in the title as promotion of neo-Nazi skinheads.
APPENDICES. Crime and punishment statistics (Word)
Appendix 1. Statistics of racist and neo-Nazi attacks between 2004 and 31 August 2008 (by city)
Appendix 2. consolidates statistics of racist and neo-Nazi attacks between 2004 and 31 August 2008 (by season)
Appendix 3. Consolidates statistics of racist and neo-Nazi attacks between 2004 and 31 August 2008 (by category)
Appendix 4. Statistics of convictions for violent crimes taking into account the hate motive between 2004 and 31 August 2008
Appendix 4. Statistics of convictions for hate propaganda (art.282 of the Criminal Code). 2004 - 31 August 2008
Appendix 5. Statistics of convictions for public appeals to extremist activity (art. 280 of the Criminal Code). 2005 - 31 August 2008
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[1] Thus, a type of :regional solidarity; was observed by experts in the village of Karagai, Perm Oblast, where a series of mass fights, triggered partially by ethnic hatred, were reported in July.
[2] See details in: Karagai: bytovye konflikty, mekhanizmy solidarnosti i bezotvetstvennye SMI // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2008. 5 September (/racism-xenophobia/news/racism-nationalism/2008/09/d14087/).
[3] On 12 July, such a congress was convened at the initiative of A. Belov's group, and on 13 September, on the initiative of A. Mikhailov's group.
[4] We know of three attacks against individuals perceived as ethnic Georgians.
[5] See the Committee's recommendations in English at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/co/CERD.C.RUS.CO.19.pdf.
[6] Notably, it is unclear whether the attackers were ever punished.
[7] Except newsletters of various groups, mistakenly identified by authorities as leaflets.
[8] For more information about the three versions of Hitler's Table Talk and about the author of the banned book in Vadim Nesterov, Chto ono takoe, nashe leto...//Park Kul'tury (Gazeta). 2008. 10 July (http://www.gazeta.ru/culture/2008/07/10/a_2779110.shtml).
[9] Georgy Butmi's book was first published in early 20th century and contains a version of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion which differs from the :classical; text.
[10] To note, some libraries were sanctioned for a lack of the federal banned list of extremist materials available, even though, to the best of our knowledge, there is no official policy saying they must have one.
[11] Moreover, such a long and erratic list is difficult to use for real-time enforcement purposes: e.g. during the Russian March organized by S. Baburin's Narodnyi Soyuz, police had to check the leaflets disseminated by the organizers against a list of about three dozen titles (as observed by the author of this report).
[12] The reorganization took place on 12 May 2008 as part of a broader reshufflement of federal executive authorities.
[13] See, for example, Alexander Verkhovsky. Antiekstremistskoe zakonodatel'stvo i pravoprimenenie kak instrumenty nepravomernykh ogranichenii osnovnykh svobod v Rossii (Anti-extremist legislation and enforcement as instruments of unlawful restrictions of fundamental freedoms in Russia) // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2007. 30 March (/racism-xenophobia/publications/2007/03/d10501/); Same author. Antiekstremistskoe zakonodatel'stvo i zloupotrebleniia pri ego primenenii (Anti-extremist legislation and its unwarranted enforcement) // Ibid. 2008. 27 May (/racism-xenophobia/publications/2008/05/d13425/).
[14] The site was closed on the ground that a few materials it had published were found extremist, but the website owners could not appeal the judgment, because they were notified after it had already come into force.
[15] Vyneseno preduprezhdenie dagestanskoi gazete :Chernovik; // SOVA Center. Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia. 2008. 9 July - 6 August (http://xeno.sova-center.ru/89CCE27/89CD1C9/B5C58FD); See details of the case in: Protiv glavnogo redaktora :Chernovika; zavedeno ugolovnoe delo // Ibid. 2008. 6 August (/misuse/news/persecution/2008/08/d13864/).
[16] The two warnings placed the agency under threat of closure, but then the conflict was mediated by the Russian Association for Public Relations (RASO) and somehow settled. See: RIA :URA.Ru; blagodarit RASO i lichno Evgeniia Minchenko // RASO website. 2008. 16 September (http://www.raso.ru/index.php?action=show&id=53345).
