In June, there were reports of widespread police raids and an uptick in expulsions (in Russia, “administrative expulsion” is different than deportation, which is due to criminal charges). July saw major legislative activity on the issue of migration (more about this below), as well as something like a “Russian march” in the town of Korenovsk, Krasnodar Region, the march taking place without any interference from police, which is, to put it mildly, unusual for Russia in the 2020s. All this is happening amid constant discussion of a big shortage of labor.

At the same time, complaints are myriad from citizens and politicians at various levels who are upset that thousands of migrants from countries to Russia’s south and east who have accepted Russian citizenship – they are sometimes called “new citizens” – do not register with the military and thus do not have to fight in Ukraine. Basically, part of the host population thinks the war burden is not being shared fairly. Yet anti-migration policies would only aggravate this, not to mention the labor shortage. Thus, if only because of this, anti-migration measures should be relaxed rather than stiffened, but the opposite is happening.

When analyzing immigration policy, it bears to keep in mind that there is no single “Russian government” or “Russian authorities” with a single line, but rather several bureaucratic clans with their own ambitions and agendas, along with bureaucratic interests that do not necessarily coincide. Some are interested in fighting migration, others are not; some need migrants in a bureaucratic sense, others see them as a headache, and so on. These circumstances have always ensured and will continue to ensure the lack of a single line in the policy of the government.


Migrant phobia vs the benefits of migration

The most obvious factor can be seen in the word “migrant” itself, or more precisely in the way it is most often used in colloquial speech. Someone with a UK passport is not considered “migrant” in Russia, for example, unlike a holder of an Uzbekistani one. Meanwhile, the aforementioned “new citizens” are still considered “migrants.” The word is still used even in relation to native-born Russian citizens from outlying regions, primarily the North Caucasus.

In other words, the very term “migrant” in its everyday use is racist and reflects a racist attitude toward a corresponding groups of people. Though the state suppresses the most radical forms of racist propaganda, generally it does not fight such racist attitudes and, perhaps, does not consider them a big deal. Overall, deep-rooted racist attitudes toward several groups of people in Russia are a constant factor, pushing the government in the direction of a tougher migration policy.

Of course, racist attitudes cannot be shown at the official level, but sometimes they prove impossible to hide. For instance, in July a Ministry of Internal Affairs lieutenant colonel reported at an official meeting he had received instructions from above to “whiten up” Moscow Region.

The labor shortage continues to grow, but it is due to many factors. Among them are the relative dynamics of economic development and currency exchange rates in Russia and in countries whence migrants come, relative demographic trends, Russia’s migration policy (the visa regime, the procedures for issuing various permits, how rigidly rules are enforced, corruption, etc.) and the war, which simultaneously demands more and more people on the battlefield and the assembly line to make military equipment. I am not an economist, and I do not presume to judge how these factors played out in the last two or three years, but migration policy, in my view, is unlikely to be the most important one.

It is very difficult to assess how much the possibility of being forced to fight in Ukraine deters migrants. They still end up there, with or without Russian citizenship, having signed a contract. Their number is unknown, but it is unlikely to be very large. For example, Russia’s Investigative Committee recently reported that 10,000 “new citizens” who had not registered with the military had been sent to the front.

There is no direct link between the registration of “new citizens” at military commissariats and the needs of the “special military operation,” as the Russian government calls it, since registration is important for mobilization and conscription, though there is no mobilization now, and conscripts still do not go to Ukraine unless they sign a contract while in the army.

It seems the number of migrants who thus ended up in Ukraine after signing a contract has been relatively small so far, since just recently a law was passed to synchronize the granting of citizenship and military registration. Until now, this simple bureaucratic task of synchronization – successfully addressed long ago by Moscow registration at one’s place of residence, for example – somehow still presented a problem. The authorities probably have reason to hope that the new law will not make “new citizens” leave Russia en masse (and whether the number of people wishing to obtain Russian citizenship falls as a result does not matter much to the government).



Escalation of migrant phobia

Migrants have long been an irritant to a large part of the host population. Since 2011, the authorities have moved from incantations about the need for tolerance and order to the formation of a doctrine that can be called official nationalism.

This doctrine promotes the political unity of citizens and nations around a Russian (russkoye)and Orthodox “civilizational core,” as opposed to ethnic nationalisms, including Russian ethnic nationalism. However, it did not really say anything about migrants: apparently, they were perceived as temporary help and not part of Russian society, with no policy in relation to them actually needed.

A rather unfriendly regulatory regime for migrants (incidentally, it has been noticeably improved since the early 2010s) was coupled with action against their being overtly targeted as the government sought to minimize the risk of violence and instability. A mysterious breakdown in this policy occurred in 2013, when the authorities openly provoked anti-migration sentiments and carried out widespread, demonstrative police raids, which quickly translated into a series of local riots. This campaign was abruptly curtailed when one such riot occurred on the outskirts of Moscow, in Biryulyovo Zapadnoye.

However, in 2021 the effort was resumed, and again for no apparent reason. Since then, it has only accelerated, with a six-month pause after the start of the special military operation. Note that this is not only propaganda but also numerous police raids and restrictive initiatives coming out of nationalistic elements in society.

The campaign, which has already lasted three years, is not the same as the six-month one in 2013. I can only assume that the start of the anti-migration campaign in 2021 is attributable to the constitutional reform of 2020, which marked a new step toward making the Putin regime ideological. That process has generally accelerated since 2022, inevitably affecting the government position toward migrants, though the thrust of the ideological mobilization is, of course, anti-Western.

Acceleration does not happen on its own – it is based on pretexts that are to one degree or another relevant to the actual issue of migration, but resonance seems more important than relevance here. An obvious example is the reaction of the authorities and loyalists to the terrible terrorist attack in March at Crocus City Hall in Moscow.

Of course, the “migrant threat” was talked about even before the terrorist attack, with such rhetoric intensifying in 2023. The leading official voices were (and remain) Investigative Committee Chair Alexander Bastrykin and Duma Deputy Chair Pyotr Tolstoy (he even collaborated with nationalist groups, which is unusual for high-ranking United Russia party figures). There is not enough room here to list all such voices, however. Already in 2023, the authorities fully condoned noticeably rising grassroots nationalistic vigilantism. After Crocus, however, everything intensified – raids, vigilantism (see Russia.Post here) and rhetoric.

Here some important clarifications should be made. The intensification of police raids is not something special either related to the terrorist attack or instituted over the last few years. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has always reacted this way to any high-profile migrant-related incident, seeking to be seen “taking measures,” and raids are the simplest one, clearly visible to both society and the political leadership.

The scale of the raids after Crocus was large but not exceptional: unlike in 2013, migrants were at least not marched in columns through the streets for the camera. Vigilantism on the part of nationalists also did not change much quantitatively. It is more about its gradual evolution and increasingly close cooperation between nationalists and the police. What has really changed, however, is the rhetoric.
Anti-migration voices and legislation

Firstly, the list of alarmist voices has got a lot longer. Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov, who had previously not felt the need to speculate on the issue of migration, alleged unprecedentedly rising migrant crime. That, however, is incongruous with police statistics, which are regularly published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and continue to be routinely announced by Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev. In addition, mainstream figures (and not just, for example, the monarchist Konstantin Malofeev) moved from routine complaints about the “preponderance of migrants” to radical proposals on migration.

If we just look at the highest-level voices, Tolstoy back in April proposed radically toughening the current system of labor migration, which is rather liberal, especially in relation to citizens of Eurasian Economic Union countries. The proposal would mean that a foreigner could come to Russia to work only with an already signed contract (he would not be allowed to look for a job while living in Russia), while the employer would be responsible for his return to his home country at the end of the contract and pay any expenses incurred by the state in connection with the migrant. Bringing family members and obtaining a residence permit or citizenship for such migrants would be prohibited, and movement within Russia limited.

In June, Bastrykin proposed doing without migrant workers altogether. Already in the spring, various regions began to introduce bans on professions for migrants – covering sectors like trade, education, transport (including taxis), pharmacy services, among others – a trend that continues. Deputies from the less responsible parties of the “systemic opposition” like the KPRF, A Just Russia and the LDPR also put forward their own radical proposals.

However, real legislation – that is, bills with a chance of being adopted at the federal level – turned out to be more moderate. At the end of the legislative session in late July, two laws were passed. The first expanded the list of administrative offenses for which expulsion without trial is possible, while the second essentially did not place restrictions on migration itself but made it easier to expel and deport migrants and tightened monitoring of them.

Dissatisfied with such moderation, A Just Russia and the LDPR subsequently introduced two bills – one to exile a migrant worker’s family should he be expelled or deported and another to put in place a federal ban for migrants to work in certain professions. Yet discussion of the bills will start only in the autumn – perhaps in the hope that by then the mainstream will radicalize and the legislation would have a better chance at passing than now.

The second law that was recently adopted is also interesting as it introduces restrictions on the civil rights of migrants. For example, they are not allowed to make any public demands on the authorities and must follow the whole set of “traditional values”: marriage only between a man and a woman, “the inadmissibility of distorting historical truth” about World War II and so on. Not that there is much opposition to these values among migrants. Moreover, today there are no signs that many migrants are openly protesting anything (though a scandalous report last year by Russia’s Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, or FADN, said otherwise).

The only noticeable friction may be that related to some migrants’ adherence to certain norms of Sharia law or customs accepted in their home countries and localities, though the recent law does not mention this. An educational video released by the FADN in July does talk about it, though such instructions for newcomers are not new in themselves, overall they are quite reasonable, and strange norms in them (for example, not to whisper in your native language in front of strangers) aren’t many.

In other words, the authorities are trying not to limit labor migration but to better control it – the entry and exit of migrants, as well as their impact on the labor market and to some extent on tensions in society in general.


Ideology outweighing pragmatism

At the same time, the authorities are whipping up negative sentiments toward migrants and are clearly trying to control them ideologically. There are likely two goals here. The first: migrants are probably still seen as a potential threat, and the current political regime prefers to neutralize any potential threat as much as it can and as far out as possible; the second: anti-migration rhetoric is meant to introduce into the official nationalism the idea that “Russian civilization” must be protected not only from the West, which is overly modernized, but also from the South, which is not modernized enough.



Of course, the authorities might worry about the consequences, beyond those related to the economy and the war, as discussed at the beginning of the article. For example, the growth of hate crimes, which is already quite noticeable. On the other hand, though it is rapid, the absolute numbers are not yet politically significant. The authorities might also fear localized unrest sparked by ethnically charged conflicts, like in 2013, yet there have been no such incidents thus far. The main vigilante organizations act very carefully, avoiding violence as much as they can, and when it does happen, they try to hush it up.

Finally, there is the growing political influence of independent nationalist organizations. However, for now, unlike the situation a decade ago or earlier, all nationalists, except for very small groups, are so diligently demonstrating loyalty that the authorities have no reason to worry. Of course, all these potential concerns could become serious, but for now the authorities feel free to ignore them.

To summarize, the government has at least three reasons to gradually – without making sudden moves – pursue an anti-migration campaign. The first is purely populist pandering to anti-migration sentiments, which the authorities apparently consider important for the population in general, including for political supporters of the regime. The second reason is related to this – mutually beneficial cooperation with the majority of nationalists, who are loyal to the Kremlin and the special military operation. The third is strengthening the ideology of official nationalism (Russia is a fortress under siege not only from the West) and an attempt to make this ideology more understandable for Russians.

Only in fourth place, it seems, is the task of more effectively regulating migration: cleaning things up a little would probably be useful but is hardly necessary. After all – the logic being – we have managed somehow up to this point. Taken together, these reasons for an anti-migration campaign appear to outweigh concerns about its negative consequences.