The war in Ukraine has changed Russian society in many ways. One of the most anticipated areas of these changes is related to nationalism, and these changes are certainly taking place. This article will discuss only those changes that directly relate to the Russian nationalists’ movement, that is, a wide and extremely heterogeneous set of politically active people who define themselves mainly as nationalists. The article is based on the monitoring data of SOVA Research Center, which are incorporated into the materials published on the Center’s website as news, open databases, and periodic reports.
Russian nationalists were an important movement in the 2000s, and before the mass protests of the winter of 2011-2012, it was the Russian March that was for several years the largest opposition event. Then the movement entered a crisis streak, and when it split abruptly into supporters of Kiev, i.e. the new authorities in Ukraine, and supporters of Donetsk, i.e. the irredentist movement in the eastern regions, in 2014, a decline began that was progressive and visible to everyone. In 2019, the Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev tried to resuscitate the movement not as an opposition movement, but as loyal to the Kremlin. But the latter did not want such allies, and since 2020, the sharply increased pressure on all social groups has crushed the attempt to revive Russian nationalism.
But at the same time, in 2020-2023, the Kremlin itself was increasingly turning toward a national-conservative policy: moral conservatism became increasingly important (the fight against LGBT+ people, denunciation of various kinds of immoralism, especially after the beginning of the war, and from 2023 even the campaign to ban abortion), certain elements of Soviet patriotic education were more actively revived, a semi-official campaign began against migrant workers in Russia (mostly from Central Asia) as a threat to public order; the rhetoric of “protecting Russians” in Ukraine has led to a full-scale war, and this war was quickly positioned as a military confrontation with the West.
Russian nationalists have, of course, been supporting and participating in the anti-migrant campaign all these years. Also, almost all of them take the position of moral conservatism, although there are possible variations here. Most nationalists are skeptical of Soviet traditions, if not outright negative, but they tend to approve of patriotic education, with some degree of criticism of the way the authorities do it (criticism of how well officials do their job is a common feature of Russian life). The attitudes to the policy in the Ukrainian direction, however, were not homogeneous at all.
As mentioned above, in 2014, the nationalists were split, and that rift has not been healed to this day. It was mostly those who were more white racist than Russian nationalists who sided with Kyiv because, for a white racist, there is no difference between a Russian and a Ukrainian, and the life of the ultra-right in Ukraine is much freer than in Russia, and there are far fewer “non-Aryan” migrants in Ukraine. At the same time, white racists are much less concerned about the greatness of the Russian state; they think more globally. In practice, this leads to such groups largely following the lead of the liberal opposition, but supplementing its rhetoric with their own racist discourse. The difference between 2022 and 2014 was that in 2014 the initial split was roughly in half, but since then the pro-Kiev wing has weakened much more than the pro-Donetsk one. Pro-Donetsk nationalists could be loyal or oppositional (and, in case of the latter, often allied with communists), but in both cases, they thought of the relations with Ukraine (and beyond) through the prism of confrontation with the West and the strengthening of Russian power. By 2022, this wing was already undoubtedly dominant. Perhaps that was why the division among the “pro-Donetsk” – let’s call them patriotic nationalists – into those who were quite loyal to the authorities and those who were in opposition and who constantly harshly criticized all the actions of the government, including the war efforts, became more noticeable.
Pro-Kiev nationalists tried and are still trying to campaign and agitate online, but they easily succumb to pressure from the authorities: almost all of their organizations have effectively ceased operations in Russia as early as 2023. Grassroots activists of this type, usually veterans of neo-Nazi groups or their young associates, sometimes try to join the Ukrainian Army or commit sabotage inside Russia. Their contribution to general sabotage activities (arson of military recruitment centers, vandalizing vehicles bearing Z-symbols, etc.) doesn’t look significant, but it exists nonetheless. There were even attempts to plan terrorist attacks. In general, society barely notices these people.
Patriotic nationalists are incomparably more active and visible. They too may go to the front, but, unlike in 2014-2015, they are practically unable to form their own units. It was Igor Strelkov, the main hero of the 2014 Donbas irredentism, who came closest to doing so in the fall of 2022, but the plan to assemble “his own” volunteer battalion failed. Much more material assistance is provided to the army and the population of the frontline regions (both Russian and “new”), but even here the state and organizations directly supervised by it do so much more that the contribution of nationalists is hardly noticeable.
More noticeable is their contribution to the anti-migrant campaign, which since 2021, with a short break for the first six months of the war, has been increasingly actively carried out by a significant part of the country’s political class and mass media. Here we see, albeit in a weak form so far, the revival of those forms of activity which produced the political nationalism of the 2000s – involvement in local conflicts with ethnic elements and diverse vigilantism.
The war and the anti-migrant campaign gave patriotic nationalists quite a dramatic increase in popularity at the level of social networks. The popularity of the Telegram channels of both media and individuals belonging to this segment of the political spectrum grew between 3 and 10 times by the end of 2022, and the popularity of Strelkov’s Telegram channel increased 30 times, reaching almost 750,000 subscribers and making his channel comparable to top political bloggers. Many saw growth continue in 2023, albeit not as rapidly, but still at least 1.5-2.5 times, although anti-migrant rather than military activity probably played a major role here. However, after Strelkov’s arrest, the most popular man was Vladislav Pozdnyakov, the leader of the banned Men’s State known primarily for his aggressive misogynist and racist agitation and activities – his main Telegram channel has already attracted about 450,000 subscribers.
In today’s conditions, a Telegram channel, which works not only as a “party newspaper,” but also as an aggregator of activist news, and thus incites readers to certain actions, is becoming more effective than the traditional type of organization. Of course, this is true to a greater extent about groups and movements disloyal to the authorities. For example, if we look at pro-Kiev nationalists, the audience of the Natsdem Telegram channel with its 17,000 subscribers is four times larger than that of the most prominent organization in this segment of the spectrum.
Since the beginning of the war, the authorities have very noticeably and quite expectedly increased the intensity of persecution for what they consider to be ideologically motivated (and going against the official line) and illegal actions. These prosecutions concern all political sectors and almost all non-political segments of society. They concern both the actions that would be considered criminal in any European democratic and law-governed state and those that are clearly innocent in this sense, as well as many controversial cases. These persecutions have both before and now been systematically applied to nationalists. But the war has introduced certain changes here, too.
Of course, nationalists have often been and are still being prosecuted for violent crimes motivated by racial and other group hatred. This violence has been declining for more than a decade, but its prosecution has had a more complex dynamic. In particular, it intensified in 2022, although the violence itself declined in an unprecedented manner: it is possible that the militarized far-right, like the rest of the country, was in a state of shock at what had happened. But since the spring of 2023, grassroots far-right violence has been on the rise again. As before, it is being committed by autonomous youth groups, but they are completely new, with little or no connection to known nationalist political organizations. As a rule, it is not even known what these groups think about the war.
Pro-Kiev nationalists are often prosecuted for sabotage or for anti-war and pro-Ukraine statements. But it should be mentioned that we do not observe a total dismantling or destruction of pro-Kyiv organizations by the state; more likely, they cease their activities themselves for fear of repressions. We cannot say that the authorities are any tougher on this category of nationalists than on other opponents of the war in comparable circumstances.
If we look at the loyal segment of patriotic nationalists, they are, of course, not persecuted. Although general restrictions apply to them as well – no street actions are allowed, even in support of the war. It is only since the middle of 2023 that some groups of loyal nationalists have been cautiously encroaching on this general ban by participating in (or even organizing) local residents’ gatherings against migrants. Political activity is, essentially, almost impossible as well: the authorities do not approve of it, and no one is prepared to go against the state’s will. In local elections, the participation of loyal nationalists, such as the Rodina (Motherland) party, is extremely unimpressive. At the moment, one nationalist, Sergei Baburin, a veteran of the movement, has joined the race for the March 2024 presidential elections, but it is unclear whether he will actually be allowed to run.
The opposition patriotic nationalists, naturally, have an even slimmer chance of political participation. And their only attempt, in the spring of 2023, at founding a political association of even the most amorphous type, the Club of Angry Patriots, headed by Igor Strelkov, led to his arrest in July (now he is awaiting trial on charges of calling for extremism) and the stalling of the Club’s activities. However, Strelkov remains the only one arrested in this segment of the spectrum. The others are still allowed to criticize the authorities, including Putin personally. The state still has a need for such activists of pro-war political mobilization. Especially, since in critical moments, such as the Prigozhin rebellion in June 2023, they side with the authorities and not the rebels.
The question remains open as to whether the authorities will continue to be able to keep nationalist groups that are too radical or simply in opposition to them within the desired limits in a war situation.
Dr. Alexander Verkhovsky – Director, SOVA Research Center, Moscow, an independent initiative focuses on nationalism and xenophobia, the relationship between religion and society, and the formation and implementation of anti-extremist policy in Russia.
